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Preface
Introduction
The dissertation argues for considering national or ethnic identity as an
important tool for conflict resolution. This is done in two steps:
1. A theoretical argument for the importance of national identity in
conflict resolution. The role of national identity is examined and
aspects that may have been overlooked are pointed out. This high-
lights the importance of identity in creating and sustaining conflict,
but also its possible role in resolving it.
2. A qualitative analysis of the use of national identity in a particular
conflict resolution setting. The analysis was developed alongside
the theoretical argument and gives examples of identity use sup-
porting conflict and conflict resolution.
As I have used a grounded theory approach (see section 3.1 on page 51)
in my dissertation this split between theory and qualitative research is not
very easy. The theories described in chapter 1 and and my integration of
the theories into a concept of investment of identity in conflict in chapter
2 have developed alongside the analysis described in chapters 3 and 4.
This process of mutual influence of analysis and theory development is at
the heart of grounded theory. In this sense my dissertation also has two
“results”: One is the theoretical view of the role of national identity in
conflict resolution, the other is the qualitative finding that national identity
is being used in a conflict resolution setting. I have chosen the current
format of the dissertation in order to keep with conventions in my field
and have separated the two aspects of my dissertation.
iii
iv Preface
Chapter 1 focuses on defining several terms central to the dissertation,
such as conflict, ethnicity, essentialism and nationalism. It looks at spe-
cific theories in social psychology, foremost social identity theory, that
can illuminate the role of identity in conflict resolution.
Chapter 2 investigates what the theories described in chapter 1 can con-
tribute to understanding large-scale conflicts and their resolution. The
chapter is the theoretical result of the grounded theory approach.
Chapter 3 describes the methodology employed in my qualitative analy-
sis of conflict resolution workshops. It provides an overview of grounded
theory, the interactive problem solving approach and the different method-
ological steps of my analysis.
Chapter 4 reports the different workshop analyses I produced during the
course of the dissertation and ends with prototypical examples for the
different uses of identity I found.
Chapter 5 summarizes the findings of both theory development and qual-
itative analysis. It also provides an outlook on possible improvements of
track-two conflict resolution efforts.
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Chapter 1
Theory
The topic and limits of this dissertation, conflict resolution in protracted
ethnic conflict, will be defined. In order to achieve this I will draw on
knowledge from the fields of social psychology, sociology and interna-
tional relations. I begin with descriptions and definitions of conflict and
ethnicity.
In this chapter I will present important theories in social psychology
that form the basis of my theoretical development in the next chapter. One
underlying assumption is that protracted ethnic conflict, due to its nature,
makes social identities salient as individuals are confronted with different
aspects of the conflict in their daily life and especially in conflict reso-
lution settings. I will draw on self-categorization theory to answer the
questions: What does this salience imply? (Section 1.2.2) In looking at
ethnic conflict one can ask: How do you get from liking your ingroup to
hating the outgroup? Both Brewer’s optimal distinctiveness theory (sec-
tion 1.2.3) and theorizing on issues of prototypicality (section 1.2.5) can
explain this link. Theories on prejudice and Just World Theory (section
1.3) can give us some answers to the question: Why do people need to
believe their leaders or engage in discrimination if the conflict is to be
upheld? How do you motivate your group to stay in conflict? In addition
I would like to look at the social psychological view that some conflict
resolvers have regarding social identity and ethnic conflict. One question
that should be answered from a social psychological perspective is: Is the
use of national or ethnic identity just coincidental or is there something
specific about these identities that other social identities may not provide?
1
2 Theory
1.1 Definitions
1.1.1 Conflict
The following definition of conflict can be found in the International en-
cyclopedia of the social & behavioral sciences (2001) under the heading
of Conflict Sociology:
When two or more social actors pursue incompatible inter-
ests they may be said to be in a relationship of conflict [. . . ]
(Crouch, 2001)
Similarly, when I hear the word conflict, I first think about something
very easy: Two people want different things and are fighting each other.
But then I start thinking that it is also something very complicated. What
are they fighting about and why are they in conflict and not just disagree-
ing or even disinterested in the other? Who is defined as “other” and
how does this construction occur? This depends probably on the kind of
conflict one is confronted with. At least three interaction levels at which
conflict can take place can be distinguished: interpersonal, intragroup and
intergroup. My own research is firmly focused on the latter as I study
protracted ethnic (i.e. intergroup) conflict.
But first let us consider what these types of conflict have in common
and how they may be distinguished from non-conflict situations. Take for
example the difference between disagreement and conflict. The aim is not
to give an exhaustive distinction between the two but rather to clarify what
I mean when I refer to conflict. In my view conflict and disagreement can
be distinguished by the degree of involvement of the concerned parties.
Conflict describes a high stake that both sides attach to the disagreement
and an increased importance (compared to “just” a disagreement) of the
outcome of any resolution. In addition conflict necessitates a view on both
sides that the goals pursued by the two sides are mutually exclusive. On-
going or protracted conflict also seems to require a belief in the righteous-
ness of one’s own demand and (as the demands are mutually exclusive)
a belief that the other’s demand is somehow wrong. If these conditions
are not fulfilled I believe that the parties will not stay in conflict but rather
accept that they have a difference of opinions or find a compromise and
move on. This suggests that conflict is not a stable state but requires an
investment on both sides in order to sustain this high-energy state of af-
fairs. In addition the situation is perceived as a zero-sum game, meaning
that if one side wins the other has to loose.
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Let’s return to the different levels of social interaction at which conflict
may occur. Laursen (2001) gives the following definition of interpersonal
and intergroup conflict1:
Interpersonal conflict describes a social interchange that is
marked by opposing goals and that involves two or more per-
sons. [. . . ] Group conflict refers to negative or incompatible
attitudes and behaviors directed by members or representa-
tives of one group toward those of another group. (Laursen,
2001)
Both are social interchanges and opposition between two entities defines
both. But the difference between the two lies in the fact that the nega-
tive behavior directed against another in the case of intergroup conflict is
directed at her because of her group membership. In addition the con-
flict can be fought between representatives of the groups on behalf of the
whole group. There is also the possibility of intragroup conflict where the
conflict is about who or what should represent the group.
A and B have opposing goals. They want di!erent things or outcomes.
!
A B
Goal: X ¬ X
Figure 1.1: Basic conflict
So, in an interpersonal conflict two people are engaged in trying to
achieve their goal to the detriment of the other as visualized in Figure 1.1.
The investment that has been made can be seen in the way that the con-
flict situation and the opposing “partner” are described. Usually inflexible
terms are being used (e.g. “S/he has always been like this”, “That’s just
the way s/he is”). In addition one’s self is seen as trying to mend the
situation but being kept from resolving the conflict successfully by the
1Text in [ ] throughout the document has been removed or added by the author to facilitate
reading.
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other, establishing moral superiority (“I have always done these things for
him/her”, “I want to resolve this but s/he does not want to do X”, “If s/he
did not insist on doing X everything would be fine”, “S/he just cannot see
that X is the case”).
Intragroup conflicts add a dimension. Here the conflict participants
are members of the same group. Their struggle to win the conflict will
involve presenting one’s self as a prototypical member and the other as
a deviant member of the ingroup, even going as far as denouncing the
other’s right to group membership (“S/he is a traitor” etc.). This kind of
conflict will not only be focused on a certain individual goal that one is
trying to achieve but also on who is correct in claiming to be representative
of a group. One can also imagine how the proposed boundaries between
individual and intragroup conflict can be blurred. In an individual conflict
situation both parties may try to convince the other of the rightfulness of
their claim by referring to a common ingroup and their values to justify
one’s own position and to discredit the other’s position. Two people in
a relationship who are in conflict can, for example accuse, each other of
being a bad parent or a bad spouse, while implicitly or explicitly stating
that they are a good parent or spouse, claiming a moral justification (you
should try to be a good parent/spouse) for their stance in the conflict.
                          Group
                            B
Group !!!!!
A !!!
A B
!
Groups can a!ord additional resources
to support and motivate con"ict.
Figure 1.2: The influence of the group on conflict
In an intergroup conflict this is drawn out onto an even bigger stage
as is demonstrated in Figure 1.2. One can imagine that a couple could
engage in a fight with a school about how to raise their child. Here two
groups (teachers and parents) are in conflict with each other and these cat-
egories can be used for the conflict. This involves stereotyping of a group
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(“Parents are neglecting their children” versus “Teachers do not have any
idea how to raise children.”). It is important to see that this conflict may
very well involve the same mechanism, of claiming superiority for one’s
own group on the dimension of being a good influence on children, as in
the case of an intragroup conflict. In ethnic conflict the stereotypes about
the other group involved, may take the form of “They cannot be trusted”,
“They only exist because of us”, “They have always behaved in hostile
ways, think of what they did to us in X”. Here it is easy to see how one’s
own (group) identity also becomes an integral part of the conflict. What
“they did to us in X” is part of the construction of one’s own identity as
the time X is usually also employed to define what it means to be part of
the ingroup. Parties in an individual conflict can also make references to
the other’s differing group membership in order to introduce prejudices
(or “attributes”) about that group, which aim at undermining the other’s
position and legitimacy.
1.1.2 Ethnicity
In order to be able to talk about the influence of national identity on the
resolution of protracted ethnic conflict the various elements need to be
defined. This is a difficult task as there are many, sometimes opposing,
definitions of ethnicity and identity. In addition the definitions vary from
discipline to discipline. The previous section concerned my view on con-
flict. In this section I would like to define the term ethnicity for use in
this dissertation. In the International encyclopedia of the social & behav-
ioral sciences under the section Ethnic Conflicts Williams (2001) defines
ethnicity as follows2:
The term [ethnicity] has been used variously to signify ‘na-
tion’, ‘race’, ‘religion’, or ‘people’, but the central generic
meaning is that of collective cultural distinctiveness.
(Williams, 2001)
Max Weber (1978/1922) developed an early definition of ethnicity:
[Ethnic groups are] those human groups that entertain a sub-
jective belief in their common descent because of similarities
2Typesetting of quotes such as quotation marks and emphasis are presented as they occur
in the original text unless otherwise noted.
6 Theory
of physical type or of customs or both, or because of mem-
ories of colonization and migration; this belief must be im-
portant for the propagation of group formation; conversely, it
does not matter whether or not an objective blood relation-
ship exists. (Weber, 1978/1922)
It becomes clear that ethnicity is not easily defined. Even if it is de-
scribed in terms of a race or a people it is evident that ethnicity is not
explainable by blood relationships. But also the definition of ethnicity as
a group of people that share a culture is not sufficient. Devreux (1975)
called ethnic behavior ‘dissociative’ as it is not actually prompted by past
tradition but is informed by a contrastive and presentist strategy of oppo-
sition of one ethnic group against another. Barth (1969) saw the value of
ethnicity in the ‘ethnic boundary that defines the group, not the cultural
stuff it encloses’. So what does this leave us with? A helpful definition
of nation is given by Anderson (1983), who defines the nation as being an
“imagined political community” (p. 15). This emphasizes the constructed
nature of national identity and ethnicity. If identity is constructed to serve
a purpose it should not surprise us that there may be different and com-
peting identity versions for the same social group: for example, a liberal
versus a conservative view of what a specific nation should look like and
stand for.
Ben-Rafael (2001) points out that different versions of the same iden-
tity either employ distinct symbols or attach contrasted meanings to the
same symbols; although different, they “broadly, though not exclusively,
draw these symbols, which are theirs, from the same ‘store’ — myths of
descendancy, time-honored customs, and sanctified objects.” (p. 4839)
But as Reicher and Hopkins (1996, 2001) have demonstrated, even pro-
ponents of the same version of identity, or even the same person, can use
the same myths in very different ways depending on the situation and the
goal they have within that situation.
Hardin (2001) argues that mystification is required for nationalism,
quoting Ernest Renan as saying that “one can be committed to the right-
ness and purity of a nation only by forgetting its brutal and messy past”
(p. 7167).
So what groups are we talking about? One good starting point is what
Geertz (1967) calls “candidates of nationhood". In political science the
protracted ethnic conflicts I am focusing on are usually assumed to be
situated in what has been termed weak statehoods or second and third
wave democracies. These candidates of nationhood can be described as
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communalistic groups that share a common culture or identity either by
self-definition or definition of others. The groups are usually not restricted
with regard to gender, age etc. and show signs of class, status and other
stratifications. A common origin or descend is usually claimed by an
ethny (Williams, 2001) as mentioned above.
What characterizes ethnicity in relation to protracted conflicts? Bös
(2004) gives the following basic characteristics for the content of the iden-
tity of these candidates for nationhood. They are a group of people who
imagine themselves as having a common descent and (political) fate. The
group is characterized by the use of cultural patterns as group markers
and a totalizing of that identity, which means that all aspects of life are
influenced by that identity. In addition there is also a universalization of
identity. The question is if this universality is a consequence of a natural
human tendency of essentializing ethnic groups or a process of ingroup
projection. Conflict can be deemed (in a broad definition) ethnic if either
the actors are defined in ethnic terms and/or the object of the conflict is
recognition as an ethnic group and/or the conflict began with ethnic vio-
lence and/or the conflict leads to an ethnization of the actors and/or the
conflict is being regulated in terms of ethnicity. Kelman (1997b, p. 335)
clearly states that “national identity is the psychological underpinning of
national self-determination; that is, establishment of an independent state
and other forms of self-determination are attempts to give political expres-
sion to a group’s national identity.”
Identity reflects the state of mind of an individual toward his or her
social community. It represents a process of discovering and generating
a consciousness toward one’s environment, a social assertion of the self
as being somebody in the world. The function of national identity is de-
scribed by Kelman (1997b, p. 327) as follows: “Ethnonational identity
groups are the primary entities through which basic human needs—the
societal needs of individuals—are met.” Through such an identity the in-
dividual locates and defines him- or herself in the world, acquiring a col-
lective personality based on shared values, experiences and orientations.
As with the political culture, subjective orientations of the population give
meaning to the overarching structural setting. Images of nations, of one’s
own as well as foreign nations, are common and widespread in society
and politics. Wuthe (1987) described the national community as the in-
dispensable link between the general mass of human beings and familiar
local and regional governments.
Staab (1998) formulates a good definition of national identity, which
captures the importance of emotional attachment in the context of forming
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a national identity by the two German countries in the recently reunified
Germany:
The nation represents a prominent object for people’s emo-
tional attachment and provides the scope for the individual’s
search for definition and location within the world. National
identity levels individuality and emphasizes communality,
whereas the nation forges common loyalties and emotional
attachments out of a heterogeneous mass of individuals. Na-
tional identity rests on common values that are born out of a
shared past and a shared vision of the future. As such, the
nation blends two fundamentally different sets of principles.
(p. 11)
1.1.3 Ethnicity and Conflict
What do I consider to be an ethnic conflict in this dissertation? It is a
conflict in which the aspect of ethnicity has been politicized in order to
achieve a political goal. Conflict is different from other group settings.
So what makes the use of ethnicity different from using other identities in
conflict? It seems that using ethnic or national identity in conflict has spe-
cific meaning for the development of conflict and effects on the process
of conflict. Williams (2001) states that ethnicity, when rendered highly
salient, provides an attractive base for political entrepreneurs. Similarly
Gagnon Jr (1994) states that long-ago wrongs are effective instigators of
today’s conflict only when reactivated and politicized, often as the prod-
uct of elites’ manipulation. Gurr (1993) describes main factors that fa-
vor group conflict, including strong identity, inequalities and grievances,
political opportunity structures allowing mobilization, provocative state
policies, and international contagion and diffusion. Williams (2001) points
out that many ethnic conflicts develop into protracted warfare because one
party believes that another seeks total and irreversible domination. He
concludes that fear of extinction is far more common in protracted ethnic
conflicts than previously recognized.
In conflict resolution research on protracted conflict scholars, such
as Burton (1987), distinguish between conflicts that focus primarily on
resources and those that focus on identity. But Lederach (1997) points
out that protracted conflicts tend to become (if they did not already start
out as) identity-based, such that two-thirds of the world’s conflicts at that
time could be defined as identity conflicts. In Coleman’s overview in
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the Handbook of conflict resolution (P. T. Coleman, 2000) these identity-
based conflicts end up being experienced as lose-lose conflicts in which
the alternative to continued fighting is annihilation. Coleman contrasts
what he describes as intractable (or protracted) conflicts with manageable
conflicts. The characteristics he lists, which are different for protracted
conflicts, include issue centrality (needs or values), pervasiveness of the
conflict, hopelessness, motivation to harm, and resistance to resolution.
As Burgess and Burgess (1996) put it in their description of three types of
issues leading to intractable conflict, irreconcilable moral differences lead
to a protracted conflict. Fisher and Keashley (1990) describe that, with
the escalation of conflict, issues of conflict become more focused on basic
needs or values and ultimately on the very survival of the parties. In their
model this is described as the fourth stage of conflict escalation, destruc-
tion. Pruitt (2001) states that “another unique aspect of groups is the role
of leadership. Leaders and would-be leaders often dramatize frustration at
the hands of other groups, exacerbating conflicts while strengthening their
position with their constituents.” (p. 2531) J. Z. Rubin, Pruitt, and Kim
(1994) observe that escalation is often accompanied by other changes:
“issues proliferate, negative attitudes and partisan perceptions develop,
distrust sets in, goals change from doing well for one’s self to hurting the
other party, and broader communities polarize into hostile camps.” J. S.
Coleman (1957) remarks that these kinds of changes outlive the conflict
in which they are generated, hurting the broader relationship between the
parties and making the next conflict episode more likely to escalate.
In summary in the cited descriptions and definitions ethnic conflict
is characterized by a resistance to resolution, a motivation to harm the
outgroup and a pervasiveness of conflict in everyday life. In chapter 2 I
will give an argument why protracted conflict takes on these properties.
1.1.4 Essentialism and constructionism
Both the essentialist and the constructionist perspective are important for
the study of national identity in conflict resolution. I see national identity
to be both essentialized and constructed. Essentialism, on the one hand,
can explain why many people tend to readily respond to and use ethnic
or national markers as group boundaries. Constructionism, on the other
hand, is an important perspective in comprehending the changing nature
of what nations stand for, believe of themselves and ultimately to make
sense of political processes within a nation that may change the outlook
of a whole nation. A constructionist perspective also enables us in the
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realm of conflict resolution to look for alternative ways of resolving or
transforming conflict.
Reicher and Hopkins (2001) impressively demonstrate in the context
of Scottish politics the constructed nature of national identity. Opposing
political parties and political projects (favoring the Union with Britain or
advocating Scottish independence) both use the same myths and heroes
and employ them to opposing political ends. Even the same politician in
different contexts can use the same myths in opposing ways. They demon-
strate that entrepreneurs of identity are able to adapt their construction of
national identity to different social situations. In addition it becomes ob-
vious that the so-called “essence of Scottishness” (such as, for example,
tolerance) can be constructed as being the essence of independence and
union with Britain.
But how could one question the reality of suicide attacks being carried
out in the name of Palestinians against Israelis and claim that the fear of
such attacks and its reminder of the Holocaust are just constructions? Or
the other way around, how could one argue that the daily experiences of
Palestinians under occupation and the feelings of powerlessness, despair,
and injustice to the Palestinian people are just constructed? I believe it is
important to have an understanding of how national identity in protracted
conflicts is shaped by essentialist views on a day-to-day basis. So how can
one make the case for looking at identity as a real-time constructionist pro-
cess without losing touch with “reality” and failing to take the subjective
experience of people belonging to a nation into account?
Gil-White (2001) describes his understanding of what an essentialist
view of ethnicity is as the “hypothesis that ethnies (and similar social cate-
gories) are processed by the machinery which evolved to deal specifically
with “natural living kinds” of the “folk-species” rank-level such as BEAR
and MOUSE. Other social categories will typically not be processed in this
way.” (p. 516) This implies that humans have an innate tendency to per-
ceive different ethnies as differing from one another in the same way as a
mouse is different from a bear. I would not follow this argument as far as
this but he makes a good case as to why it is advantageous in everyday life
to essentialize ethnies. Perceiving ethnies as more or less natural living
kinds gives a good guidance as to whom one should trust immediately in
day-to-day interactions. In that sense it is advantageous to our survival if
we process individuals as belonging to certain categories. But I am not
convinced that this is the only response we can have towards ethnies. Gil-
White is also conscious of the tension between the constructed nature of
ethnic identity and every day essentialized representations when he states
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that “constructivists often appear to confuse the fact of ethnic-group con-
struction with a consciousness by ethnic actors of such constructive pro-
cesses.” (p. 516) Again I do not believe that this makes it necessary to
assume that the only way humans can perceive ethnic groups is in an es-
sentialized way. Ethnic entrepreneurs, for example, may not always be
aware of the constructed nature of ethnicity but that does not make it im-
possible for actors to become conscious of this fact and integrate it in their
actions. Gil-White (2001, p. 518) even gives a very good argument, albeit
unintentionally, for a constructionist perspective, when he states that “dif-
ferent equilibria [of interactional norms] are possible because, for many
domains, that [sic!] all members follow the same rules is vastly more im-
portant than their specific content.” So having an essentialized view of
a large social category is advantageous for the establishment of interac-
tional norms but does not necessarily imply that essentialized processing
is the only way to view these categories.
Recent research in psychology on essentialism (Haslam, Bastian, Bain,
& Kashima, 2006; Demoulin, Leyens, & Yzberbyt, 2006) has focused on
the structure and use of lay theories of essentialism. This focus underlines
that essentialism is seen as a real-world phenomenon that influences indi-
viduals’ perceptions of and behavior toward their environment when con-
fronted with social groups. Demoulin et al. (2006) demonstrate that social
categories can vary not only in the degree to which they are essentialized
but similarly essential categories can differ in their perceived natural kind-
ness and entitativity. Demoulin et al. demonstrate that forced social cat-
egories, which are categories whose membership is imposed upon group
members (such as gender), tend to be essentialized by being perceived
more as natural kinds, while chosen social groups, where membership is
dependent on group members’ personal choice, are essentialized more in
terms of entitativity. Haslam et al. (2006) try to integrate research on im-
plicit person theories into a broader concept of essentialism. Haslam et al.
give evidence for the importance of essentialism for understanding in- and
outgroup attitudes. For the concept of infra-humanization (Leyens et al.,
2003) this implies, for example, that infra-humanization of an outgroup
only occurs if the ingroup is seen as an essentialized category. Haslam
et al. go on to highlight the importance of essentialism as a concept that
includes beliefs of immutability, discreteness, informativeness and the ex-
istence of a biological basis as characteristic of an essentialized group. In
this research it also becomes evident that essentialism is not necessar-
ily negative as it can provide help for low-status or minority groups to
support progressive views of social order and change. Research on es-
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sentialism has gained momentum over the last years that give us a better
understanding of the cognitive, attitudinal and behavioral implications of
essentializing social categories. This is different from claiming that a cer-
tain social category actually has, for example, a biological foundation that
necessarily makes category boundaries immutable. The difference be-
tween understanding lay theories of essentialism and reflecting upon the
“real” constructionist process of creating social categories is important.
Too often the existence of essentialist beliefs is confused with an essential
nature in a scientific sense of social categories.
Reicher and Hopkins (2001), in my opinion, demonstrate clearly that
social actors are constructing ethnic or national identity on a day to day
basis, while Gil-White (2001) rightfully points to the fact that this does
not necessarily imply their own consciousness about that construction and
even less that of their audiences. He also points out that ethnic identities
are “constructed with ideologies of descent-based membership that con-
strain the constructive process.” (p. 519) This is important as we think
about what a change in identity to support conflict resolution could look
like. So it may not be necessary to believe that ethnic or national iden-
tity is either a constructed or an essential category. It is both. Depending
on the perspective it is a constructed identity, which is at the same time
essential in everyday use. In fact, I believe that the power of national or
ethnic identity lies in the fact that it is both. It is possible to change na-
tional identity, which is a constructionist process. The huge impact that
this change may have, is based on the essentialist perception of national
identity by group members.
I would like to end this section by quoting Kelman (1997b, p. 336)
on the duality of the essentialist and constructionist nature of national
identity:
Empirically, national identity is a psychological conception,
which cannot be dictated or prescribed by outsiders. [. . . ]
On the other hand, however, how a group defines itself often
has significant consequences for others. The moment a group
acts on the self-definition of its nationhood [. . . ] its chosen
identity has an impact on the interest, rights, and identity of
other groups. [. . . ] The social construction of the identity
implies a degree of arbitrariness and flexibility in the way
the identity is composed [. . . ]. These choices depend on the
opportunities and necessities provided by the elites that are
engaged in mobilizing ethnonational consciousness for their
political, economic, or religious purposes.
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1.1.5 Bad versus good nationalism?
If we only look at nationalism and thus national identity as something bad
we may miss the point. Reicher and Hopkins (2001) make this point by
showing how different concepts of national identity can be employed by
different entrepreneurs of identity or even by the same in different circum-
stances. Even within the very bad situation of protracted ethnic conflict,
nationalism is not in itself evil, only to the extent that it supports sustain-
ing violent conflict at all costs. National identity has a function and is
being used to attain the goal of supporting conflict. If one wants to re-
solve conflict, one has to use the same mechanisms and therefore change
national identity to fit the project of conflict resolution. That idea is only
feasible if national identity in itself is not viewed as bad. Mummendey,
Klink, and Brown (2001) looked at the relation between a positive feel-
ing toward one’s ingroup and negative feelings or derogation toward an
outgroup. They found that “national identification and ingroup evaluation
only show a reliable relationship with outgroup rejection if the judgments
are based upon an intergroup comparison but not so if based on temporal
comparisons or in control conditions” (p. 168). This means that if a focus
is put on comparing the ingroup favorably to an outgroup that outgroup is
derogated, while a focus on a positive evaluation of the ingroup through
a favorable comparison to the same ingroup in the past does not lead to
outgroup derogation but still provides for a positive view of the ingroup.
Mummendey et al. (2001) relate this finding to the concepts of blind and
constructive patriotism (Staub, 1997), seeing judgments based on inter-
group comparisons as blind patriotism and temporal judgments as con-
structive patriotism. A similar distinction is that between nationalism and
patriotism (Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989) with patriotism as a good use
of social identity and nationalism as a bad use. I believe that in analyzing
protracted ethnic conflict it might be more helpful to consider these differ-
ent relationships between ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation as
a function of the content of national identity that is constructed. Showing
different possibilities in imagining national identity can open the door to
changing national identity from supporting conflict to supporting conflict
resolution. Judging the nationalism one finds in protracted ethnic conflict
as immoral or bad does not help to understand the motivational impact the
current national identity has on the conflict and can discredit the conflict
parties as being bad. This would be contrary to efforts that try to involve
conflict parties in order to resolve the conflict.
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1.2 Social Identity
The social identity approach (see for example Wagner & Zick, 1990)
consists of several theories and concepts. The concept of social identi-
ties was first developed by Tajfel (1978) and Tajfel and Turner (1979) as
an explanation for effects found in studies based on the minimal group
paradigm (Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971). Turner (1987a) fur-
ther expanded social identity theory into self-categorization theory. Ad-
ditional work by Brewer (1991) on the concept of optimal distinctiveness
and Mummendey and Wenzel (1999) on prototypicality has further elabo-
rated the concept of social identity. These will be covered in the following
subsections. Gartner’s work on reducing intergroup conflict (Gaertner &
Dovidio, 2000), while linked to social identity theory, will be covered
separately in section 1.4.
1.2.1 Social identity theory
One can summarize Social Identity Theory (SIT) established by Tajfel &
Turner (Tajfel, 1974, 1981; Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner, 1987a) as fol-
lows: an individual wants to establish and uphold positive self-esteem;
this self-esteem is in part derived from an individual’s social identities;
social identity is said to provide positive self-esteem through belonging
to a positively valued group; the valuation of the group is achieved by
comparing the ingroup to other important groups. SIT posits that there
exists a continuum between personal identity and social identity. Depend-
ing on context an individual will define himself somewhere along that
continuum. In the minimal group paradigm Tajfel et al. (1971) demon-
strated that individuals have a tendency to favor their ingroup when al-
locating resources. Tajfel (1978) argues that this ingroup favoritism oc-
curs because individuals seek to promote their group’s status, and through
that their own self-esteem, in comparison to an outgroup. The minimal
group paradigm also demonstrated that ingroup favoritism already occurs
when an individual is randomly assigned to one of two groups, is aware
of the randomness, does not know any ingroup or outgroup member, and
is distributing resources to these anonymous ingroup and outgroup mem-
bers without any benefit to himself. In other words, individuals may act
in terms of their social identity even if that social identity is a random
assignment. The minimal group paradigm also implies that there is no
strong reason for the individual to act in terms of their individual iden-
tity. The relationship between individual and group identity within SIT is
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described in terms of salience. Turner (1987b) in his self-categorization
theory further explains the conditions of salience as we will see in section
1.2.2.
Another aspect of social identity is its theorizing on group action. If
there are status differences between two groups, these can be described
in terms of perceived legitimacy of the difference and the permeability of
group boundaries. If the boundaries are perceived to be permeable and the
status difference is perceived to be legitimate, individuals who belong to
the lower-status group can improve their social status and their self-esteem
by trying to move up into the higher-status group. If the group boundaries
are not permeable this option is not open to a group member. If the rela-
tionship between the two groups is perceived to be legitimate, the status
quo will continue to exist. If on the other hand the relationship is per-
ceived to be illegitimate by the lower-status group there is a possibility for
group action if the individual members cannot exit the low-status group
(impermeable boundaries). One possibility is to change the comparison
dimension between the two groups so that the lower-status group com-
pares more favorably with the higher-status group. Lower-status group
members call this an act of creativity. If this is not possible or not de-
sirable the lower-status group can engage in a direct confrontation over
group status with the higher-status group. This is the case when we deal
with protracted identity-based conflict. In order for a low-status group
to mobilize, active group members have to perceive a certain degree of
group efficacy. They have to believe that collective action has a possibil-
ity to change the current relationship between the two groups.
1.2.2 Self-categorization theory
One central assumption of self-categorization theory (SCT) is that indi-
viduals derive part of their self-concept from their membership in social
categories, that is their self-categorization (Turner, 1987b). These self-
categories vary in their degree of inclusiveness and are hierarchically re-
lated to each other, in that social categories are compared to each other on
the basis of their shared next more inclusive category. SCT also assumes
that self-categories tend to be positively evaluated. This is equivalent to
having or maintaining a positive social identity in social identity theory.
As Turner (1987b, p. 48) put it “The comparison of different stimuli de-
pends upon their categorization as identical (the same, similar) at a higher
level of abstraction, and takes place on dimensions that define their higher
level identity”.
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Mummendey and Wenzel (1999) stress this point when they state that
“the superordinate identity thus implies the relevant dimensions for com-
parison. It also implies the value connotations of the dimensions” (p.
164). The value connotations are implied in the prototype for the posi-
tively valued superordinate category to which both ingroup and outgroup
are compared. So the ingroup will be more positively evaluated than an
outgroup if it is perceived by the evaluator to be more prototypical of the
superordinate category. Ingroup favoritism described in social identity
theory can be described as a function of perceived prototypicality of the
ingroup in relation to some salient outgroup for the category that contains
both the ingroup and the outgroup. As Mummendey and Wenzel put it,
“the concept of relative prototypicality on valued dimensions of the inclu-
sive category corresponds to SIT’s concept of positive distinctiveness” (p.
164).
According to Turner’s self-categorization theory (Turner, 1987b), if
and when a given social identity becomes salient depends on fit and readi-
ness. Personal variables describe the readiness of an individual to perceive
a given situation in terms of a social identity and the situational context
describes how well that situation fits or lends itself to a perception in terms
of a social identity. Depending on fit and readiness one will perceive cer-
tain situations in group terms. Self-categorization theory also postulates
that when this happens there is a functional antagonism, which renders
other possible identities less salient and influences the perception of a
situation in terms of the salient group identity. This means that on a cog-
nitive level we start to process information in terms of group membership
accentuating the social categories in a given situation. It also leads us to
selective and biased information that helps us support a positive view of
our social identity. These mechanisms are important in understanding the
pervasiveness of protracted conflict in the identities of conflict parties. It
is a circle of information selection and augmented salience of the conflict
identity that supports the existence of protracted conflict.
1.2.3 Optimal distinctiveness
Brewer (1991) describes her understanding of social identity as follows:
“[. . . ] social identity derives from a fundamental tension be-
tween human needs for validation and similarity to others
(on the one hand) and a countervailing need for uniqueness
and individuation (on the other) [. . . ] Social identity can be
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viewed as a compromise between assimilation and differenti-
ation from others, where the need for deindividuation is sat-
isfied within in-groups, while the need for distinctiveness is
met through intergroup comparisons. (p. 477)”
In explaining why individuals may link part of their self-esteem to a
group Brewer (1991) posits in her optimal distinctiveness theory two so-
cial motives, inclusion and differentiation. Social identities are therefore
a result of a need for inclusion and differentiation. Social identities fulfill
both needs by offering an identity that links an individual to other group
members (inclusion) and at the same time provides a differentiation by
contrasting the ingroup with a relevant outgroup.
Brewer (2001) argues that the effect of “ingroup love”, that is ingroup
favoritism, does not necessarily imply “outgroup hate” or discrimination.
As an example she cites Mummendey and colleagues’ (Mummendey et
al., 1992; Mummendey & Otten, 1998) findings that a shift from dis-
tributing positive outcomes to negative ones reduces the ingroup bias.
Mummendey and Otten (1998) stress that the difference may stem from
the normative difficulty to harm others instead of “just” benefiting the in-
group. Benefiting the ingroup is normative in the sense of being a “good”
member, so in distributing positive outcomes favoring the ingroup should
be the norm. But harming the other is not in itself normative for a group
member as it lacks justification if it does not benefit the ingroup. If a justi-
fication, as to why harming the other benefits the ingroup, is given a group
member should be expected to harm the other in order to help support the
ingroup. This harm is then not seen as distributing negative consequences
but just(ly) withholding positive benefits.
Brewer (2001) argues that in order for outgroup hate to occur interests
of ingroup and outgroup first need to be perceived as being in conflict,
with each other. This is an important condition for justifying harming
the other group. Framing group goals as opposed and mutually exclusive
to those of another group serves this purpose. It provides the perception
of conflict (opposition of goals) and a justification for harming the other
(mutual exclusivity of goals). The goals of both parties are framed in
such a way that if one group wants to achieve X the other group will
have to give up their goal for it. We will see that reversing this zero-
sum perception of conflict is an important goal of the interactive problem
solving approach and other conflict resolution efforts.
The content of identity can provide an answer to the question why
national identity seems to be such a force in protracted conflict. National
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identity seems to be an especially inclusive identity that includes almost
everybody one knows as a member and extends a sense of shared identity
to many people a person is going to meet in daily life. In addition national
identity also includes myths of a shared past and common fate. These
myths usually refer to outgroups that are different to the ingroup (“not
like us”), have threatened the ingroup in the past or, in the case of conflict,
are threatening the ingroup. In this way national identity can also provide
distinctiveness. A perceived threat posed by an outgroup can provide the
grounds for considering the ingroup to be “good” while allowing for the
dehumanization of the other (see also section 1.3.1). As Brewer (2001)
argues identification with the group has to be established before a group
member will act in a hostile way towards members of an outgroup. This
is one explanation for the difficulty to mobilize a large group for political
action but also provides a rationale for using nationalism or ethnicity as a
political tool as it is a readily available, wide-spread identity, which has a
history of discourse in society, and usually is framed in essentialist terms,
all important aspects in mobilizing a constituency for political action.
National identity seems to be a prime candidate to serve the purpose of
having an identity that is optimally distinctive as it includes a large group
with a (constructed) shared fate while being very distinct from other na-
tions. How do you get to perceive a conflict in zero-sum terms? This
can only happen if the other can be construed as threatening the very ex-
istence of one’s group. So, in terms of SIT, the distinction between the
two groups has to be highly valued for both and the group’s status per-
ceived to be illegitimate and changeable, which allows for a perception of
group efficacy and collective action. The next section focuses on issues of
mobilizing individuals to participate in group action.
1.2.4 Politicized identity
Simon and Klandermans (2001) define the notion of a politicized collec-
tive identity as a social identity that revolves around the following triads:
an individual must act as a member of a social group, this group needs
to be involved in a power struggle, and this power struggle is about con-
trol in the wider societal context. To illustrate this process Simon and
Klandermans use the case of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Here politi-
cization of identity means that individuals have to act as Palestinians or
Israelis in a given situation rather then acting as, say, parents or in terms
of other identities. The power struggle between the two groups is, among
many other things, about being recognized as states, achieving security
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for their nation or ethnicity, and changing or maintaining the power bal-
ance respectively. In this process both sides appeal (and have appealed)
to an overarching notion of nation state, their right to self-determination
and self-defense, and involve third parties such as the US, Arab states,
UN, and the EU. Ethnicity and national identity are important in getting
as much support as possible, in justifying their continued social action,
and in appealing to third parties.
Simon and Klandermans (2001) distinguish five functions or needs
that collective identity serves: belongingness, distinctiveness, respect, un-
derstanding, and agency. Ethnic identity seems to be a very good candi-
date to fulfill these functions in a protracted conflict. Section 1.2.3 already
described the first two needs. Ethnicity can be construed, through the use
of myths such as blood ties amongst members, to create a sense of belong-
ingness for a large group of people, while, through using the same idea of
different bloodlines, maintaining a strong distinction from other groups.
The need for respect from others, served by belonging to a group and
being a respected member of that group, is described by Simon and Klan-
dermans as a necessary precondition for self-respect and self-esteem. Un-
derstanding is served through social identity by providing a perspective or
frame of reference from which the world can be understood. A member’s
perception of a group’s agency is important to achieve the group’s goal
and a member can also count on social support from other group mem-
bers. All of these needs combine to form a politicized collective identity.
Special about the politicization is that “politics is typically defined as the
constrained use of power by people over other people” and “that politi-
cized collective identity can be understood as a form of collective identity
that underlies group members’ explicit motivations to engage in such a
power struggle” (Simon & Klandermans, 2001, p. 323). This process un-
folds through an awareness of shared grievances, which are then blamed
on an external enemy and finally the group seeks the involvement of a
third party or the larger society. The creation of a movement for self-
determination follows this path by basing the claim of shared grievances
in a specific version of history that usually already includes another to be
blamed for the group’s predicament. A full-fledged national movement
appeals to the larger group insofar as they present a “self-evident” right to
nationhood just as all the other nations in the world.
In addition Simon and Klandermans (2001) note that there are sev-
eral psychological processes, which operate in the service of collective
identity. Stereotyping and self-stereotyping are employed by individu-
als at the cognitive level when they process information based on their
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collective identity, which has its correspondence in conformity at the be-
havioral level. Threats to a collective identity entail prejudice processes
at the affective level and discrimination at the behavioral level (Duckitt,
2003). Citing work by Mummendey and Wenzel (1999) on prototypical-
ity, Simon and Klandermans point out that in conflict “each group can
be expected to strive for hegemony, claiming that their own position is
or should be prototypical or normative for that more inclusive “ingroup”,
whereas the position of the other group is discredited as beyond the lati-
tude of general acceptance.”
Why do people engage in conflict and stay there? How do they do
it? Social identity theory predicts that people engage in collective ac-
tion if they perceive their group as disadvantaged, group boundaries as
non-permeable, and the current structure as illegitimate. In addition a
perception of high efficacy of group action compared to individual ac-
tion can support collective action. But what motivates an individual to
participate in a social movement that is getting underway? In several
studies on different groups in the US and Germany (Simon et al., 1998;
Stürmer, Simon, Loewy, & Jörger, 2003; Stürmer & Simon, 2004) Simon
and Stürmer have shown that willingness to participate and actual par-
ticipation is influenced by two independent pathways. The first is based
on cost–benefit calculations, usually researched in social movement re-
search, the second is based on collective identification. Identification is
an independent pathway that predicts participation in social movements
in addition to, not in interaction with, cost–benefit calculations. In ad-
dition Stürmer and Simon (2004) found that, with the development of a
fierce conflict, identification with the broader recruitment category, which
had not been a unique predictor for movement participation, can politicize
to such an extent that it also becomes a strong predictor. That means that
identification with the group in itself can motivate participation in a move-
ment independently of the perceived costs and benefits. If a movement is
framed in terms of a group identity that is pervasive and with which indi-
viduals can easily identify, such as an ethnic identity, individuals can be
motivated to participate in the movement even if the cost–benefit relation
is negative, as for example it could be the case for Palestinians. Even more
to the point, Stürmer and Simon (2004) found that, with the development
of a fierce conflict, identification with the broader recruitment category
(in our example all Palestinians, in the case of Stürmer and Simon gays)
could politicize identity to such an extent that it becomes a strong pre-
dictor in addition to the usual correlation between identification with the
movement, for example the PLO, and movement participation. This is
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strong evidence for the pervasiveness of conflict, which can turn formerly
uninvolved bystanders into active supporters of a movement. Here again
we can see how a formerly diverse social identity, such as being Palesti-
nian, can become a rigid identity that supports conflict, such as the PLO
as a representative of all Palestinians. This is evidenced by the list of
needs and fears, which can be found in section 4.2.2, where the PLO as
representatives of the Palestinian people finds its way into the needs stated
before the declaration of principles in 1993.
1.2.5 Ingroup projection
Mummendey and Wenzel (1999) describe the process of ingroup projec-
tion as “pronouncing the positions and attributes of the ingroup to be pro-
totypical for the inclusive category” (p. 164). In doing so the “ingroup
claims to be the more prototypical and thus superior subgroup, compared
to the relevant outgroup.” (p. 165) Social discrimination implies not only
a favoritism of the ingroup by perceiving it to be more prototypical of
the superordinate category but differences with regard to the outgroup can
also be perceived as a challenge to the ingroup’s position in the inclu-
sive category. If both groups are seen to be included in a more abstract
social category the outgroup’s difference challenges the positive value of
the ingroup’s norms and will be evaluated negatively. So “differing out-
groups in the inclusive category, for whom these norms should also apply,
are considered nonnormative and inferior and their positions are deemed
false.” (Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999, p. 165)
There is a conflict over the adequate social categorization itself; so-
cial discrimination is the secondary phenomenon. This disagreement or
conflict is essential for the phenomenon of social discrimination. If the
groups agree on the relative prototypicality of either group for a consensu-
ally evaluated inclusive category, then a different evaluation of the groups
is not experienced as social discrimination. Turner (1987b, p. 58):
On the contrary, one’s personal self may compare unfavor-
ably with other ingroup members in terms of a positively val-
ued ingroup self-category, and an ingroup category may be
perceived less favorably than an outgroup in terms of one’s
definition of ideal human beings.
The important conclusion is that a disagreement on prototypicality be-
tween the two groups involved is the essence of social discrimination,
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potentially resulting from the reciprocal process of projecting ingroup at-
tributes onto the inclusive category. Mummendey and Wenzel (1999) il-
lustrate the derogation of the outgroup very well using the case of a split
in one group and describe derogation as “based on an ethnocentric gener-
alization of ingroup attributes through their projection onto the formerly
common ingroup, which remains the inclusive background”.
In order to illustrate the concept of prototypicality and how it concerns
intergroup relation we can use Germans and Italians as examples for pro-
totypical Europeans. In comparing their ingroup to a superordinate group,
here Europeans for Germans and Italians, both groups tend to project their
own ingroup as being prototypical for the superordinate group. What does
that do in case of a conflict over what it means to be European? It allows
for an upholding of group differences, with both groups claiming to be
the better Europeans. This is part of the struggle to define what a social
category means. Prototypical members signify the content of the social
category. So in this case, Germans might claim that a prototypical Eu-
ropean should be well organized, hard working and frugal, attributes on
which Germans are more prototypical than Italians, while Italians might
claim that the prototypical European should be cultured, have a savoir
vivre, be passionate and so on. By competing over the definition of a pro-
totypical European the assumed conflict between Germans and Italians
would include and express itself through the supraordinate identity.
As Brewer (2001) (see also section 1.2.3) stated, there will be no dis-
crimination unless there is legitimacy. How can ingroup projection pro-
vide legitimacy to discriminate against another group? Legitimacy can be
derived from the projected prototype for the superordinate category which
the ingroup is seen to conform to and the outgroup deviates from. Depend-
ing on what is being defined as a prototypical “ought”, rules change within
the larger group. This normative aspect makes it possible to legitimize
discrimination against the outgroup if the ingroup norm is postulated as
prototypical for the superordinate group and the outgroup norm deviates
from one’s ingroup position. If a prototypical member is religious and
concerned with family values, then any member that wants to or has to
belong to the group ought to be a family person and religious. So a strug-
gle to be more prototypical for an inclusive category than the outgroup can
also lead to changes in norms for the ingroup as the pressure to conform
to ingroup norms is increased for group members, which is something
that can be observed in parties to protracted conflict. What is especially
important here is that prototypicality also adds a normative aspect to the
social identity. If, on the other hand an outgroup is deemed not to be part
1.2 Social Identity 23
of the superordinate category, tolerance should be the result. But the ex-
clusion of an outgroup from a superordinate category, especially if this
should be the category of being human, may also lead to a withholding of
rights from the outgroup, in the case of being human to a dehumanization
of the outgroup.
1.2.6 Critical reflections on SIT
Social identity theory has been criticized from various directions and in
various aspects. Brown (2000) summarizes the biggest problems and chal-
lenges facing Social Identity Theory. According to Brown, there are four
major areas of criticism.
First, the self-esteem hypothesis put forth in SIT can be separated
into to parts: first, positive intergroup differentiation should result in ele-
vated self-esteem, and second, people with initially depressed self-esteem
should show more differentiation in order to restore it to ‘normal’ lev-
els. Brown (2000) points out that these two aspects of self-esteem have
not received unequivocal support, the first hypothesis fared better than the
second (M. Rubin & Hewstone, 1998, reported that 9 out of 12 studies
and 3 out of 19 studies supported the assumed relation). Brown argues
that the weak and inconsistent correlation between intergroup differen-
tiation and self-esteem may be attributable to social desirability factors.
In addition the hypothesized link faired much better when implicit rather
than explicit measures of self-esteem were used. Farnham, Greenwald,
and Banaji (1999) showed that there was a social desirability not to ex-
press too much or too little self-esteem and too much intergroup deroga-
tion. Brown (2000) concludes that the motivational role of self-esteem
in producing outgroup derogation should be de-emphasized and increased
self-esteem should rather be seen as by-product of discrimination. He also
proposes that an increase in self-esteem could be due to the reduction of
uncertainty associated with outgroup derogation.
The second challenge of concern for SIT focuses on the so-called
positive-negative asymmetry. SIT processes may only be applicable to
discrimination and favoritism in the positive domain. Mummendey and
Otten (1998) advanced three possible explanations for this phenomenon: a
normative explanation, a cognitive explanation and an explanation focus-
ing on recategorization. The most influential explanation is recategoriza-
tion. Mummendey and Otten argue that, when individuals are faced with
unusual and undesirable negative distributions this creates a perception of
a common fate among them and former outgroup members, recategorizing
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them as ingroup members and leading to no discrimination. According to
this recategorization account, the reason why discrimination with nega-
tive outcomes reappears with minority or low-status ingroups is that such
conditions make it more difficult for the recategorization to occur due to
the heightened salience usually associated with such groups. Another ex-
planation was provided by Reynolds, Turner, and Haslam (2000). They
argue that people may resist seeing themselves in a negative light, which
would decrease the ‘normative fit’ of categories when negative outcomes
are to be distributed. The finding that the asymmetry disappeared when
fit and valence were controlled for supported this explanation.
Thirdly, the effect of intergroup similarity is ambivalent as similarity
can create both less and more bias. The increase in outgroup bias is more
consistent with SIT predictions. Brewer’s optimal distinctiveness theory
(Brewer, 1991; see also section 1.2.3) holds that there is a trade off be-
tween the needs for inclusion and distinction for individuals in choosing
and constructing social identities, which may also operate at a group level.
This would explain the ambivalent findings with regard to intergroup sim-
ilarity. In some cases the similarity would be a threat to distinctiveness,
increasing intergroup bias, while in other cases an inclusion or assimi-
lation to a positively valued similar outgroup would be more desirable,
decreasing outgroup bias.
Fourth, the actual grounds for the choice of a specific identity main-
tenance strategy are unclear and these choices seem rather unpredictable.
One promising avenue in explaining different choices of strategies by dif-
ferent individuals is found in examining the influence of group identifi-
cation. Ellemers, Spears, and Doosje (1997) hypothesized for example
that more committed group members would be the least likely to opt for
the strategy of individual mobility. Overall there seems to be a negative
correlation between individualistic strategies and group identification.
All of these questions about and possible inconsistencies in SIT are
important and interesting. My main focus in using SIT in this project,
however, is on the existence and possible structure of social identities in
conflict resolution. Protracted ethnic conflict seems to be a prime can-
didate for an analysis that is informed by SIT. The motivational aspects
of SIT, while not without questions, seem to be very clear in protracted
conflict situations where a self-definition of a group has developed into a
strong movement participation that includes many if not all of the group
members.
One of the limitations mentioned by Brown (2000) regards the role of
the content of a social identity. He concludes that “at present, SIT does
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not differentiate between different kinds of groups. With the qualifications
just noted, all groups—be they small face-to-face units or large scale so-
cietal categories—are thought to be psychologically equivalent for their
members, at least as far as the operation of social identity processes are
concerned” (Brown, 2000, p. 761). Brown and Torres (1996) have already
shown that different kinds of groups had different psychological meanings
to participants while the level of identification was similar across groups.
The authors also found disparate correlations between identification and
ingroup bias, a finding already reported above, supporting the theorized
importance of the content of social identity on the effects expected by
SIT. This look at the role of national identity in conflict resolution may
hopefully inspire a look at the role of content in SIT theorizing.
Brown (2000) also concludes that a “future research agenda for SIT
must be to theorize how, when and why groups display dislike, hostility
and other forms of negative affect toward one another” (p. 761). He goes
on to state that “one important ingredient in that task will be to develop
a theoretical account which links identity processes to the formation and
dissemination of belief systems that allow group members to justify such
treatment of outgroup members or which legitimate inequality” (Brown,
2000, p. 769). In looking at the importance of social identity in creating
and supporting a protracted conflict I am trying to bring together different
results from SIT and related theories to form a view of national identity
that is helpful in explaining its contribution to ethnic conflict and at the
same time can give a guide as to how national identity might be employed
in resolving conflict.
1.3 Investing in conflict
Research on justice perception, Just World Theory and also prejudice finds
that people seem to have a need for justice. With regard to justice percep-
tion, a certain exchange can be viewed as just in terms of its outcome
and/or in the way the outcome is arrived at (which is called distributive
and procedural justice respectively). So even if the outcome is unfavor-
able to me I can perceive it as just if I believe the procedure which led
to the decision is just. As stated above, intergroup conflict is not stable.
In order to uphold it, I have to see it as justified to continue the conflict.
If I believe my demands are unjust, I would actively engage in exiting or
resolving the conflict. Assuming a need for justice makes it necessary to
frame the conflict in such a way that I have the right to win what I want.
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But if I need to forcefully occupy a land, or if people are being killed in
the name of my group, or if I cannot freely choose how to live my life be-
cause I am being threatened by other group members if I deviate from the
group norm, I need a way to justify the status quo to myself, as these in-
stances may be in opposition to other values I hold dear, such as freedom
of expression or the right to physical and psychological integrity. How
can one achieve that in order for protracted conflict to exist?
One possible explanation lies in just world theory and research on
prejudice: The need to see one’s conflict position (one’s demand) as just
can be combined with prejudice in order to afford the creation of an abso-
lute moral standard to which the ingroup complies and the outgroup does
not. This use of prejudice while supporting one’s moral account of the
conflict can justify dehumanization of the other and support the conflict
situation.
1.3.1 Prejudice
Prejudice is seen by Duckitt (2000) as a possibility to reduce a perceived
threat by an outgroup. Prejudice is defined as an intergroup attitude and
as a negative affective-motivational intergroup orientation. This implies
that prejudice includes tendencies to act against the outgroup with, for
example, aggression or avoidance and that the outgroup elicits negative
emotions such as anger, fear or envy. Duckitt proposes that a threat can
arise through a perception that a group exists in an uncertain or competi-
tive environment. This threat can be related to different group characteris-
tics, such as a threat to group status or the legitimacy of group status, and
can be perceived as a threat to group security or as competition. Duckitt
relates responding with prejudice to these two different kinds of threat to
two different worldviews: one is the view of the world as a competitive
jungle, which he also relates to the individual-level variable of social dom-
inance orientation (SDO), the other views the world as dangerous place
and is related to the individual-level variable right wing authoritarianism
(RWA). The use of prejudice is considered to help reduce the perceived
threat from an outgroup through either competition with or a challenge to
the outgroup. In the first worldview a prejudicial response to a competitive
threat can take the extreme form of dehumanizing the other by focusing
the prejudice on the inferior status of the outgroup in competition. In the
second worldview a perceived threat to security can lead to prejudicial
judgment that excludes the outgroup on a moral dimension in order to
legitimize actions that ensure the security of the ingroup, which are neg-
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ative for the outgroup. I believe that these responses of dehumanization
and moral exclusion to a perceived threat by the outgroup are important
aspects in turning ingroup love into outgroup hate (see section 1.2.3).
In their test of this dual process model of prejudice Duckitt, Wagner,
du Plessis, and Birum (2002) found significant support for their model.
Duckitt et al. demonstrated the mediating effect of RWA and SDO on the
two hypothesized worldviews. A belief in a dangerous world increased
prejudice, measured as both negative outgroup attitudes and positive in-
group attitudes, through a positive correlation with (that is mediation by)
RWA. Similarly the perception of the world as a competitive jungle influ-
enced prejudice through the mediation of SDO. Duckitt et al. also found
that individuals’ level of social conformity and tough-mindedness pre-
dicted the view of the world as a dangerous place and the view of the
world as a competitive jungle respectively. They tested an alternative ex-
planation for finding individual level and worldview influences on RWA
and SDO. Duckitt et al. proposed that a competitive-jungle worldview
might be used only by people high in SDO, as a legitimizing myth through
which they might justify holding prejudiced attitudes. But this model did
not fit the data and was therefore dismissed.
It is important to note that Duckitt et al. (2002) also emphasize that
the intergroup context, in addition to the individual-level variables SDO
and RWA, can play an important role in the expression of prejudice. They
stated that “these effects [prejudice] varied as hypothesized according to
the degree that out-groups seemed to be in directly threatening and com-
petitive relationships with the in-group” (p. 86). Outgroups need to be
perceived as threatening in order for prejudice toward them, mediated by
worldview and SDO or RWA, to increase. This emphasis on perceived
threat is similar to Brewer’s argument (Brewer, 2001) that ingroup love
only turns to outgroup hate if the outgroup is perceived as threatening
to or in direct competition with the ingroup. In my current endeavor it
seems important to recognize the influence conflict has on worldview. In
the case of protracted conflict it seems to be the case that the outgroup
one is in conflict with not only threatens the security of the ingroup but
is also in direct competition with the ingroup over resources, such as land
or water, and self-determination or recognition. In the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict the threat to security can be exemplified in the existence of sui-
cide bombers for the Israelis and army occupation for Palestinians. These
are also everyday occurrences and therefore will likely deeply influence
the view of the other and the world. Similarly both parties have engaged
in direct competition not only over land and borders but also over recog-
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nition of the legitimacy of their struggle by the international community.
Both of these aspects of competition are also framed in zero-sum terms
further underlining the direct competition of both groups. Duckitt et al.
(2002, p. 88) summarize this implication of their model as follows: “One
implication suggested by the model pertains to social environmental influ-
ences on ideological beliefs and prejudice. Social worldviews should be
influenced not only by individuals’ personalities but also by social reality.
Consequently, social environments that are really dangerous and threaten-
ing or competitive jungles should both increase prejudice, the former by
generating authoritarian attitudes and the latter through generating social
dominance.” This account underlines the importance of using myths in
protracted conflict that make the outgroup responsible for the ingroup’s
current situation.
1.3.2 Just World Theory
Lerner (1980) developed the idea that people need to believe that the world
is just. He asked why we would blame a victim of a crime and why this
only occurs sometimes. He stipulated that negative reactions towards a
crime, such as anger, derogating and blaming the victim, are motivated by
a concern with justice. This concern with justice can explain both helpful
and negative behavior towards victims. According to Lerner we develop
as children a general justice motive in order to be able to enter into long
term contracts and to maximize profits. In order to be able to hold off
immediate impulses with the aim of achieving benefits in the future, we
need, according to Lerner a belief in a just world. Only a belief in a just
world affords us the sentiments of entitlement and deservingness of future
gains. Without these sentiments supporting the feeling of a right to future
rewards it would not be wise to refrain from fulfilling our impulses now.
Lerner (1980) proposes nine strategies for dealing with threats to a
justice motive that are part of the believe in a just world: two are rational,
prevention and restitution; four are nonrational, reinterpreting the cause
(blaming victim), character (derogating victim), or outcome (suffering
builds character), and denial-withdrawal (physical and mental avoidance
of injustice and withdrawing from threats when encountered); two are
protective of the justice motive, there is an ultimate justice belief, which
trumps the threat (everything will be alright), and a view of the environ-
ment as two different worlds, one is unjust and one is the one in which we
prefer to be. Lerner also points to the option of pretending that one does
not belief in a just world, which he characterizes as false cynicism.
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In summary one can say that, according to just world theory, virtually
all people, as a result of intrinsic developmental forces in combination
with a relatively stable environment, develop a commitment to deserving
their outcomes and to organizing their lives around principles of deserv-
ingness. For this commitment to be maintained, people need to believe in
a just world, and, therefore, they are threatened by instances of injustice
and motivated to reduce this threat through the above mentioned strate-
gies, and to maintain the appearance that the world provides resources
and ill fate as deserved.
Hafer and Bègue (2005) found individual differences in the belief that
the world is a just place. This stands in some contrast to the claimed uni-
versality of a concern with justice. But even Lerner (1997, p. 129) points
out that “the phrase ‘belief in a just world’ originally was intended to pro-
vide a useful metaphor rather than a psychological construct”. In keeping
with the original theory Hafer (2000) argued that a primary function of a
belief in a just world is to allow one to invest in long-term goals and to do
so according to society’s rules of deservingness. Hafer and Bègue (2005)
therefore supposed that people should have a greater need to believe in
a just world if they have a strong focus on long-term investments and a
strong desire to obtain goals through socially acceptable means. That is to
say, the more people need to believe in a just world, the more they should
be motivated to preserve a sense of justice in the face of contradictory
evidence. Hafer (2000) provided evidence in this direction as she found
evidence for a relation between a long-term goal orientation and a belief
in a just world.
Supporting the claims of strategies employed in maintaining a belief
in a just world in the face of a grave injustice, Ellard, Miller, Baumle,
and Olson (2002) demonstrated that the perpetrator is seen as evil and is
demonized by participants if he showed no remorse and there was no jus-
tification given for the crime. This reaction was correlated to the strength
of a belief in a just world, the higher this belief was the more the perpetra-
tor was described as evil. Karuza and Carey (1984) by contrast examined
the preferred strategies to restore just-world belief: they found that behav-
ioral blame was superior at maintaining or strengthening a belief in a just
world compared to characterological blame. They argued that this was
due to the fact that behavioral blame provided a more direct explanation
of the event, if such an explanation was feasible. Hafer and Bègue (2005)
conclude that innocent suffering provokes the kind of characterological
defenses described by Lerner (1980). They stated that “the injustice of in-
nocent suffering can threaten observers, and, in the absence of reasonable
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helping responses, observers of these injustices may deal with the threat
in a less prosocial manner, for example, by distancing themselves from
the victim or by derogating the victim’s character” (p. 149). This seems
to be very important in protracted conflict when one group is confronted
with the injustices suffered by the other at their own hands. According
to this account, the other could be dehumanized to describe their fate as
deserved.
Support for this reasoning can also be drawn from Ellard’s and Bates’s
investigation of the effect of unjust benefits (Ellard & Bates, 1990). They
randomly assigned participants to a supervisor who either increased (un-
just condition) or did not change (just condition) the status of the partici-
pant over that of a confederate during the course of the experiment. They
reported that participants rated their own character more positively when
they were of higher rather than of equal status relative to the other. Ad-
ditionally, evaluations of participants’ own fate and character were pos-
itively correlated, as were their ratings of the other’s fate and character.
Thus, it seemed that individuals rationalized the undeserved benefit be-
stowed upon them in these studies by the supervisor in order to maintain
their notion of a just world. This rationalization was achieved by upgrad-
ing one’s character to match one’s status and linking it to the fate in the
experiment.
Social rules of deservingness may function as a way to support con-
flict. In a conflict situation both sides have to justify their fight for their
goal and the negative consequences for the other side as part of that con-
flict and if the goal is achieved. In order to achieve this goal, blaming
the victim, derogating the other and believing in one’s own high moral
status, which supports one’s deservingness of the desired outcome, are all
strategies that should be expected to be employed by both conflict parties.
1.4 Reducing intergroup conflict
As my theoretical argument in chapter 2 aims at establishing a recon-
struction of national identity as a feasible way to reduce intergroup con-
flict other theories on reducing intergroup conflict should be examined.
In the realm of the contact hypothesis, first developed by Allport (1954),
there have been many studies that investigate and theorize on the possi-
bilities to reduce intergroup conflict through contact between members of
the conflicting parties. A famous field experiment in the study of inter-
group conflict has been the experiment conducted by Muzafer Sherif and
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colleagues (Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, & Sherif, 1961) at a summer
camp for boys at Robbers Cave. In this experiment boys were divided
into two groups, which developed a strong competition and negative at-
titudes toward each other during the summer camp. Sherif et al. were
able to shift the interaction between members of the two groups from in-
tergroup conflict to cooperation by creating a shared superordinate goal
for both groups, which could only be achieved through cooperation of the
two groups. This shared goal eliminated the intergroup conflict and the
distinction between the two groups and led to a superordinate identity in
which all boys belonged to the same group. This is an extraordinary ex-
ample of the power of categorizing participants into two groups, inducing
conflict through competition, and recategorization of these two groups
as belonging to the same superordinate group, thus creating a common
ingroup and promoting cooperation between the former adversaries. Re-
search on the contact hypothesis has influenced many researchers, includ-
ing the development of Kelman’s interactive problem solving approach.
It is practiced in programs such as, for example, the Program on Inter-
national Conflict Analysis and Resolution (PICAR). The data I am using
in this dissertation (see chapter 3) stem from interactive problem-solving
workshops.
Pettigrew (1998) summarized the conditions necessary to develop har-
monious group relations through contact between members of conflict
parties as follows: “equal status between the groups (optimally within and
outside the contact setting), cooperative intergroup interaction, opportu-
nities for personal acquaintance between outgroup members, and norms
within and outside of the contact setting that support egalitarian inter-
group interaction.” But these conditions do not constitute, as Gaertner
and Dovidio (2000, p. 71) put it, a “unifying conceptual framework that
explains how these prerequisite features achieve their effect”. Gaertner
and Dovidio propose their Common Ingroup Model as such a framework.
The model has been developed out of previous work on aversive racism
(Dovidio & Gaertner, 1998; Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986). Gaertner and
Dovidio found that participants consciously endorsing egalitarian values
(that is, rejecting overt racism) still showed discriminatory behavior when
this behavior could be justified on the basis of factors other than race. Par-
ticipants held negative unconscious feelings and beliefs toward a group
(in this case African-Americans) and acted in discriminatory ways while
at the same time consciously expressing egalitarian values. Gaertner and
Dovidio (2000) characterize aversive racism as a tension between feelings
and values, which creates an ambivalence of participants toward members
of an outgroup.
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In the Common Ingroup Model developed out of this research on aver-
sive racism Gaertner and Dovidio (2000) focus on possibilities of reduc-
ing intergroup prejudice and conflict. To this effect Gaertner and Dovidio
propose that a shift of who is “we” and “they” is helpful in circumvent-
ing normal psychological processes involved in categorizing the social
world into different groups, such as ingroup favoritism (as is the case in
the minimal group paradigm, Tajfel et al., 1971). The Common Ingroup
Model proposes different ways in which this can be achieved: decatego-
rization, recategorization of the two groups into two subgroups belonging
to a superordinate group and recategorization into a common (superor-
dinate) group. As the title of the model already implies, Gaertner and
Dovidio (2000, p. 7) state that “we view the recategorization of different
groups into one group as a particularly powerful and pragmatic strategy
for combating subtle forms of bias.”
The first strategy, decategorization, emphasizes that members of par-
ties in conflict should view the other as an individual rather than belonging
to a certain group. The perception of the other is therefore decategorized
by reducing the view of the other in terms of their group membership and
by increasing the perception of the other in terms of their individual char-
acteristics. According to Gaertner and Dovidio (2000) ingroup favoritism
is reduced in decategorization precisely because ingroup and outgroup
members are all seen only as individuals. Another possible approach re-
lies on emphasizing categories that cross ingroup/outgroup boundaries.
Here the emphasis is placed on group memberships that some members
of the conflict parties may share with members of the other side but not
necessarily with members of their own group, for example gender, educa-
tion or occupation.
Using Sherif et al.’s experiment at Robbers Cave as an example (Sherif
et al., 1961), Gaertner and Dovidio (2000) state that intergroup cooper-
ation, in the view of the Common Ingroup Model, induces participants
to see themselves as one group rather than as two separate groups. This
is the recategorization of individuals belonging to the same superordi-
nate group. Gaertner and Dovidio conducted an analysis of which factors
might mediate the effect of intergroup cooperation. They showed that
a decategorization of individuals in the process of cooperation and a re-
categorization of the two initial groups into two subgroups reduced the
positive effect of cooperation on the outgroup view, while a recategoriza-
tion of participants as belonging to one inclusive group and the degree of
cooperation increased the positive effect of cooperation on the outgroup
view. Gaertner and Dovidio thus conclude that in this analysis the posi-
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tive effect of cooperation was fully mediated by a recategorization of two
formerly competing groups into one inclusive group. They also hypothe-
size that the perception of a common fate of two competing groups may
have a positive effect on intergroup attitudes that is independent of co-
operative interdependence. The experimental support is not unequivocal
but Gaertner and Dovidio found at least less bias in facial expressions in
the Common Fate condition, which was independent of a possible recate-
gorization. These findings support the conditions that produce a positive
outcome of contact put forth by Pettigrew (1998). The positive effect
is explained through the Common Ingroup Model in the form of a “one
group” representation as central mediator, a finding that has been repro-
duced in diverse environments such as in the laboratory, in stepfamilies,
in corporate mergers and in the context of ethnic groups. The condition
of equal status between parties in contact, however, does not seem to hold
in every case. Gaertner and Dovidio (2000) note that an equal status be-
tween two groups may induce threats to the groups’ identity. Supporting
their argument for the Common Ingroup Model, that is recategorization
into one group, Gaertner and Dovidio note that recategorization into dual
identities, that is keeping the old identities of both parties while focusing
on a superordinate identity, can be a sign of failure if a new common iden-
tity is desired, as would be the case in mergers or the creation of a new
family. But if two subgroups are seen as constructively working together
for a common goal, as would be peace between Israelis and Palestinians,
a dual identity predicts more positive intergroup relations in the case of a
possible threat to the initial groups’ identity.
Gaertner and Dovidio (2000) conclude that mutual differentiation may
be the best option for protracted conflict. This includes positively valuing
the similarities and differences between groups in a context of intergroup
cooperation. This is the Mutual Intergroup Differentiation Model devel-
oped by Hewstone and Brown (1986). Gaertner and Dovidio (2000, p.
41) state that “win-win cooperative relationships can initiate mutually fa-
vorable feelings and stereotypes toward the members of the other group
while emphasizing each group’s positive distinctiveness.” The Mutual
Intergroup Differentiation Model also has the benefit that the positive ef-
fect of contact is more effectively generalized to all members of an out-
group if the distinctiveness of both groups is kept up within the contact
setting. With respect to generalizing the positive effects of intergroup
contact, Gaertner and Dovidio (2000) propose a trade-off hypothesis be-
tween attitude change and generalization. They hypothesize that if group
boundaries are erased during contact (complete decategorization or recat-
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egorization into one group) a change toward a positive outgroup attitude is
most likely and pronounced. However generalization of this effect would
be close to zero precisely due to the removal of the initial group bound-
aries. If the contact situation is seen in terms of two distinct subgroups be-
longing to a superordinate category, generalization of the contact effects
is highest. The strength of the superordinate category is seen as mediating
the positive effect of contact, that is the stronger the identification with the
superordinate category is the more positive the attitude change is going to
be.
Chapter 2
National identity and
conflict resolution
Initially I wanted to inform conflict resolution efforts on the role of na-
tional identity. In this pursuit it became necessary to first examine the role
national identity plays in sustaining conflict. The examination of national
identity in conflict provides insight into the role national identity can play
in conflict resolution. This is the outcome of theorizing done during my
work on interactive problem solving workshops using grounded theory.
For the sake of clarity I will only present my theoretical ideas in this chap-
ter. The process that led to these is detailed in chapters 3 and 4. The data I
use in this dissertation stems from interactive problem solving workshops
between Palestinians and Israelis (see section 3.2.1 for a description of the
setting). This particular conflict is the focus of my work and is used most
of the time as point of reference in this chapter. The interactive problem
solving workshop itself has a specific aim. Its goal is to allow participants
to overcome zero-sum perceptions of the conflict and mirror images of
both parties in order to find new and innovative solutions for the conflict
(see section 3.2 for a detailed description). It is with reference to this
goal I examined the role of identity in conflict, trying to generate ideas for
further improving the process.
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2.1 National identity in conflict
In the last chapter many pieces concerning national or ethnic identity in
protracted conflict were covered. They are all part of my reading during
the grounded theory process. My aim is to present a view on the function
of national identity in conflict in this section. Identity seems to play a cen-
tral role in conflict. In section 1.1.3 we saw that many authors agree that
ethnic conflicts have a potential for escalation (J. Z. Rubin et al., 1994;
J. S. Coleman, 1957; Pruitt, 2001; Fisher & Keashley, 1990; Burgess &
Burgess, 1996). In addition the authors point out that ethnic or national
identity is very interesting for leaders as a tool to mobilize support. Social
identity theory (section 1.2) provides different ideas on the motivational
aspects for individuals to use a social identity, such as belonging to a group
and being distinct from other groups, maintaining positive self-esteem (ei-
ther as a byproduct or a goal of categorizing the world into social groups).
Research in social identity theory has also shown that outgroup hate does
not necessarily materialize easily and prejudice and discrimination are not
a necessary outcome of efforts to establish a positive ingroup representa-
tion (sections 1.2.3 and 1.2.5). Social identity theory however regards any
social identity as equal to another. That does not explain why national or
ethnic identity seems to be a very good candidate to mobilize support. The
framework of politicized identity (section 1.2.4) tries to explain how in-
dividuals decide to take part in social movements. One interesting result
was that identification with the group can lead, independently of cost–
benefit analyses, to movement participation. National identity is usually
perceived as an essentialized category (section 1.1.4). This may be one
reason why national identity is more easily used as a politicized identity
than other social identities.
One important issue with regard to protracted ethnic conflict is the fact
that conflict is an unstable state of affairs (section 1.1.1) that needs con-
stant investment to uphold. Social identity theory (section 1.2.1) proposes
several different options for individuals to act upon a perceived negative
group identity, such as exiting the group or choosing different groups or
dimensions for comparison. These are not necessarily good motivators
for a group to stay in a protracted violent conflict. As has been pointed
out in section 1.1.3 protracted ethnic conflict is characterized by a very
strong moral dimension. How and why does this dimension enter into
the initial effort of establishing social action towards self-determination?
Two different but not necessarily exclusive explanations have been pre-
sented in section 1.3. One is Duckitt’s work on prejudice (Duckitt, 2003).
He explains prejudice as a reaction to a perceived threat by an outgroup.
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Prejudice facilitates aggression toward or avoidance of the outgroup. The
research is based upon individual-level variables social dominance orien-
tation and right wing authoritarianism, that is to say that individual differ-
ences in these two aspects predict the degree to which an individual reacts
towards a threat with prejudice toward the threatening outgroup. Duckitt
et al. (2002) also note however that prejudiced reactions toward an out-
group also depend on social reality. If for example a conflict is framed in
terms of its threatening aspects or a zero-sum competition for resources
ingroup members will be more likely to hold prejudices toward the out-
group. A second explanation for the introduction of a moral dimension
into conflict comes from just world theory (section 1.3.2). Lerner (1980)
postulates a need for justice. A situation of protracted conflict would vi-
olate the principle of justice unless there is a justification for sustaining
one’s demand. If I want something that the other wants as well and we are
not finding a compromise I have to have a good reason why I can justly
uphold confronting the other on the issue. Individuals and groups should
therefore be motivated to actively justify their demand in order to claim
that the continued involvement in the conflict is just. It seems easier to
achieve this by not only making an argument for one’s own position but
also by discounting the other’s position. Discounting the other is usually
associated with stereotyping and prejudice. Prejudice in conjunction with
an absolute conception of morality provides the ingroup with a powerful
justification for their goals. It also makes it easy for both conflict parties
to see the question of just demands as a zero-sum situation. In an effort
to sustain conflict it seems that outgroup enmity becomes an integral part
of the national identity, which is part of and not just linked to ingroup
amity. Both sides claim to have justice on their side and link it with their
own absolute moral standard, which they comply with and the other side
does not. Expressions of stereotypes and prejudices can easily be found
in conflict and illustrate this point: “They cannot be trusted”, “They only
exist because of us”, “They have always behaved in hostile ways, think
of what they did to us in X”. Here it is also easy to see how one’s own
(group) identity becomes an integral part of the conflict. What “they did
to us in X” is part of the construction of one’s own identity as the time X
is usually also employed to define what it means to be part of the ingroup.
The moral standard can in turn, for example, be used in a process of
ingroup projection (section 1.2.5), allowing for ingroup members to per-
ceive themselves as adhering to moral standards while the outgroup is not.
This process can lead to the dehumanization of the other and justify vio-
lent behavior towards the outgroup, which is usually found in protracted
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ethnic conflict. In addition once a clear ingroup / outgroup distinction has
been established, self-categorization theory (section 1.2.2) can provide an
explanation for the increasing pervasiveness of these distinctions in pro-
tracted ethnic conflict. A conflict increases the salience of the categories,
which in turn leads to an increased processing by individuals of their en-
vironment in terms of the social identity. This means that in the case of
protracted conflict most everyday interactions will be perceived by group
members in terms of their conflict group membership, discounting other
possible perceptions of the world.
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Figure 2.1: Identity supporting conflict
Figure 2.1 represents what I see as the process of creating, investing
and upholding conflict. As I believe that conflict in itself is not a desired or
stable situation, there needs to be an investment (as described above) for
protracted conflict to occur. The protracted nature of the conflict brings
with it certain properties and functions assigned to national identity that
are relevant to consider for conflict resolution efforts. The cycle in Figure
2.1 leading to protracted conflict can be described as follows: A project
that challenges the status quo, for example self-determination, is created
for various reasons. In order to appeal to as many supporters as possi-
ble the project is framed in terms of a national or ethnic identity that has
so far been repressed. It seems important that this identity can claim an
essentialist nature in order to motivate a large audience for social action.
The goal needs justification to motivate a constituency. If opposition is
encountered the justification needs to be even stronger in order to form
resistance against the opposition. This in turn sharpens the project as the
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opponent becomes clearer and leads to an expression of national identity
that compares the ingroup favorably to the outgroup. In addition the cate-
gory becomes more salient as the struggle for self-determination comes to
the fore. The salience of the conflict and possibly positive self-esteem de-
rived from comparing to an outgroup can help attract more support from
the public and sharpen prejudice toward the outgroup in order to justify
the actions taken so far. A continuation of this cycle will move ingroup
members to an ever more rigid self-definition. Conflict and identity defi-
nitions mutually influence one another.
Why is national or ethnic identity so especially powerful in creating,
escalating, and sustaining conflict? Using ethnic identity in order to gain
political support from a large group of people is one reason why ethnic
identity becomes politicized. Turner (2005) states that power is the ability
to have many people act on one’s behalf. He notes that this is differ-
ent from the usual perception that power is equal to being able to force
as many people as possible to act on one’s behalf. Ethnicity or nation-
alism thus provide the possibility of exerting much power by getting a
large group, a nation, to act on one’s behalf without having to use repres-
sive force. So if entrepreneurs of identity strive for power they are well
advised to do this in terms of nationalism or ethnicity. In addition na-
tional identity corresponds to an essentialist view of ethnicity that many
group members share. In justifying the goal of prolonged conflict with
an outgroup, ethnicity lends itself more readily than other group identi-
ties to acquiring a moral dimension. A deviation from the moral standard
by the outgroup can support a feeling of belonging to a morally superior
group for ingroup members. The deviation is attributed to a very distinct
outgroup.
From a different point of view, Druckman (2003) points out that re-
searchers in conflict resolution face a puzzle: The theme that initially mo-
tivated a group to take up social action is not the same theme that will
continue to motivate that group if the action is being carried out for a
period of time. Following the argument above it seems clear that the ini-
tial project of self-determination changes over time as a conflict arises
and the process of justifying the existence of a protracted conflict adds a
moral dimension to the project of self-determination. In protracted con-
flict national identities create an ingroup that is seen as morally superior
to the outgroup in order to motivate and sustain group action. In doing
so, national identity shifts from being a recruitment category to being the
justification itself (“we are more moral than you”), possibly explaining
this puzzle.
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2.2 Palestinian/Israeli case
As I work with interactive problem solving workshops between Israelis
and Palestinians, I believe it to useful to examine this conflict more closely.
In the Israeli-Palestinian case the Palestinian side is involved in a struggle
for self-determination in which the public even tolerates suicide attacks
and where social disobedience in the form of the Intifada was (success-
fully) practiced. This is evidence for a strong belief in a common social
or national identity of being Palestinian. On the other side the Israelis
are convinced of the legitimacy of the state of Israel and there is a broad
consensus that it is in essence a Jewish state, whereby (at least) a Jewish
majority of inhabitants is meant. The importance of this national identity
can be seen in the fear in Israeli society of being “driven into the sea”
by the Palestinians, the perceived necessity of a forceful army and the
continued occupation of the West-Bank and Gaza.
Both sides claim that the other is behaving in unacceptable ways (for
example: illegitimate occupation and settlements and suicide bombers)
and especially that the other is not to be trusted. Take for example the
Palestinian point of view of “security issues” as an Israeli excuse for “ha-
rassing” Palestinians and the Israeli claim that Palestinians do not accept a
state of Israel in the Middle East and will do anything to destroy that state
despite any proclamations to the contrary. This may serve as an example
for the lack of trust on both sides. In this situation, as is characteristic in
ethnic conflicts, the own group identity is being seen as threatened in its
existence by the other (see also Kelman, 1987).
The identities of both conflict parties are also in a state of what Kelman
(1999) calls negative interdependence. One implication is that the “the
negative interdependence of the two identities has also burdened the par-
ties with the requirement of maintaining the demonic image of the enemy.
Affirming the enemy image is a common feature of conflict norms and in-
dicator of group loyalty in deep-rooted conflict” (p. 591). Kelman points
to the investment necessary to sustain a conflict, which I have outlined
above:
“Negative interdependence [. . . ] makes it more difficult and
costly for each group to establish its own identity. It is not
enough for it to demonstrate, to itself and to the rest of the
world, its own legitimacy, authenticity, and cohesiveness as a
national group; it has the additional burden of demonstrating
the illegitimacy, inauthenticity, and lack of cohesiveness of
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the other, often in the face of powerful evidence to the con-
trary. [. . . ] A related indicator of negative interdependence
has been the systematic effort to delegitimize the other’s move-
ment by placing it outside of the bounds of what the world
community can tolerate. The most extreme examples of dele-
gitimization of the other have been the equation of Zionism
with racism and of Palestinian nationalism, as represented by
the PLO, with terrorism. [. . . ] Since racism and terrorism are
morally unacceptable in human society, these designations
make the other’s national movement as such illegitimate by
definition. Delegitimization in these cases verges on dehu-
manization in that it excludes the other from the moral com-
munity shared by all members of the human family. [. . . ]
One reason for the emphasis on keeping the demonic image
intact is its contribution to the group cohesion that is deemed
necessary to sustain the group in its life-and-death struggle.
[. . . ] The demonic image of the enemy is considered vital as
support for the justice of the group’s own cause”’ (Kelman,
1999, p. 589–91)
In this description one can find the elements of social identity theory with
a nation or national movement presenting itself as a group and contrast-
ing favorably with another group for its constituency. In addition, as the
identity has developed under threat from a different group, the national
identity has to reflect characteristics of its constituency that make it possi-
ble to sustain a conflict with another group in order for the national iden-
tity to exist. This implies the negative features mentioned by Kelman
(1999), which are evidence of the investment in conflict through claim-
ing moral superiority over the other and denying their right to their iden-
tity. The previous section has given us some insight into how and why a
group can arrive at the behavior described for the Israeli-Palestinian case
above. Kelman’s description of the conflict situation highlights the im-
portance of investment into the conflict and the threatening expressions
that this investment can take in protracted conflict. Hicks et al. (1995)
offer a very useful distinction between three kinds of identity threats that
occur in intergroup conflict: the fear of actual, physical annihilation, the
fear of social annihilation and the fear of psychological annihilation. In
sustaining a protracted ethnic conflict the fear of social and psycholog-
ical annihilation, through the negative interdependence of identities and
investment into the upholding of the conflict, become as important as, if
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not more important than, the fear of physical annihilation. These fears
are what make protracted conflict so prone to violence and difficult to re-
solve. Kelman (1999) concludes that “negative interdependence creates
the conditions for protracted conflict”. In order to mobilize a constituency
to enter into conflict, if that is deemed necessary to achieve one’s goal of
self-determination, and to sustain the conflict, a national identity must be
created in part through negative interdependence to provide the necessary
tools to turn ingroup love into outgroup hate.
With regard to the impact of contact, Gaertner and Dovidio (2000, p.
162) note that “we do not believe that recategorization as one group, at
least by itself, would be capable of sustaining favorable intergroup rela-
tions over the long term. Unless supported and sustained by group norms
and the leadership structure, such an ephemeral superordinate connection
between groups is unlikely to remain stable over time.” Gaertner and
Dovidio cite Kelman’s interactive problem solving approach as a case in
which a positive effect of contact is achieved through the use of a subset
of members of conflict groups by temporarily creating a common ingroup
identity, which, in their view, has significant residual effects for the groups
as a whole (see also section 1.4).
2.3 Mirror images
One important aspect in conflict group interactions are mirror images.
One goal of the interactive problem solving workshops is to make parti-
cipants aware of these mirror images and reduce their impact on problem
solving. Kelman (1997b) summarizes the impact of national identity in
protracted conflict as follows:
“National identity, national self-determination, and the estab-
lishment of a state as the political expression of a group’s na-
tional identity are in themselves positive concepts [. . . ] Yet,
these positive, laudable goals often lead [. . . ] to systematic
efforts to destroy other peoples as part of a project of estab-
lishing an ethnically pure, homogeneous state or region [. . . ]
(p. 330)”
Mirror images are almost always found in protracted conflict and usu-
ally lead to a spiral of violence or military buildups, as was the case during
the Cold War. They give us a clue that both sides are highly invested in
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the conflict. In addition to the spiral of violence and investment in con-
flict, another consequence of mirror images is an increase in the difficulty
to believe the other and recognize the similarities between parties and the
common strategies used by both parties. This is in part due to cognitive
biases that help maintain a positive self- and a negative other-image.
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Figure 2.2: Mirror images
As can be seen in the Figure above, the relation between one’s view
of oneself (positive) and the other (negative) is mirrored by how the other
perceives himself (positive) and me (negative). That is to say the self-
perceptions of both parties are different from how they are seen by the
other. One example of mirror images can easily be found in the arms
race of the Cold War, where both sides justified their own increase in
arms through the threat posed by the other: We have only the best in-
tentions (positive self-image) but the other side is threatening us through
their arms increase (negative other-perception), so we have to increase
our arms arsenal in order to protect us (morally justifiable action). As
both sides mirrored each other in how they perceived themselves and the
other an arms race was the consequence. The self-perceptions of both
parties are equally positive but cannot coexist at the same time. Why?
Because the other’s positive self-perception violates my perception of her.
As we have a zero-sum perception of the conflict on both sides the par-
ties need to actively frame the outcome they are looking for as just, as it
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implies a loss for the other party. This loss would not be a just exchange
in terms of just world theory and with it would violate one’s own justice
motive. Prejudice and the employment of differing social justice norms
serve this purpose. So in order to maintain a positive self-image one is
contrasting favorably with the other, usually also claiming moral superi-
ority over the other. The investment required to sustain a conflict seems
to be achieved at the expense of casting the other group in a negative light
and in this way justifying one’s own demands. Any compromise or so-
lution in the conflict necessitates the awareness of the mirror images and
may threaten one’s own self-perception. The positive self-perception and
negative other-perception will have to change in order to make a compro-
mise possible and desirable, especially if one’s identity (i.e. self-image)
is linked to one’s other-perception. Otherwise a compromise would seri-
ously threaten one’s identity. This is true not only for explicit claims about
national identity and character of both parties but includes implicit or even
unconscious assumptions about oneself and the other. While interactive
problem solving workshops are successful in making mirror images visi-
ble to participants, it seems important to go one step further and examine
the ingroup’s identity that is involved in maintaining conflict.
2.4 National identity in conflict resolution
The main theoretical idea being presented here is that a national or eth-
nic identity, often considered an important and detrimental part in these
conflicts, is an important tool, not just an obstacle, in conflict resolution.
It seems that this goal may require a change in national identity on both
sides, so that national identity no longer supports conflict but conflict res-
olution while still performing its functions of inclusion and differentiation
(see Figure 2.3 on the facing page).
There have been many attempts to bring the conflicting sides to a
peaceful resolution of their conflict. Many different approaches have been
developed over the years in order to facilitate or enhance the process.
Many agreements have been reached and many of them have been bro-
ken or have not been implemented leading to the same result: continued
conflict. The Oslo accords, for example, seemed to be a promising step
towards ending the Israeli-Palestinian conflict but failed to produce the
hoped-for peace. The situation today might be described as worse than
ever before with continued suicide attacks by the Palestinians and retal-
iations from the Israelis and fighting among Palestinians. Why did such
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a promising process end up in such a discouraging situation? This is not
an attempt to analyze the failure of the Oslo accords; others have tried to
do so. But it seems that an underlying issue is the question of trust. How
can I trust the other? Why is it so difficult to build up a working trust
between parties and so easy to destroy it? One possible answer may lie
in the national identities of the conflicting parties. As we have seen, na-
tional identity is intimately involved in creating and supporting conflict.
If one tries to resolve conflict there is an immediate threat to identity for
members of the conflict parties. The threat could be described as follows:
If “we” give in now and start to compromise (on almost any issue of the
conflict), we get dangerously close to giving up our argument for the jus-
tice of our demands. This would in effect undermine the whole project by
delegitimizing it. But as the group’s identity is linked to the goals pursued
in conflict this implies a perceived threat to the very core of one’s national
identity. In this vicious circle an investment in the conflict by one side
forces the other side to do the same and leads to a concept that if “we”
exit the conflict in one form or another we will end up losing ourselves.
One hypothesis is that, in order to build lasting trust necessary for
finding a stable solution, the identities of the conflicting parties need to
change to accommodate a more peaceful and non-threatening view of the
other. Therefore a conceptualization of ethnic identity as constructed and
changeable may be helpful in reducing the threat that the resolution of
conflict poses for identity. Kelman (1997b) points out the dilemma that
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one faces in talking about negotiating national identities. A national iden-
tity is inherently “non-negotiable” as it represents the will of a group and
its reason for existence that cannot be dictated from the outside. But, if
the group takes action on the basis of this identity (e.g. pushing for an in-
dependent state) it is impacting the interests and identities of other groups.
This makes some sort of negotiation necessary. So it is important to keep
in mind that national identity (in particular) is a concept that is based upon
an active self-definition of a group and subject to transmission of shared
values, goals and affects. Reicher and Hopkins (2001) demonstrate in the
context of Scottish political speech that national identity is constructed,
taking into account the audience and the goal of the speaker in framing
what “Scottishness” is about. The characterization of the conflict situa-
tion and the issues of conflict highlighted at a given time by a given actor
correlate to the political project or vision of the future that the actor has
at that time, the audience she is addressing and the construction of one’s
national identity. The constructed national identity of the “other” is influ-
enced by these factors too and also influences one’s own behavior, goals,
and constructions, for example through mirror images. Rendering this
constructed nature accessible to participants of interactive problem solv-
ing workshops can be an important step in supporting conflict resolution
efforts. This can open the path to creating an identity that is more inde-
pendent of the conflict as before and less threatened by a resolution of the
conflict (see top left corner in Figure 2.3 on the preceding page).
The idea of changing national identity in the process of conflict reso-
lution has been brought forward by others. Kelman (1997b, p. 338), for
example, writes that “the idea that national identity is a social construction
has implications [. . . ] It is the identity that a group, under the leadership
of its mobilizing elites, chose to construct. By the same token, since na-
tional identity is a social construction, it can also be reconstructed.” The
possibility to change identity is in my opinion an overlooked resource in
conflict resolution, given the strength of national identity to sustain and
escalate conflict.
Kelman (2001) underlines that in the case of the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict the identities are based on the negation of the other and have
become monolithic. He distinguishes between a peripheral and a core
identity in his approach to identity negotiation. Kelman claims that ne-
gotiations of peripheral parts of that identity are necessary to achieve sus-
tained conflict resolution. One problem I have with this claim is that, what
Kelman sees as peripheral parts of an identity, are perceived by the con-
flict parties as central. This is because the adaptive back and forth between
2.4 National identity in conflict resolution 47
different versions of national identity probably has stopped under the in-
fluence of conflict and has become rigid and monolithic (Hicks, 1999). In
this situation any threat to the existing identity is perceived as a threat to
the core of one’s being. This dilemma is what first drew my attention in
taking part in interactive problem solving workshop in 1999. In contrast
to Kelman (1997b, 2001) I argue that it is not only important for both
parties to negotiate their identities with the other and accommodate the
other on peripheral issues of their own identity but that the self-definition
of a group has to change at its core away from supporting the conflict to-
wards independence of the conflict for conflict resolution to be successful
in the long run (see Figure 2.4). Despite the opportunity for participants
within the workshop to take the other’s perspective and understand their
needs and fears the possibility of resolving the conflict presented a threat
to their own identity. In trying to facilitate conflict resolution it may be
more helpful to explicitly acknowledge that the conflict itself has become
an integral part of the group’s identity. A project of conflict resolution
therefore needs a construction of identity that does no longer include the
other through negative interdependence before the necessary negotiations
of identity as described by Kelman (2001) can take place.
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Figure 2.4: Disarming identity
Drawing on their experience from conflict resolution workshops be-
tween Palestinians and Israelis Rouhana and Kelman (1994) note that it
is dangerous for participants to become too supportive of members from
the opposing party. If participants are seen to be crossing the established
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boundaries between the conflict parties, they are at risk of being labeled
as traitors and losing their influence within their own group. This is a
difficult dilemma. What do you do if, through intensive trust–building
measures during workshops, an Israeli starts to understand the needs and
fears of Palestinians and sees ways to ameliorate the situation, but by do-
ing so becomes a traitor to his own group? It would seem important to not
only focus on understanding the other side, but, as a second step, to focus
on one’s own identity and notice in what way it may prevent otherwise
willing members of one’s group from resolving the conflict. The goal of
reflecting on the ingroup’s identity would be to provide participants with
ideas on how to decouple the identity from the conflict (as depicted in
Figure 2.4 on the preceding page).
2.5 Conclusion
This chapter is the result of theory building within the process of grounded
theory. This chapter examined the role of identity in conflict and conflict
resolution. In order to focus on the possibility of identity negotiation it
seemed necessary to understand how and why national identity so often
supports conflict. The theoretical exposition presented here needs test-
ing. One hypothesis is that dealing with identities explicitly in conflict
resolution settings may enhance the quality of the outcome of such ef-
forts. This includes a few suggestions for the interactive problem solving
approach, which already provides a unique setting for conflict resolution
efforts. Kelman (1997b) describes his vision for identity negotiation:
They [negotiations] should be carried out in a context of give
and take based on the principal of reciprocity. With both
identities simultaneously on the table, the parties need to en-
gage in a process of jointly thinking about ways in which their
respective identities can be accommodated to each other.
But it seems that the current identities of the conflict parties first need
to be opened for change. A sustainable conflict resolution seems to require
a change in national/social identity. Each party is currently mobilizing its
population for their project in the conflict using national history, heroes
etc. in such a way that supports the identity and hides its constructed na-
ture.
I believe that the learning aimed at in conflict resolution workshops
(see section 3.2.3) includes already the aim to change the participants’
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self-perception even if this is not made explicit by Kelman and colleagues
or in the workshops. One important aspect in this effort could be a dis-
cussion about the traits a prototypical ingroup member possesses with an
emphasis on integrating the ability to dissent or challenge the ingroup
identity in that prototype. This way members of the ingroup can decide
consciously what parts they consider core and periphery or non-negotiable
and negotiable. This gives efforts of conflict resolution the opportunity to
maybe discuss issues that facilitators might deem non-negotiable. Even
though chapter 4 shows that the approach can already produce positive
uses of identity, interventions specifically aimed at reflecting on one’s
identity and political project could enhance the outcome of problem solv-
ing workshops. Making the constructed nature visible and presenting the
problems inherent in the current identity should be steps included in an
interactive problem solving workshop. This would open the possibility
for participants to work on a new vision of identity that can replace the
current one. The workshop process itself seems to be necessary to lead
participants to recognize the difficulties in trying to resolve conflict, such
as mirror images and zero-sum perceptions. Adding an additional step
that explicitly addresses issues of identity could improve the outcome of
conflict resolution workshops. So, pointing parties in conflict to the link
between identity and resolution of the conflict and actively constructing
alternative versions of national identity should be important to problem
solving.
A different identity project that includes the resolution of the conflict
as a vision for the national group needs to compete with and ultimately re-
place the current identity project that supports the conflict. I believe that
only this kind of change can successfully address all the different fears of
annihilation described by Hicks et al. (1995). This makes it necessary to
explicitly talk about the self-definition of the conflict parties and to negoti-
ate these identities in addition to other negotiations aimed at resolving the
conflict. In trying to resolve protracted ethnic conflict we not only need
to find agreement on the distribution of resources, disarming militias, de-
signing a truce or peace agreement but we also need to disarm identities
so that any other agreement reached becomes sustainable.

Chapter 3
Methods
In this chapter I present the method, grounded theory, I used to develop the
theoretical argument in the previous chapter and to investigate the empir-
ical data presented in the next chapter. I will continue with a description
of the specifics of my data set and present a detailed description of the
steps taken to arrive at the content of this dissertation. This chapter also
describes the method I developed to answer my main empirical research
questions:
• Is there evidence of identity use in conflict resolution settings?
• What expressions of identity can be found in a particular conflict
resolution setting?
• Are there any positive examples of identity use that can support
the idea that national identity can be used as a resource for conflict
resolution.
Answers to these questions will be presented in chapter 4.
3.1 Grounded Theory
As it forms the core of my approach to this dissertation I will go into
some depth in reviewing the grounded theory approach. Grounded the-
ory was originally developed by Glaser and Strauss (1967). It has since
undergone many changes with Glaser and Strauss developing two some-
what different approaches. These differences will be highlighted below.
51
52 Methods
Glaser (1978) has kept the method more flexible while Strauss and Corbin
(1998) have added a more detailed description of processes in grounded
theory and developed a more structured procedure. Despite these differ-
ences, grounded theory can be described as a “rigorous, orderly guide to
theory development” (Glaser, 1978, p. 2). As Heath and Cowley (2004)
describe grounded theory, rather demanding details from the researcher in
the exploration of a field, parsimony, scope and modifiability are stressed
by this approach. Behind this lies the idea that theoretical saturation can
be achieved without complex details; indeed these details can strangle the
workability of developing a theory. As Glaser (1978) describes this aspect
of grounded theory, which was already implicit in Glaser and Strauss’s
(1967) original development of the theory:
Our strategies do not insist that the analyst engage in a de-
gree of explicitness and overdrawn explanation in an effort to
coerce the theory’s acceptance by drugging the reader’s imag-
ination and beating him into intellectual submission. (Glaser
& Strauss, 1967, p. 8)
However, ideas generated during reflection and analysis are subject to
further comparisons, which ensure the accuracy of the theory in devel-
opment. In the original work Glaser and Strauss (1967) described this
balance between analytic focus on details and flexibility in the work with
data as follows:
Generation of theory through comparative analysis both sub-
sumes and assumes verification and accurate description, but
only to the extent that the latter are in the service of genera-
tion. (Glaser & Strauss, 1967, p. 28)
In their comparison of Glaser’s and Strauss’ approaches to grounded
theory Heath and Cowley (2004) point to symbolic interactionism as a
root for grounded theory. They cite the founder of symbolic interac-
tionism, Blumer (1956), describing the “importance of concepts that are
sensitizing rather than definitive and gain their significance and utility
from the pattern of exchanges rather than quantitatively measurable re-
lationships” (cited in Heath & Cowley, 2004, p. 142). Greckhamer and
Koro-Ljungberg (2005) describe grounded theory as a methodology that
“grounds its analysis in data yet focuses on theory development” (p. 731).
Greckhamer and Koro-Ljungberg go on to summarize grounded theory
work as follows: “Grounded theory draws from both qualitative and quan-
titative inquiries by staying open to data while aiming to produce theory
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and arguments logically and systematically” (p. 731). Following Greckhamer
and Koro-Ljungberg and Heath and Cowley one can reasonably state that
most grounded theorists see the systematic generation of theory from data
as the general goal of the method.
Burck (2005, p. 245) provides a useful step-by-step description of
grounded theory to illustrate they way a researcher using this methods
proceeds: “A grounded theory analysis begins with a line-by-line cod-
ing of written text, identifying descriptive categories which are constantly
compared for similarities and differences. These in turn are clustered or
merged in order to construct researcher categories at a more conceptual
and interpretive level. These categories, in turn, are used to re-examine the
data to further elaborate the concepts analyzed. Throughout the analysis
the researcher writes memos to clarify and to record emerging theoretical
reflections, which help make and keep the process of the analysis trans-
parent, and maintain a self-reflective stance.” She goes on to note that this
approach is particularly helpful in developing theory in under–theorized
areas of research. Here a grounded theory approach aids the researcher
through its methods in generating new theory in a way that is grounded
in specific data and includes a conceptual analysis of the area of inquiry.
In addition grounded theory, according to Burck, includes instructions to
explore initial concepts further through subsequent data gathering and ex-
ploring variability through the method of theoretical sampling. Important
in this process is Glaser and Strauss’s insistence on staying open to dis-
cover new categories until no new categories or concepts are generated
(Glaser & Strauss, 1967).
Important methods of grounded theory include: coding the data, de-
veloping initial data codes and connecting these to theoretical codes. This
process needs to be accompanied by memo writing, constant comparison
of data and codes, and theoretical sampling of further data to be coded
in order to aid the development of theoretical codes while ensuring that
these are grounded in data. Strauss and Corbin (1998) and Glaser (1992)
have developed different terms for these steps. Strauss and Corbin (1998)
differentiate between what they call open coding, axial coding and selec-
tive coding. During axial coding the researcher tries to reduce the number
of categories and establishes clusters of categories, which then form the
basis for selective coding, whose aim it is to integrate the categories into
a theory. Glaser (1992) differentiates between substantive and theoreti-
cal coding. Substantive coding includes the categorization of the original
data and the refinement of these categories through subsequent coding of
new data. During theoretical coding the discovered categories are refit-
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ted around the emerging core of the categories, as seen by the researcher.
The theoretical coding provides the step from categorization of data to the
formulation of a theory.
Regarding differences and similarities between Glaser’s and Strauss’s
approaches Heath and Cowley (2004) find that discovery is at the heart
of both Glaser’s and Strauss’ ideas. The researcher enters a field open
to realizing new meaning and through cycles of data gathering and anal-
ysis focuses on a core problem around which other factors will be inte-
grated. Differences, in addition to the above described differing steps in
coding, can be found in Glaser’s and Strauss’s approaches in the use of
prior knowledge in using a grounded theory method. Heath & Cowley
describe Glaser’s approach to prior understanding (Glaser, 1978) as being
based only on the general problem area. According to this view, reading
of scientific material should occur on a broad range of topics in order to
alert or sensitize the researcher to a wide range of possibilities. Learning
“not to know” is seen to be crucial to maintaining sensitivity to data by
Glaser (Heath & Cowley, 2004, p. 143). For Strauss (1987) both use of
self and the literature are early influences and, while diffuse understand-
ings provide sensitivity, both specific understandings from past experience
and literature may be used to stimulate theoretical sensitivity and generate
hypotheses. Furthermore, he recommends (Strauss & Corbin, 1998) that
a research question should take the form of identifying the phenomenon
to be studied and include what is known about the subject.
In Heath and Cowley’s view (Heath & Cowley, 2004), Glaser (1978,
1992) has remained true to the initial commitment (Glaser & Strauss,
1967) of emphasizing the modifiability and openness of a grounded theory
approach. In symbolic interactionism, on whose conceptions grounded
theory was original based, induction is viewed as the key process, with
the researcher moving from the data to empirical generalization and on
to theory (Bulmer, 1979). In this view of grounded theory, according to
Heath and Cowley (2004, p. 144), as the data are analyzed and coded,
ideas and potential insights will begin to develop which are recorded in
theoretical memos. It is the data that develops theoretical sensitivity, giv-
ing induction a key position in grounded theory. Following this view of
grounded theory, selection of data and categories to fit preconceived or
prematurely developed ideas is to be avoided, however creative these may
appear. Glaser (1999) stresses that “the researcher must be able to toler-
ate confusion, hard work and tedium of the constant comparative method
and wait for concepts to emerge.” In contrast, Heath and Cowley (2004)
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claim that deduction and verification dominate analysis in the approach
described by Strauss and Corbin (1998), even if Strauss and Corbin again
modify their position in relation to coding and theory construction. As
Heath and Cowley (2004) put it “stages and analysis do appear less con-
trived” (p. 147).
In my research I followed Glaser’s approach more than Strauss’s. Over
time my initial theme of “identity negotiation” as conflict resolution
changed through the influence of open coding to a focus on the use of na-
tional identity in a conflict resolution setting and the theoretical question
if a social identity could be a positive resource for conflict resolution. My
own experiences in the workshop in 1999 were marked by a very open and
rather uninformed stance toward the field of conflict resolution. My mas-
ter’s thesis (Kraus, 1998) had concerned the relation between a European
identity and several national identities, which probably had sensitized me
to the issue of national identity when I participated in the workshop. After
my initial experience and writing a class paper on the topic, I began read-
ing transcripts of other workshops. Through this reading I explored differ-
ent categories, which influenced my reading and through writing memos
developed into the results presented in chapter 4. This work developed
the focus of my theoretical considerations reflected in chapter 2. In keep-
ing with a grounded theory approach I used selective coding on the one
hand and theoretical sampling on the other. In order to control for my own
biases I sampled most of my data from three workshops, which were all
three years apart (1989, 1992, 1995) and chose the same times in these
workshops. I selected two different points of time as I expected from the
setup of the workshops (see section 3.2.3) that they might contain dif-
ferent uses of identity. I did, as Glaser (1999) (quoted above) stressed,
endure quite a bit of confusion before I arrived at the current work.
Greckhamer and Koro-Ljungberg (2005) examine the epistemologi-
cal foundations of grounded theory. They describe the original theory
as anchored in positivism and cite Glaser (1978) with this description of
grounded theory in which he underlines the importance of logical analy-
sis: “Grounded theory is based on systematic generation of theory from
data, that itself is systematically obtained from social research” (Glaser,
1978, p. 2). The positivist stance becomes very clear in the following
quote from Strauss and Corbin (1998): “Although we are studying ob-
jects more worldly than, yet often just as elusive as, the sun and the stars,
we, like Galileo, believe that we have an effective method for discov-
ery” (p. 1). According to Greckhamer and Koro-Ljungberg (2005, p.
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742) “Glaser, Strauss and Corbin propose that coding procedures take
researchers beyond description and put them “into a conceptual mode
of analysis” (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p. 66)”. Greckhamer and Koro-
Ljungberg go on to conclude that “analytical procedures such as those
to identify concepts and discover their dimensions (open coding), proce-
dures to relate categories to their subcategories (axial coding), and proce-
dures to integrate and refine those discovered categories (selective coding)
are consistent with the embedded epistemology and theoretical stance”
(Greckhamer & Koro-Ljungberg, 2005, p. 742). Greckhamer and Koro-
Ljungberg also point to the importance of controlling the sampling pro-
cess. They make the point that “it makes a difference if random, situated,
experienced data are used to produce a generalizable theory or if con-
trolled and objectified data lead to a generalizable theory” (Greckhamer
& Koro-Ljungberg, 2005, p. 741).
I believe this to be an important point, as, from my own experience,
the controlled selection of data from different workshops at the same
times, helped me control for my own biases in selecting material and kept
my inquiry open to alternative explanation of the data. Greckhamer and
Koro-Ljungberg (2005) write in part a response to the development of a
“constructivist” grounded theory by Charmaz (2002). For my personal
research a positivist stance with regard to grounded theory makes a lot of
sense. In my view it does not conflict with the constructionist approach to
national identity, which I have argued for earlier (see section 1.1.4). I be-
lieve that grounding my work in a positivist view of the theory constructed
is plausible, as I have treated the data as existing expressions of identity
use in a conflict resolution setting. As I did not conduct interviews or col-
lect data for subsequent coding directly myself, but used transcripts from
workshops that already existed, the question of how much I constructed
the data together with my subjects is not as pressing as it might be in a
different setting. In addition I believe that, though self-reflection is an
important part of a grounded theory process, within the thematic world of
“conflict” and “conflict resolution” it may be difficult enough to propose
a new point of view in this arena without questioning my own project
through a constructionist perspective.
But Greckhamer and Koro-Ljungberg (2005) also find conceptual in-
consistencies in the work of Glaser and Strauss. Especially the role of ver-
ification in the process of grounded theory is questioned. For their argu-
ment Greckhamer and Koro-Ljungberg oppose the following two quotes:
“Although our emphasis is on generating theory rather than verifying it,
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we take special pains not to divorce those two activities, both necessary
for the scientific enterprise” (Glaser & Strauss, 1967, p. viii). “These hy-
potheses are probability statements, not facts that are verified. Grounded
theory is not verificational” (Glaser, 1992, p. 29). While Greckhamer and
Koro-Ljungberg do not take a position on which of these two statements
is correct or better, they note that “we believe that any method is con-
siderably altered if verification appears or does not appear as part of the
epistemological aims even if verification itself does not form the focus of
the method” (Greckhamer & Koro-Ljungberg, 2005, p. 740).
From my own experience in working with grounded theory I believe
that a different conclusion can be more helpful. Even if a grounded theory
process itself cannot verify a theory developed as part of its own process,
the theory generated by this method should be subject to verification in
another step. The claim that a theory generated by a grounded theory pro-
cess needs to be verified, or better attempted to be falsified, is, in my view,
not a claim made in the first quote either. Grounded theory should pro-
duce a theory that lends itself easily to hypothesis generation, which can
and should be verified/falsified in subsequent (quasi-)experiments. The
described procedure should ensure, that the theory generated is not (just)
a theory to back a researcher’s belief system but grounded in and altered
by data taking into consideration by the researcher. In my own experience
the grounded theory approach was helpful in developing the theoretical
ideas presented in chapter 2. As can be seen in section 3.3 in this chapter
and in chapter 4 the process I went through helped to change and sharpen
my focus in dealing with the broad question of the relationship between
national identity and protracted ethnic conflict. It was not possible for me
to verify any of the theoretical claims made in chapter 2 in an experimen-
tal way and I believe from my own experience that it would have been
counterproductive to attempt such a step simultaneously with the current
endeavor. In contrast to other arenas of public life, scientists and espe-
cially social scientists should try to avoid theory construction that is only
done for purely ideological reasons or could be misused in such a way.
That is what, in my view, grounded theory should and can provide to re-
search and I believe it has done for my research project.
My overall aim has been to generate a different point of view on con-
flict and its resolution, that is a possibility for a different reality. To quote
Heath and Cowley (2004), I believe that it is important to keep in mind
“that grounded theory aims at discovering not the theory but a theory” (p.
149).
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3.2 Description of material
The material used here in the analysis of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict
resolution efforts is set within the framework of interactive problem solv-
ing as developed by Prof. Herbert C. Kelman at Harvard University (see
for example Kelman, 1986, 1992). This approach has been practiced by
Kelman and members of PICAR (Program on International Conflict Anal-
ysis and Resolution) at Harvard University in the form of conflict resolu-
tion workshops. Kelman (1997a) describes his work in the following way:
For over 20 years, politically influential Israelis and Pales-
tinians have met in private, unofficial, academically based,
problem-solving workshops designed to enable the parties to
explore each other’s perspective, generate joint ideas for mu-
tually satisfactory solutions to their conflict, and transfer in-
sights and ideas derived from their interaction into the policy
process. (Kelman, 1997a, p. 212)
These workshops are often described as instances of track–two diplo-
macy. This means that they are not official negotiations but intensive
meetings between politically involved but “entirely unofficial representa-
tives of conflicting parties” (Kelman, 1997a, p. 214), convened by a third
party and designed to develop new ideas about a conflict, which should
eventually influence all parties. One advantage of a track–two diplomacy
effort is that the discussions are not immediately limited by the binding
character of official negotiations and allow participants to explore possible
avenues of agreement. The basic idea of an interactive problem-solving
workshop is to provide a space, situated in an academic environment, that
allows the participants to better understand the other’s needs and fears and
to develop ideas, through interaction with participants from the opposing
parties, that may lead to new and creative solutions to certain aspects of
the conflict or the conflict as a whole. Kelman (1996, p. 110) describes
the workshop as:
a place devoted to the free exchange of ideas and non-committal,
“purely academic” discussions. It is also largely governed by
its own alternative set of norms favoring “open discussion,
attentive listening to opposing views, and an analytical ap-
proach,” to counteract “the polemical, accusatory, and legal-
istic approach that conflict norms tend to promote” (Kelman,
1992, p. 74). [. . . ] (Kelman, 1996, p. 110)
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In the history of interactive problem-solving workshops there have
been one-time workshops and, more recently, three continuing workshops.
The first continuing workshop took place from November 1990 to August
1993 (see Kelman (1997a, p. 215) and Rouhana and Kelman (1994) for
details). The second was set up after the Oslo agreement was signed with
the intention of publishing joint papers on issues, which had been deferred
to the final status negotiations and began meeting in May 1994 (see for ex-
ample the paper published by Alpher and Shikaki (1999) on the issue of
the right of return). For a more exhaustive description of the history of
interactive problem-solving workshops between Palestinians and Israelis
by Kelman and colleagues see Rouhana and Kelman (1994, p. 161).
As part of his class “International conflict: social–psychological ap-
proaches” Kelman has conducted many one-time workshops. The par-
ticipants at these workshops were different ones in each workshop. It
also included the participation of all students of the class as members of
the third party (see the next section below for a more detailed descrip-
tion). In addition to these workshops there have been many other, usually
weekend-long, workshops on the Israeli-Palestinian and other conflicts.
In the current study I am using data from problem-solving workshops be-
tween Israelis and Palestinians held between 1982 and 1999 that were
conducted as part of the above mentioned class.
3.2.1 Setting
The description of the workshops in this and the following sections refers
to the workshops held as part of Kelman’s class. The workshops are held
over a weekend and include 10 sessions of approximately 1.5 hours in
length. In addition the third party meets with both parties separately in
3 hour pre-workshop sessions. A workshop usually brings together 4 Is-
raelis and 4 Palestinians. They are joined by 8 members of the third party
at the table. Two to four senior facilitators are present at the table through-
out the whole weekend and are joined by student members of the third
party on a rotating basis. All students not at the table sit behind a one-way
mirror and observe the proceedings. This is known to all participants of
the workshop and both parties have met all students in pre-workshop ses-
sions held before the weekend. This setup allows for a system of verbatim
note taking, with two students taking notes as faithfully to the proceedings
as possible for half-hour intervals. This is the material I am using in the
next chapter. The necessity to take verbatim notes stems from the partici-
pants’ concern with confidentiality and creating a record, which made it
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impossible to record the workshops. I believe that it is necessary to stress
the fact that due to the nature of the note taking procedure all of the quotes
from the workshops in the following chapter are not actual utterances by
participants. The texts I am using can be considered good representations
of the interactions between the participants of a given workshop. As part
of Kelman’s Psychology class, the workshops were usually conducted in
April of each year.
The framework set forth by the convening third party emphasizes the
confidentiality of all interactions and the impartial position of the third
party, whose role it is to facilitate the process but not to offer solutions:
The discussions are completely private and confidential. There
is no audience, no publicity, and no record, and one of the
central ground rules specifies that statements made in the
course of a workshop cannot be cited with attribution out-
side of the workshop setting. [. . . ] The third party creates
an atmosphere, establishes norms, and makes occasional in-
terventions, all conducive to free and open discussion. [. . . ]
[Participants] are encouraged to deal with the conflict analyt-
ically rather than polemically—to explore the ways in which
their interaction helps to exacerbate and perpetuate the con-
flict, rather than to assign blame to the other side while justi-
fying their own. (Kelman, 1997a, p. 214)
The goals, which are set forth at the beginning of a workshop, are to move
toward a problem-solving mode, to share perspectives, to gain an under-
standing of the concerns and constraints of both parties and to develop
new ideas and insights into the conflict and creative new ways of look-
ing at the conflict, which may enable participants to find solutions that
meet the needs of both parties. It is stressed that the workshop is not
an official negotiation, a debate, an academic seminar or a place to give
speeches. Emphasis is also placed on the equality of both parties within
the workshop setting. Kelman (1996, p. 107) explains what is intended
by this stated equality between parties: “Within the workshop, the parties
are equal in the sense that both parties’ needs and fears are addressed and
given equal weight in the deliberations, regardless of whatever asymme-
tries of power or moral standing may characterize their relationship at the
macro-level.”
This way of perceiving conflict suggests two important goals for a di-
alog project or mediation: Reframe the conflict in non-zero-sum terms
and overcome mirror images. In order to achieve this the interactive
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problem-solving method developed by Kelman employs a technique that
focuses both parties’ attention on analyzing their needs and fears. Be-
coming aware of and expressing one’s own needs and fears vis-à-vis the
other makes it possible to find non-zero-sum solutions to the conflict. The
opposing demands may be based on very different motivations and alter-
native solutions may be found to satisfy what is needed and provide safety
in relation to what is feared. This also has the benefit that alternative so-
lutions are developed by the participants themselves, creating a feeling
of ownership instead of having a solution imposed by a third party. The
technique also includes an exercise in which the other party repeats what
the first has expressed as being their needs and fears. This is very difficult
for participants but important, as it is a considerable step towards recog-
nizing the mirror images in the conflict, which are usually obscured by
one’s own self- and other-perception (see section 2.3).
3.2.2 Participants
The goal to invite influential members of both communities is based on the
idea that the micro-processes and the learning that occurs during a work-
shop can and should be transferred to the macro-level by participants (see
Rouhana, 2000 for more details). The participants that have taken part in
these workshops over the years have included scientists, journalists, army
personnel, students and others from both sides. Kelman (1997a) states that
“in our Israeli-Palestinian work, participants have included parliamentar-
ians; leading figures in political parties or movements; former military
officers or government officials; journalists or editors specializing in the
Middle East; and academic scholars who are major analysts of the conflict
for their societies and some of whom have served in advisory, official, or
diplomatic positions” (p. 214). Participants were mainly recruited through
personal contacts of the senior third party facilitators and references from
former participants. The selection of participants is aimed at providing a
representation of the political mainstream on both sides that is as broad
as possible. “Within the broad mainstream, it is useful to have a range of
political views represented in the workshop. The diversity of views pro-
vides a broader base for assessing the realism and acceptability of ideas
developed in the workshop” (Rouhana & Kelman, 1994, p. 168). At the
same time one has to be mindful of the problem of self-selection. People
who were willing, particularly before the Oslo accords, to talk to the other
side in the first place were more likely to represent a moderate political
point of view and many were close to the peace camp on both sides. The
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following quotes from Kelman and Rouhana and Kelman represent a very
good summary of the participant selection process and its aim:
“The composition of the workshop is crucial in this context:
Great care must be taken to select participants who, on the
one hand, have the interest and capacity to engage in the kind
of learning process that workshops provide and, on the other
hand, have positions and credibility in their own communities
that enable them to influence the thinking of political lead-
ers, political constituencies, or the general public” (Kelman,
1997a, p. 215).
“Credibility should be based not only on expertise, rank, and
experience, but also on the participants’ legitimacy and trust-
worthiness in the eyes of their communities” (Rouhana &
Kelman, 1994, p. 168).
“A major consideration in the selection of participants is that
they be close enough to the centers of power to have some in-
fluence on decision makers, political elites, and public opin-
ion, yet sufficiently removed from power so as not to be con-
strained by official positions of their governments or other
political institutions. Ideal participants might include indi-
viduals who do not currently hold political office but who
have done so in the past and/or are likely to become involved
in decision making and strategy planning in the near future,
or who are politically influential by occupying positions—
in academia, the media, political parties or movements—that
enable them to have an impact on the framing of the issues
and the perception of available options by decision makers,
opinion leaders, and the general public. Selection of the indi-
vidual participants who meet these and other requirements is
based on intimate knowledge of both societies and the politi-
cal forces and dynamics in each, as well as personal acquain-
tance with at least some individuals who fit the general cri-
teria for workshop participation” (Rouhana & Kelman, 1994,
p. 167).
3.2.3 Workshop structure
A workshop can lend itself to many issues: meeting the other side; float-
ing ideas; personal healing; developing new ideas to resolve the conflict.
3.2 Description of material 63
The main focus in the framework of a workshop lies on learning. “A basic
assumption of our approach is that solutions emerging out of the inter-
action between the conflicting parties are most likely to be responsive to
their needs and to engender their commitment” (Kelman, 1997a, p. 215).
The interactive problem solving part of the workshop is the main goal of
the workshop itself. Interventions and ground-rules are geared towards
promoting an environment, which allows participants to develop and ex-
plore new and alternative ways to resolving the conflict. The learning ex-
perience focuses on this interaction. Learning consists of acquiring new
information, changes in perception of the other and the development of
new approaches to resolving conflict issues, which are supported by both
sides. The purpose of the workshop is to understand assumptions and
preconceptions by which people operate through experiencing the inter-
action with members of the other side, to jointly develop new approaches
to and new ways of defining the problem, and to communicate these new
ideas to one’s constituency. As Kelman (1997a) states, “workshops have a
dual purpose. First, they are designed to produce changes in the workshop
participants themselves. [. . . ] the second purpose of workshops is to max-
imize the likelihood that the new insights, ideas, and proposals developed
in the course of the interactions are fed back into the political debate” (p.
214). In my words this could be described as an effort to create new vi-
sions for the self or national identity that can compete with the current
national identity invested in the conflict.
The role of the third party is geared towards supporting this learn-
ing. The third party establishes ground rules, focuses on facilitating, re-
frains from involvement in substantive negotiations, gives structure to the
workshop, keeps time, and tries to balance the interactions while guard-
ing the ground rules. Techniques used to achieve these goals includes:
rephrasing, summarizing, and reframing issues. The ground rules estab-
lished by the third party include securing privacy, confidentiality, and no
accountability in order to protect participants and the process and enable
new learning. This is achieved by the absence of observers. Any person
present during the workshop is either a member of the conflict parties or
the third party and bound by the ground rules. The discourse is supposed
to be analytical and should not include discussions about right or wrong
but process and causes. There is no expectation to reach agreement be-
tween the conflict parties and the third party only facilitates the process of
interactive problem solving and neither offers solutions nor is part of sub-
stantive discussions. For a detailed list and explanation of ground rules
see Rouhana and Kelman (1994, p. 171).
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The main tools of the third party, in directing the process, are fram-
ing and structuring the process. In framing the workshop and setting an
agenda the third party aims at a move towards problem solving. The work-
shop is framed as an unofficial space, which is not a space to debate or
give speeches but a space to be open to the other and new ideas. The
focus of interaction in a problem-solving workshop can adapt to the par-
ticular stage of the conflict. One usually distinguishes here between the
prenegotiation, negotiation or postnegotiation phase of the conflict. The
focus in a prenegotiation phase of conflict is finding ways to move toward
negotiation, answering questions such as: How can we overcome barri-
ers to negotiation? In a negotiation phase the focus shifts towards finding
alternative solutions to problems, that may occur in the official negotia-
tion process. In a postnegotiation phase of the conflict, issues that might
hinder the implementation of a negotiated settlement come to the fore.
The agenda set forth by the third party usually begins with asking
the participants to give an overview of the themes that bring them to-
gether and also existing barriers that may be hoped to overcome during
the workshops. This may include a description of the current situation,
the relationship between sides, and participants’ initial understanding of
and view on the conflict. The third party then asks participants to express
the concerns and needs that a solution to the conflict has to address in or-
der to be acceptable to their side. After both sides have restated the other’s
needs and fears, to show and ensure understanding, the shape of solutions
that would be responsive to the needs and concerns is sought out. Only
after steps towards a solution have been found does the agenda cover psy-
chological and political constraints to this solution. Lastly participants are
encouraged to engage in joint problem solving to find ways to overcome
these constraints and develop parallel or joint actions that could be un-
dertaken to work towards a solution. The following quotes from Kelman
(1997a, 1996) best explain the agenda setting and its purpose:
“As the first step in the typical agenda of problem-solving
workshops, we ask the parties to talk about “the fundamental
needs that an agreement would have to satisfy and the funda-
mental fears that it would have to allay in order be acceptable
to their communities” (Kelman, 1992, p. 73). We urge the
parties not to debate these needs and fears, but to try to un-
derstand them from the others’ perspective” (Kelman, 1996,
p. 109).
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“Once both sets of concerns are on the table and have been
understood and acknowledged, the parties are encouraged to
engage in a process of joint problem solving. They are asked
to work together in developing new ideas for resolving the
conflict in ways that would satisfy the fundamental needs
and allay the existential fears of both parties. They are then
asked to explore the political and psychological constraints
that stand in the way of such integrative, win–win solutions
and that, in fact, have prevented the parties from moving to
(or staying at) the negotiating table. Again, they are asked
to engage in a process of joint problem solving, designed
to generate ideas for “getting from here to there.” A cen-
tral feature of this process is the identification of steps of mu-
tual reassurance—in the form of acknowledgments, symbolic
gestures, or confidence-building measures—that would help
reduce the parties’ fears of engaging in negotiations in which
the outcome is uncertain and risky” (Kelman, 1997a, p. 214).
Time line
To translate the agenda outlined above into the actual time line of the
workshops I am using as data here I created the following overview:
1. Pre-workshop sessions: One party at a time for 3 hours; getting to
know other members of one’s party and all members of the third
party, senior facilitators and students. Explanation of ground rules.
Addressing the audience to state their point of view of the conflict.
2. Friday: Meeting of Palestinians and Israelis, getting to know each
other. Explanation of the ground rules. Defining important issues
in the conflict.
3. Saturday AM: Needs and fears analysis by both sides. Only ques-
tions of clarification are allowed.
4. Saturday AM/PM: Each party describes what the other side has
mentioned as needs and fears. The aim is to ensure understanding
on both sides of the other’s needs.
5. Saturday PM/Sunday AM: Joint problem solving. How could a so-
lution of a specific issue look like? What can one party do for the
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other? It is important to try and limit the impact of possible con-
straints in order to suspend these issues for a little while.
6. Sunday AM/PM: Addressing constraints, hindrances, restrictions to
the ideas and solutions found.
7. Sunday PM: Creative ideas to deal with these obstacles, wrap up.
3.3 Steps in the qualitative research process
During my work on the role of identity in conflict resolution 5 steps can
be identified. I will describe them in the following sections.
3.3.1 Development of the research question
Taking part in the workshop in 1999 I was surprised by the agreement
between Israelis and Palestinians about what a settlement should look like
and their inability to accept the other’s vision as substantial. On the one
hand, participants in this particular workshop seemed genuinely interested
in finding ways to resolve conflict. On the other hand, both sides were
deeply convinced that “we have given you everything and you have given
us nothing.”
In an initial step I investigated this feeling and developed the idea that
identity issues could explain the apparent dilemma (see section 4.1 on
page 74). My first “conclusion” was that identity needed to be negotiated
for successful conflict resolution.
Using a grounded theory approach, I started out with the question:
What role does identity play in the interactive problem-solving work-
shops? While keeping a journal I started reading the workshop transcripts.
The first difficulty I had with the texts was that the focus on identity kept
slipping as I got drawn into the discussions about the problems and issues
of the day. Both sides presented arguments that were convincing in their
own right and the topics of discussion intrigued me. Reading the next
workshops was really captivating but the focus on a social-psychological
view of the exchanges slipped time and again. But there also was a sense
of a pattern that kept repeating rather independently of the substance that
was discussed, which changed over time (from Sadat to Intifada to Oslo
to the transitional period). How could I capture this pattern? What could
it be about? I began looking at different workshops.
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3.3.2 Expanding the data set
With access to more workshop transcripts I began to compare the impres-
sions I had from my initial reading of different workshops. The main
comparisons I used can be found in sections 4.2.1 on page 77 and 4.2.2 on
page 82. The issue of identity was not as evident to me in reading the other
workshops as it was participating in the 1999 workshop. In addition the
conflict issues presented in the workshops seemed to make it difficult for
me to focus on identity use. The idea of identity negotiation as a tool for
conflict resolution was not as clear to me anymore. Nonetheless impasses
in the workshops still had a characteristic of identity issues to them. In
order to see if there was any substantial identity use I began coding one
workshop in more depth (see section 4.2.3 on page 83). This work sup-
ported my idea of a significant use of identity negotiation in this conflict
resolution setting. Still focusing on identity use in individual exchanges
was difficult.
3.3.3 Qualitative analysis
In order to address my problem of keeping a focus on identity I decided
to write a hermeneutical exposition, which can be found in section 4.3 on
page 89, in order to allow myself to make identity use more explicit. I
looked for discussions of Palestinian and Israeli identity and themes else-
where to help me keep my focus on identity. Two authors captured iden-
tity themes very well, namely Khalidi (1997) and Ellis (2002). Khalidi
(1997) points to important themes of Palestinian identity: the fight against
the “recent” nature of their identity, with the implication that Palesti-
nians were created by Zionism and did not exist before; the ability to
present various failures of acquiring self-determination as unlikely suc-
cesses against powerful opponents. Drawing upon research on politicized
identity (Simon & Klandermans, 2001) one could say that this framing
of failures as successes serves to uphold a sense of group efficacy, which
is needed to mobilize the constituency for a project of self-determination.
At the same time this framing also supports an adversarial attribution of
the current and historical unjust situation to the larger powers (such as
the Ottoman Empire and Israel), which in turn also supports the mobiliza-
tion process. Ellis (2002) proposes three distinct dialectics that emerged
from “Holocaust theology” (p. 53): suffering and empowerment; inno-
cence and redemption; specialness and normalization. In this view Israel
represents the empowerment that prevents another Holocaust. The 1967
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war can be seen as a victory that brought Jews close to redemption and
manifested the idea that a threat to Israel is a threat to all Jewish life, an-
other Holocaust waiting to happen. Israeli empowerment can be seen in
this line of thought as innocent, as it is a reaction to the great disaster in
Europe. Empowerment through the state of Israel is special in the sense
that it reunifies Jews with Jerusalem, reconnecting them to the specialness
of 2000 years ago, and that the horror experienced by Jews in Europe is
special in its own right. The Lebanon war and the Palestinian uprising on
the other hand pose the question of normalization and make Israel a nation
state similar to others, hence questioning the innocence of empowerment.
While controversial, Ellis’ thoughts describe the tensions found in Israeli
identity very well.
These thoughts helped me in formulating the underlying identity strug-
gles and conflicts within the workshops, which led me to writing longer
analyses on excerpts from the 1992 workshop (see section 4.3). After this
analysis I was surprised by the amount of identity issues involved in what
had looked to me before as purely a discussion about facts on the ground.
With the notion of identity being used in the conflict resolution setting es-
tablished, I turned towards developing codes and selecting workshops for
a final, structured analysis.
3.3.4 Selecting data sets
For the next and last step of coding different workshops I wanted to get
an overview of what might happen in workshops and find a way to select
from the large number of workshops at my disposal. I looked for different
keywords and their frequency of mention in the workshops I had access
to. These frequencies can be found in appendix A. I do not include them
here, as I did not aim at producing an exhaustive list of keywords nor treat
them statistically. I used these frequencies as a guide for selection. There
are several interesting issues in table A.1 on page 139, but the overall
impression that one can get from these frequencies is that the workshops
did not differ very greatly in their content across time. From this short
descriptive overview I was quite comfortable that I would not make any
systematic errors in choosing particular workshops over others, as they
were all dealing with similar issues. For further investigation I decided to
select three workshops in order to keep the data size manageable. I also
decided to keep an equal amount of time between workshops in order not
to bias my selection too much by choosing workshops that had especially
appealed to me in my first reading. With the goal of keeping some objec-
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tivity in my procedure I settled upon the workshops from 1989, 1992 and
1995.
3.3.5 Coding procedure
After having achieved a clearer focus on identity I turned towards the
question of what I expect to happen, with regard to identity, when Pales-
tinians and Israelis meet. I wanted to develop a more structured approach
to the identity question, based on my knowledge in social psychology, for
my analysis. Using different frameworks that deal with identity in dis-
course/group settings I began developing a coding scheme. This coding
scheme is not designed to be exhaustive but it is meant to be a more struc-
tured and helpful guide to reading and analyzing the texts. The coding
scheme helped me to condense my findings and made it possible to report
prototypical representations of certain identity-related issues I encoun-
tered in the texts (see sections 4.4). Together with the help of two under-
graduate students from the department of Social Psychology at Helsinki
University, the codes were refined until we achieved a reasonable degree
of agreement. In addition to the final codes found in step 7 below, I had
to include several other steps from first reading the text to finally coding
it, to make the process clear to my students and achieve a good degree of
reliability in the use of codes. These steps are based on the work done
before arriving at this coding scheme and includes the results presented in
sections 4.1 to 4.3 on pages 74–89. This is what the final coding instruc-
tions, we used to code the 1989 workshop and I used to code the 1992 and
1995 workshops, looked like:
In coding the exchanges between Israelis and Palestinians
in conflict resolution workshops I would like us to follow 7
steps:
1. Segment the text into small logical units.
2. Group segments into intelligible units (i.e. one Pales-
tinian sentence only makes sense if it is read together
with the preceding question by an Israeli)
3. Determine the frame of reference, i.e. is the talk about
the Palestinians, Israelis or their relationship (ingroup,
outgroup, us)
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4. Define the content (or function) of the exchange, possi-
ble content can include: statement of fact or status quo;
proposition; demand; conditions
5. Ascribe a goal to the exchange (use the themes outlined
for Palestinians and Israelis), for example: undermining
the other; upholding status quo; challenging the other;
reducing one’s insecurity; displaying power; increasing
power
6. Define a large piece of text as a unit and describe what
it is dealing with, e.g. this passages deals with elections
which represent a struggle between the two groups to
define reality favorably in their own terms...
7. Return to the text and mark segments according to the
categories we have used so far:
(a) Characteristics are ascribed to ingroup
(b) Characteristics are ascribed to outgroup
(c) Statement about what ingroup is not (e.g. “we are
not murderers”)
(d) Statement about what outgroup is not (e.g. “you
are not peace loving, as you claim”)
(e) Statement about what the intergroup relation (for
example conflict) is about
(f) Statement about what the intergroup relation (for
example conflict) is not about
(g) Expressions of group loyalty (aimed at one’s in-
group)
(h) Emphasizing group cohesion (usually directed to-
ward outgroup)
(i) Challenging the credibility of another person
(j) Statements lending credibility to oneself
(k) Disagreeing with ingroup member
(l) Expressions of one’s own guilt or responsibility
(m) Expressions of the other’s guilt or responsibility
(n) Denying guilt or responsibility
(o) Talk about/of (proposed or effectuated) divisive col-
lective action (escalating conflict)
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(p) Talk about/of (proposed or effectuated) positive col-
lective action (resolving conflict)
(q) Derogating the other (using sensitive topics to at-
tack, prejudicial statements, hostility)
(r) Self-stereotyping (for example: we as X)
(s) Other-stereotyping
(t) Contrasting between self and other (stereotypes);
emphasis is being placed on differences between
groups
(u) Expression of attributes shared between (members
of) groups (for example: Palestinian who says that
s/he speaks Hebrew)
(v) Statements taking into consideration (or integrat-
ing) both points of view (can be definitions of the
relation or the other. . . )
These steps are concerned with different questions asked of
the text:
• Steps 3 to 5 try to give an answer to the question: What
is the psychological function of this (these) segment(s)?
• Step 6 is asking the question: What is the theme of
this (larger) passage?
• Step 7 still asks the question: How is identity being
used in this (these) segment(s) (given the context de-
veloped so far)?
In steps 3 to 6 we moved to a broader scale of analysis and tried to
develop a process that makes clearer the kind of steps that have gone into
my own categorization. We started out the coding process at the sentence
or even sub-sentence level and proceeded from there with an analysis that
should end on the level of a page or more and make a statement about the
content of the passage and how it relates to the positions of both parties
in the conflict (themes) or within the workshop. Only then did we pro-
ceed to using the categories we had initially developed and applied them
to sentence and sub-sentence structures identified in the first two steps. It
was also the case that one had to go through the process more than once
in case, for example, the use of the categories in step 7 changed the un-
derstanding of the text and therefore the steps before. This in turn did in
a few instances change the assignment of labels.
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My prior work, using a grounded theory approach, provided me with
the overall theme of codes and I wanted to employ my social psycho-
logical knowledge to provide more theoretical codes. To give a few ex-
amples how theory informed the development of codes I want to refer
to Ellemers, Spears, and Doosje (2002) matrix of possible intergroup sit-
uations (no-threat to threat and high and low commitment) with regard
to social identity theory. Within this framework one would expect inter-
actions in the workshop to be located in the high commitment category
as the presence of representatives from the other party make one’s own
category salient. The intensity of the conflict also renders commitment
high, as a protracted conflict necessitates a commitment to uphold the
conflict. Regarding a workshop, interactions can vary from a no threat
condition to individual- and group-directed threat conditions. Accord-
ingly concerns for social meaning, exclusion and distinctiveness should
be observable in the interaction. So what constitutes identity use in this
sense? One would expect statements that affirm one’s group membership
(in an individual-threat condition), that create a positive distinctiveness
(given a group-threat condition) with regard to the outgroup, and that are
free expressions of identity (in a non-threat condition). What forms can
these statements take? Expressions of group loyalty (code g), and reas-
surance of group membership (for an individual-threat condition; codes
h, n, r), of prejudice, stereotype, absolute moral standards to which the
ingroup conforms, and assigning blame to the outgroup (in a group-threat
condition; codes i, m, q, s, t), and free expression of self- and other-image
without these functions come to mind (codes u, v).
Another identity use to be expected in conflict resolution workshops
should deal with defining both groups in interaction with the other1. De-
scriptions of what the ingroup and the outgroup is like (codes a and b) will
be a first step towards creating a shared meaning of “Israeli” and “Pales-
tinian” within a workshop, as this kind of interaction is most likely very
new to participants. In addition the relationship between parties will be
discussed (codes d and e). An analysis of the exchanges as “norm-in-
action” (Housley & Fitzgerald, 2002) helps to focus on the use of identity
to “win” the conflict (codes c and d). When the two parties engage in
a discussion about who represents or should represent them it may be a
struggle over who has the power or right to define the conflict and the
parties identities.
1For a use of the symbolic interactionist approach, which promotes this view of interac-
tions, see, for example, Jeon (2004).
Chapter 4
Workshop analysis
In this chapter I will walk through the various stages of my analysis of
interactive problem-solving workshops as outlined in section 3.3. I will
first present material from the early stages of working with the workshops,
including initial reflections after participating in the 1999 workshop, pro-
ceeding through the stages of focusing on the use of identity within the
workshops and ending with a formal analysis using the category system
explained in the last chapter to show the mostly indirect use of national
identity in workshops. Comments on the progression and change in my
work will be made in the concluding section (4.5) of this chapter. In
this I will compare workshops from different years and different points
in time within the workshops. In addition I will present some prototypes
of positive identity use in these workshops as a guide to creating a new
intervention that will focus more explicit attention on the constructionist
aspects of identity.
All quotations in this chapter are from near-verbatim notes of the
workshops, which were taken by students of Prof. Kelman’s class (see
section 3.2.1). Comments by Israeli participants can be identified by ini-
tials beginning with an I (e.g. IE) and by Palestinian participants begin-
ning with a P (e.g. PZ). Third party interventions are characterized by
initials other than the naming principle described above. Any text in “[
]” has been edited or added by me, other brackets have been created by
the note takers. It is important to again stress that these “quotes” are not
actual utterances by participants as all text has been produced by students
taking notes (see section 3.2.1). As the students’ aim was to take verba-
tim notes these are nonetheless good representations of the interactions
between participants.
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4.1 Development of the research question
In this section I am presenting my first impressions and ideas generated by
participating in the interactive problem-solving workshop in 1999. This
was the first time I encountered the workshop setting I am using in this
analysis. What struck me in the workshop was that participants on both
sides seemed to agree upon the shape of a solution, namely a Palestinian
state, but very much felt threatened by the other. Drawing on my previ-
ous work on identity (Kraus, 1998) I framed these seemingly opposing
tendencies in the workshop as an expression of identities in conflict. The
remainder of this section is very much a reproduction of my initial ideas
that I wrote as a paper for Kelman’s class:
The first questions were: How can social identity be represented in the
workshop? What does it look like? Going back to Brewer’s analysis of
the needs for differentiation and inclusion, which national identity serves
(Brewer, 1991; see section 1.2.3), one could say that the identity-based
conflict that took place in the workshop was characterized by the need for
the outgroup to acknowledge the legitimacy of the ingroup deindividua-
tion process, which represents the need for inclusion. At the same time the
need for differentiation was expressed through the insistence on two sep-
arate states with the emphasis on the Jewishness of the state respectively
the Palestinian state.
One can demonstrate the importance of the two needs for both parties
through the following content of the workshop. Both the need for dif-
ferentiation and inclusion were present on the Israeli and the Palestinian
list of needs, produced during the workshop, and were placed at the same
position of importance:
• The most important need for the Israelis was a state of Jews, as was
an independent state for the Palestinians. This reflects the need for
differentiation.
• As the third most important need both sides listed what can be
called a need for acknowledgement, which can be linked to the need
for inclusion. The Israelis mentioned their need for the finality of
an agreement on the Palestinian side and the acceptance by the Pa-
lestinians. The Palestinians worded this need for acknowledgement
as a need for the admission of responsibility by the Israelis for the
Palestinian suffering.
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The dialectic of security and vulnerability came into focus as the Is-
raelis addressed the issue of the right of return for Palestinian refugees
and the admission of responsibility raised by the Palestinians as part of
their needs. The intervention by the Israeli participant IE clearly makes
the point of diffusing identity vulnerability:
IE: “I hear two demands [. . . ] You need us to make a declar-
ative statement. The one I can make is that in the process
of establishing the state of Israel. . . that things happened to
other people and act in accordance of this responsibility. I
can’t say in the process of the illegitimate establishment of
the state.”
The last sentence expresses IE’s representation of Israel as vulnerable. In
order to achieve a degree of security, he seems willing to acknowledge
some responsibility of Israel for Palestinian suffering. But the creation of
Israel needs to be a legitimate act and, as was clear in different interactions
in the workshop, Israeli participants need this legitimacy acknowledged
by the Palestinians, in order to reduce the perceived vulnerability of Israeli
identity.
That identity issues were addressed and that identity negotiation was
in fact tackled can be seen in the closing remarks from both sides. PV said
that she and the Palestinian people did not hate the Israelis, which in her
impression was the image the Israelis might have had. PM said he learned
that “this mighty Israel, this nuclear power that threatens the security of
even Russia, still needs reassurance of Palestinians”. The Israelis were
surprised, even shocked, that for the Palestinians a state of their own was
nothing they took for granted but that instead the issue of being acknowl-
edged by Israel was a fundamental concern to them.
In my view, both sides addressed the identity needs they had in terms
of preventing what Hicks et al. (1995) call psychological and social an-
nihilation. The Palestinian focus on their right and need for admission
of responsibility from the Israelis can be characterized as an attempt to
reduce their own fear of annihilation. Interestingly, this focus triggered
for the Israelis (as the quote from IE shows) their own fear of physical
annihilation rather than a surprise about the Palestinians “lack of faith”
in the peace process. Both sides seemed to acknowledge the other’s fun-
damental right of existence during the pre-workshop session, something
that was lost during parts of the workshop. This was a mirror situation:
We, the Israelis, need acknowledgement for our right to exist and we have
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already acknowledged you (with the Oslo agreement) vs. We, the Pales-
tinians, are the victims who have lost everything and we have to fight for
our own state but we acknowledge that Israel is a reality and (maybe) has
the right to exist. But both sides seemed unable to perceive the others
acknowledgement as valid or sufficient due to a fundamental distrust.
This distrust surfaced when the Israelis felt threatened in their legiti-
macy to have a Jewish state and was echoed in the Palestinian feeling that
the Israelis did not acknowledge their (rightful) claim to Palestine. In this
situation identity negotiation started to take place.
There are two instances in which the negotiation of identities became
especially apparent. The Israelis stated, and were somewhat perplexed
that the Palestinians were not of the same opinion, that with the Oslo
agreement they made the most important step towards accepting a Palesti-
nian state: Most Israelis and definitely the participants gave up their dream
of the “Greater Israel”.
IL: “For the Israelis, their decision in giving up the dream
of Greater Israel was a turning point. It changed their inten-
tions. (. . . ) For the Palestinians – the decision didn’t change
anything.” (. . . )
IE: “Now it’s in a different phase of logistics and minutia. . . ”
The Palestinian reaction to this showed that for them the impact of this de-
cision was not yet real. They were able to acknowledge the Israeli notion
of an important turning point but insisted on the omission of the pejora-
tive use of “giving up” the land/dream. Clearly, at this point one can see
how the way the parties talk about the issue is negotiated. This negotia-
tion revolves around the Palestinian need to feel that the Israelis gave up
their dream not out of goodwill but because they acknowledge the right
for a Palestinian state and involves also negotiating what words are used
in describing specific situations. A similar event took place concerning
the Palestinian need (especially voiced by PF) for admission of responsi-
bility. The first stance was that the Palestinian needed an admission of full
responsibility and later on PF would probably have been willing to accept
a partial admission of guilt. He said: “They have been waiting for the last
50 years for you to say ‘sorry’.”
In summary, in my view the interactive problem-solving framework
kept its promise that conflict issues can be addressed in a rather non-
confrontational manner, given the strong emotions involved in an identity-
based conflict. One strength of the approach was the possibility to come
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back together and to acknowledge the other as a partner in negotiations
who shares some common ground with oneself.
What caught my attention in the workshop was, on the one hand, the
possibility of negotiating identity and its promising impact on conflict
resolution. My first hypothesis was that the workshops might give a re-
searcher an idea of how identity was negotiated in the workshop setting.
On the other hand it was surprising that participants were so afraid of
the other. I was able to receive access to transcripts of previous interac-
tive problem-solving workshops and proceeded to write short characteri-
zations of the events of this and other workshops.
4.2 Expanding the data set
4.2.1 Characterizing different workshops
My initial focus in this section was on summarizing the main aspects of
these workshops. I tried to focus on issues that related to identity in order
to develop my understanding of wether and how identity was being used
in these workshops.
1999
In this workshop a main theme for Palestinians was sovereignty. This was
expressed through a need for a Palestinian state and included the need for
occupation to end, the right of return as the sovereignty to control immi-
gration, and an acknowledgement of the Palestinians plight as a people as
part of a sovereign history. Security was an important theme for Israeli
identity. This was reflected in the need for a Jewish state, that is a secure
Jewish majority in Israel, and the need for strategic strength in the region
as providing physical security. This need was questioned by the Pales-
tinians as they claimed that they were the ones who needed security not
Israel, which has, in the Palestinians opinion, the power on the ground.
The differentiation made above by the Israelis between physical and iden-
tity security did not make sense to the Palestinians. Similarly the Israeli
participants did not trust the Palestinians to forgo demands for more ter-
ritory once they had established a Palestinian state. This mirror image
in distrust could be described as an expression of the insecure identity of
both parties.
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Another important issue in the workshop was the question of repre-
sentation and the shape of a process that might lead to conflict resolution.
The perceived dynamic of the current process was discussed in the work-
shop with the Palestinians stating that a bilateral deal would produce the
least extreme result while the Israeli insisted that the best way forward
was through the involvement of the US and a change in the dialog be-
tween the US and the PLO. The Intifada was seen by both sides as having
rendered the Palestinian youth more militant. The Palestinians pointed out
that this allowed for an unholy alliance of hardliners on both sides. But
the Intifada was also perceived as having provided the needed opening for
negotiations, as, from the point of view of the Israeli participants, it took
the Palestinians out of their victim position and handed them the initiative.
On the semantic level there were many contentious issues such as the
Israeli description of Palestinian escalation during the Intifada as equal
to a military aggression. This was seen by the Palestinians as a neces-
sary and restrained act of self-defense. Similarly suicide bomb attacks
and other attacks on Israeli soldiers were seen as a people’s resistance
to occupation by Palestinians while they were described as acts of ter-
rorism by the Israelis. Palestinian insisted in these discussions on their
point of view, not as a matter of semantics but as a matter of identity.
This reflects the struggle over identity definitions during the workshop,
as one Israeli participant said: “Saying 16 year-old [Palestinian youth]
was killed, I am ashamed, but [an Israeli] soldier acting in self-defense
is different!”. Another semantic issue that stirred many emotions, as it
related to the national self-definition, was the use of “Judea and Samaria”
by Israeli participants to refer to the West Bank.
1983
In this workshop there was an early agreement on the goal for both sides:
mutual recognition and peace. But both sides characterized themselves
as somewhat powerless, mirroring each other. That raised the question of
how to achieve the common goal. This question lead to an impasse, which
revolved around the issue of “which foot to put forth first and by whom”.
There was discussion about a step-by-step process, favored by some, and
unilateral declarations, favored by others. The discussion was very much
focused on and limited by barriers and constraints for the two options on
both sides. These limitations carried over into the needs and fears analy-
sis, which was characterized by a great difficulty to relate to the needs and
constraints of the other side. The needs and fears analysis was dismissed
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as mere “role playing” and seen as either not possible or of very limited
use. The major constraints that surfaced were described as the inability of
the Israeli participants to directly influence the political process, referring
to the democratic process in Israel as the reason for the inability, while the
Palestinian participants expressed their helplessness in pushing for recog-
nition of Israel as they felt they lacked any gesture from the Israelis that
would allow them to do so. This raised the question on both sides if this
reflected an insincerity (of the other side) in the early agreement on the
common goal. The Palestinian participants also stressed their feeling of
immediacy for action to resolve the conflict. The participants came up
with the following ideas and helpful actions that both sides could take to
achieve the common goal and support peace parties on the other side: the
recognition of Israel by the Palestinians, the refusal to serve in the West
Bank as soldiers for the Israelis, and the creation of a joint newspaper that
could support dialogue.
1984
The workshop started with a search for commonalities. Suffering, the loss
of identity and land were identified as common themes in Palestinian and
Israeli history. This led to a discussion of differences. Palestinians made
clear that they were suffering at the hands of the Israelis now and that a
solution was of immediate concern to them. They went on to point out
that the Holocaust was perpetrated by Western societies, not the Palesti-
nians. Israel was described as being European and Israel’s occupation of
the West Bank and Gaza as an extension of European colonialism. This
argument ended with the conclusion that Israeli suffering did not come at
the hand of Palestinians or other Arabs and is therefore not comparable to
Palestinian suffering.
The Israelis expressed their great fear of annihilation by the Arab
world, despite Israel’s military power, and the need for recognition to al-
lay this fear. The peace treaty with Egypt and Sadat’s visit to Israel were
cited as an example where territorial security was exchanged for peace,
which was described as “emotional” security in contrast to military secu-
rity. This particular Israeli fear was very surprising for the Palestinians.
1992
One contentious issue in this workshop was the Israeli need for security.
The Palestinian participants questioned the Israelis’ definition of security
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and suggested it might be an excuse to revoke any concessions given. This
brought out the following clarification:
• Security as ability: Strong army for defensive purposes and demili-
tarization of a Palestinian entity
• Willingness of the other side to enter into conflict
• Intention of the other side to enter into conflict
The return of the Sinai to Egypt and the peace treaty with Egypt were
presented as an example where the willingness and intention were per-
ceived as very low or non-existent and allowed the Israelis a sense of
security that lead to an exchange of land for peace even though it reduced
the ability to defend Israel.
Closely related to security, the issue of the need to involve other Arab
countries in peace negotiations (part of a comprehensive peace) was dis-
cussed. The Palestinians argued that the solution of the Palestinian-Israeli
conflict would eliminate any other conflict between the Arab world and
Israel, especially if the Palestinians would speak out for the Israelis. This
view was not shared by the Israelis. Israeli participants’ fear of other Arab
countries and Palestinian participants’ skepticism toward Israel’s security
concerns, reflect the distrust between the conflict parties and also the per-
ceived insecurity of both sides. The following quote may help to illustrate
the main issues of this workshop, namely identity, trust and security:
PW: Why do you feel the Arabs want to fight Israel?
IC: . . . Arabs simply don’t want Israel there on any terms . . .
this is why Israel doesn’t feel that Palestine is the only issue
. . . your sense of urgency parallels our need to delay . . . we
see our acquiescing to you as . . . for you it is the end of your
struggle . . . for us it is another stage in the struggle for our
survival . . . Some of us see the Palestinian state as just one
more stage in the struggle of Arabs to get rid of us . . . just
one more stepping stone . . . I agree with you . . . we have
the physical power . . . but you have everything to gain. . . we
have only to lose except we have peace to gain . . . we need
to explain to the Israeli public what peace means in political
terms . . . if you want to live with us in peace . . . you have to
prove that to us . . . we can deal with the present lack of peace
because we have a strong army . . .
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1993
Describing the current situation in this workshop, the Palestinian partici-
pants equated the territories (West Bank and Gaza) to a prison after the
recent closure. The Palestinians were also concerned that the current sit-
uation and Israel’s refusal to negotiate with the PLO might bring Hamas
to power. This would in their view not only jeopardize the current nego-
tiations but could mean losing the (moderate) Palestinian national move-
ment. Describing the current situation the Israeli participants perceived
the settlers (in West Bank and Gaza) as weakened but cautioned that it
would be a long process until settlements would be dismantled. They
stated that Israel would need a period of Palestinian autonomy without
dismantlement of all settlements.
This was followed by a discussion about the importance and the timing
of concessions on both sides. Each side perceived their own concessions
as huge, even if they may have been late, but characterized the other’s
concessions as “mere crumbs”. The mirror image of the other perception
became very clear. It was very difficult for both sides to feel that they
adequately communicated what gestures meant and how they affected a
position in negotiations and to feel correctly understood, as the following
quote illustrates:
PR: The main question for us is what do the Palestinians have
to offer? There are two concessions to make: recognition of
Israel and territorial concessions. Basically when the delega-
tion goes to the negotiations, these are made. Once they ac-
cept the idea of going to the negotiations both of these are on
the table. So, what do the Palestinians have left to gain? Na-
tional identity recognition and the right to self-determination
[. . . ]
IG: . . . we negotiate for a Palestinian state.. have to negotiate..
let’s discuss and see.. as much as you said, by walking into
negotiations, we have given a lot.
PR: .. not given a lot. I have to emphasize we have given
everything...
IG: This is why radical right wing doesn’t want negotiations
because they realize [it] is moving to a Palestinian state.
During the discussion both sides attempted to lower the threshold of
recognizing the other’s legitimacy, away from recognizing Zionism and
82 Workshop analysis
a Palestinian nation, towards both parties rights to a state. It is not clear
but seems unlikely that every participant supported this idea and it did
not seem to “stick”. The following quotes illustrate the deep fears related
to this discussion and the perceived threat to identity through a “limited”
recognition:
IG: [. . . ] But in all Israelis I think it is deeply ingrained to
fight being pushed into the Sea. Some of us-a few-realize
that this is not the case, that we can operate from a position
of strength, to think politically. I can live with Palestinians.
As long as my security is ensured, I can be generous with
Palestinians. (p. 53)
PL: [. . . ] We also fear that in the Israeli mind Palestinians
shouldn’t even be here [. . . ] (p. 59)
PL: [. . . ] but I don’t think there will be a day that we will say
that we understand that Israel was created to save the Jews
and that we should accept that - the Palestinians won’t say
“now I understand the Jewish tragedy...” I’m trying to work
out how much understanding is crucial... (p. 80)
IG: [. . . ] by saying we won’t accept the morality it’s almost
saying you don’t accept the right of Israel to exist. [. . . ] (p.
82)
4.2.2 Needs and fears
To look at similarities and differences across time I collected the lists
of needs and fears that the participants produced in some of the work-
shops during the Saturday sessions. The original lists can be found in
appendix B on page 140. Here, I only want to summarize the needs and
fears expressed by participants in the workshops from 1984, 1992, 1993
and 1999 where these lists were part of my data set.
The Israelis mentioned the need for the recognition of Israel, their fear
of annihilation, the need for security and the need for a Jewish state in all
four workshops. The need for a Jewish state increased in its position on
the list from fifth1 place in 1984 to first in 1999 (fifth in 1992 and third in
1993). The recognition of Israel was the first concern in 1984 and 1999,
1The position is taken from the actual lists produced by participants, which sometimes
included several issues at the same position; see the reproduction in appendix B on page 140
for the original lists
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while it was fourth in 1993, the first workshop to follow the Oslo accords
and the declaration of principles (this need was second 1992). The need
for security was third in 1984 but was first in 1992 and 1993 and second
in 1999. The fear of annihilation was mentioned second, fourth, second
and third respectively. The need for Jerusalem as the capital of Israel was
mentioned sixth in 1984 and 1992, but was no longer mentioned in 1993
and 1999. This was replaced in 1993 and 1999 with concerns relating to
the relationship with and well-being of Palestinians (needs 5 and 6 and 4
respectively).
For Palestinians the need for an independent state was the first listed
in all four workshops. The acknowledgement of Palestinian suffering (3,
3, 1, 12), the perception of Israel as a threat to security (7, 4, 2, 2) and the
threat posed by the expansion of Israeli settlements (4, 5, 3, 1) were also
mentioned in all four workshops. The need for recognition by Israel of
the PLO as representing the Palestinian people was the first, second and
sixth item on the list in 1984, 1992 and 1993 respectively, but no longer an
issue in 1999. The need for (East) Jerusalem as a capital of a Palestinian
state was fifth, seventh and first in 1984, 1992 and 1999, but not listed in
1993. Similarly, the right of return was not listed as a need in 1993 but
as fifth, seventh and first need in 1984, 1992 and 1999. In 1993 and 1999
there was a concern that Israel was not keeping to its promises (5 and 5).
Overall the needs and fears expressed by different participants at dif-
ferent times were very similar. On both sides the sovereign state for Pa-
lestinians and Israelis (expressed in the Jewishness of Israel) was a major
need. The issue of recognition was also important on both sides. For Is-
raeli participants the emphasis was on the recognition of the legitimacy
of the Israeli state while it was on the recognition of their suffering for
Palestinians. The fear of annihilation by the other was also expressed by
both sides. In all, the needs seemed to mirror each other and remained
rather stable over time. It is important to note the presence of issues of
identity, acknowledgement and insecurity in the needs and fears on both
sides.
4.2.3 Codes for 1992
After this summary of needs and fears for different workshops I turned
back to a more detailed coding of one workshop. I chose the 1992 work-
2The numbers indicate the position in the list the need or fear had in the years 1984,
1992, 1993 and 1999.
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shop because, except for summarizing it, I had not worked with it very
much up to that point. Judging from the frequencies of different key
words from the different workshops there did not seem to be great dif-
ferences between the workshops (see A.1 on page 139). So it seemed to
be a “neutral” workshop to continue my work with that would not bias
my observations too much. The main codes, using a grounded theory
approach (see section 3.1), that emerged with regard to national identity
concerned the following issues3:
• Palestinian state:
– Israeli statements included: “Accepting a Palestinian state is
acquiescing to you.”; “For you it is the end of your struggle.”;
“You have everything to gain. . . we have only to lose except
we have peace to gain.”
– Palestinian statements included: “Give me an example of who
acknowledges Palestinian national rights.”; “There is no polit-
ical organization that acknowledges our national existence.”
• Power:
– Israeli statement: “We can deal with the present lack of peace
because we have a strong army.”
– Palestinian statement: “Palestinians feel that we are not able
to speak or act for all the Arab states.”
• Time
– Israeli statement: “Your sense of urgency parallels our need to
delay.”
– Palestinian statements: “We are losing everyday.”; “We have
little time.”
• Threat:
– Israeli statements: “Israel[is] feel they will never be acknowl-
edged as part of the area.”; “If you want to live with us in
peace. . . you have to prove that to us.”; “[Palestinians] is an-
other element in hostile environment.”
3More examples can be found in appendix C on page 146.
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– Palestinian statements: “I don’t deny the Palestinian hostil-
ity.”; “. . . at the same time Palestinians feel terribly victim-
ized.”; “The only thing we get from you is occupation.”
• Peace:
– Israeli statements: “If peace with Palestinians will bring us
peace with all other Arab nations then this is what we have to
gain from it. . . this is all we have to gain.”; “We acknowledge
your right [to land].”
– Palestinian statements: “Maybe Palestinians will be willing to
work with you if there is land.”; “We don’t have to hug each
other to recognize our rights.”
• Responsibility:
– Israeli statements: “People say in different degrees that we
have done injustices.”; “I think there are a lot of Israelis who. . .
feel guilt, shame, a sense of wanting to repose or help. . . ”; “If
you want us to go beyond pragmatism this will lead us beyond
it more toward apology.”
– Palestinian statements: “I do not understand why you want
me to tell you that I feel good about you [existence of Is-
rael].”; “If we hear talk like that [apology] both publicly and
privately. . . that will go a long way to decrease the hostility
among Palestinians.”
• Arabs, being part of the Middle East:
– Israeli statements: “Israel doesn’t feel that Palestine is only
issue.”; “Some of us see the Palestinian state as just one more
stage in the struggle of Arabs to get rid of us.”; “Our enemies
have always been the Arabs.”
– Palestinian statements: “Palestinians feel that we are not able
to speak or act for all the Arab states.”; “Without solving this
issue [Palestinians], you cannot be part of the region.”
The issues described by these codes were important to both Israelis and
Palestinians. They were issues of discussion and are represented in the
lists of needs and fears shown above. In coding I differentiated between
self- and other-descriptions. In the following subsections I would like
to summarize the view of self and other in this particular workshop with
example quotes from the participants.
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Israeli self-descriptions
The Israeli self-description seems to be characterized by an ambivalence
toward the strength and security of Israel (“We have the physical power.”)
and distrust towards a lack of respect for Israel on the Palestinian side
(“Our recognition is part of the deal.”). It is not a very strong or secure
self-image. This is reflected in the description of efforts to belong and
wanting to “reorientalize” Israel (“I am saying we have a historical con-
nection to you and the Arab people. It is not a new relationship.”) while
acknowledging wrongdoings in the region (“I think of myself as someone
on the left, who would like to see justice done.”). Similarly the expressed
fear of annihilation characterizing Jewish self-descriptions contrasts with
acknowledgement of guilt. Even though this acknowledgement was ex-
pressed by the Israeli participants (and received positive feedback from
the Palestinians) it does not seem to ease the fear or pave the way for
peace but rather to be a barrier towards peace.
Israeli other-descriptions
Israelis describe Palestinians mainly as a part of the larger Arab threat,
not as an independent group (“[Palestinians] never address bringing in
the other Arab states. . . they do not seem to face the feeling in Israel that
this will not solve our problems.”). Palestinians are also seen as having
everything to gain and, in contrast to the Israelis, nothing to lose (“For you
it is the end of your struggle.”). This creates the Palestinian as a powerful
opponent. The claim of injustice done to Palestinians is only mentioned
in relation to the injustice suffered by and threat posed to the Israelis, not
as a description of Palestinians in itself. Palestinians are also implied to
be blind to the sufferings and fears of the Israelis (“A lot of Israelis feel
that they are the ones who should be apologized to not the Palestinians.
This [injustice done] is not in dispute, what comes through to us is that
you want to get rid of us.”).
Palestinian self-descriptions
Palestinians see themselves as victims in the conflict (“. . . at the same time
Palestinians feel terribly victimized.”). They also perceive themselves in
need of an acknowledgement of their suffering by the Israelis (“We don’t
feel [our feelings] acknowledged by the Israelis. . . ”). There is ambiva-
lence towards Israel as the source for Palestinian suffering (“Until such
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guilt is dealt with Palestinians will remain hostile.”) and the reality of Is-
rael’s present day existence (“Among the Palestinians, despite all animos-
ity in history, there is a humane belief that people born in Israel belongs
to these people.”). This ambivalence translates to the question of how a
Palestinian entity that represents the Palestinian people could and should
look like. Palestinians define their suffering and the conflict they are in
with relation to Israel and try to keep other Arab states out of their con-
flict (“Palestinians feel that we are not able to speak or act for all the Arab
states.”). But this is also ambivalent. Palestinians do refer to other Arab
states’ opinion when they try to support the claim of Israel’s injustice done
to Palestinians (“There is no acknowledgement [of the Israeli right to the
land]. I don’t see any Palestinian or Arab who sees it as a right.”; “There
is no acknowledgement among Arabs your right to take over Palestine.”).
Palestinian other-descriptions
The Palestinian view of Israel is very clear: Israel is the enemy respon-
sible for all the suffering of Palestinians (“You are the enemy.”; “There
are planes over our camps. . . you came to our land.”). Israel has taken
the Palestinians’ land and came as a foreign entity not native to the land
(“Jewish immigrants were not wanted from the start.”). But there is also
admiration for the achievement of Israel to establish itself as a state in a
hostile environment (“You are a reality.”; “You made the reality [through]
your hard work.”).
Coding summary
Palestinians and Israelis mirror their needs. Both need to be acknowl-
edged by the other in their right to exist, to have their homeland. Once
they are close to an agreement on acknowledging each other, the Israelis
withdraw by saying that they cannot do that and need Palestinians to fulfill
preconditions. The same withdrawal works the other way as well, when
Israelis talk about their need to be accepted by the larger Arab commu-
nity, not “just” the Palestinians. Palestinians claim not to be able to speak
for other Arab nations while mentioning Arab support for the Palestinian
cause and threat to Israel. The other side’s general acceptance of their own
responsibility or concessions usually does not get noticed or gets weak-
ened by members of the same party.
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Palestinians are creating themselves partly as a reflection of Israel
(“Nobody gave you a state except yourself (you struggled). . . nobody else.
Nobody else can tell us except us.”). Their stance is: We must do as you
did and you should like it, but you are making it impossible for us and do
not want to see how damaging that is.
Israelis have, by their own admonition, accepted the fact that there
will be a Palestinian state. In their view this should be enough for the Pa-
lestinians to end all violence and deliver a promise of Israel’s acceptance
in the region. This basic acceptance of a state-to-be will only crystallize
in the Israeli public if the Palestinians start acting as if they already had
a state and the Israeli public sees the fruits this will bear. The Palesti-
nians on the other hand do not believe that Israel will grant them a state
unless a government says so, which is impossible for the Israelis to do as
that decision depends on public support which will only grow once the
Palestinians have accepted the Israeli claim above. Similarly, Palestinians
claim that they cannot “deliver” the rest of the Arab world, but that it is
only a logical conclusion, based on Arab sentiments/culture, that the cre-
ation of a Palestinian state is the end to the conflict, as the resolution of
the Palestinian “problem” will trigger a resolution of all other outstanding
conflicts. How can other Arab states reject an Israel that has made peace
with the Palestinians? The Palestinians cannot comply with Israeli de-
mands to act as if Israel had recognized a Palestinian state, as that would
leave Israel with all the positive effects without a need to deliver on their
own promises. Such a situation would be fatal from the Palestinian point
of view as the state is the only thing the Palestinians will get out of this
and the only leverage they have is to withhold recognition of Israel until
they get their wish.
It feels like every time something hits too close to home it is tossed
back with a (legitimate?) demand to the other side, sometimes switching
context/subject in the middle of a thought. Overall it is sometimes difficult
to separate identity issues from factual discussions. This seems partly due
to the possibility of using identity to support a factual dispute and vice
versa using a factual dispute to support one’s moral superiority.
I was left with the question: How can I structure this and make it
manageable? The texts appeared rather difficult to decipher as thoughts
were not linear and the transcriptions were not complete. As the above
comments show, the content of the particular workshop had a great impact
on my reading and made it difficult to keep my focus on identity issues.
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In this section I present three hermeneutical expositions of exchanges
between Israelis and Palestinians from the conflict resolution workshop
held in April 1992. These are steps towards making identity use explicit
and formalizing theoretical categories into codes. The analyses became
shorter and more focused on identity as my work progressed.
4.3.1 Saturday 9:45 am
1 IE: Why are you fighting us? There was fighting before 1967.
PZ: Jewish immigrants were not wanted from the start. It
was seen as an extension of the supremacy of the Europeans.
We might learn to live with the reality but to neutralize
5 emotions takes two generations at least.
IE: This is an important point that it will take genera-
tions. We are still cautious about that. That still you
don’t respect us. It will take some generations to accept
us. The idea that Jews arrived from Europe as crusaders.
10 IC: The large perception among the Israelis is that if we
were in your position we had feel the same. How do you
think would feel?
PW: The only thing we get from you is occupation. There
are planes over our camps ... you came to our land. You
15 took our land, Palestine, and want to build trust over
generations without giving the Palestinians stake in that
trust? Maybe Palestinians will be willing to work with you
if there is land. Building settlements on this land will
lead to more frustration.
20 IM: A question for clarification ... you do not acknowledge
any rights beyond colonialists...
IC: That is not what Israelis would accept. Have you been
saying that Palestinians do not see settlements as any-
thing beyond colonialism?
25 PW: You are a reality. I do not understand why you want
me to tell you that I feel good about you. You made the
reality with your hard work. You won’t include
Palestinians in it.
PM: Palestinians accept the reality. This is an important
30 point. I find it difficult to answer questions like about
psychological fears and things like that but they will
always come up.
IM: What I understood is the right for Jews to that land
is no more than the colonialists rights to that land. Do
35 you recognize anything more?
PZ: No. There is no acknowledgement. I don’t see any Pales-
tinian or Arab who sees it as a right.
IE: We acknowledge your right. On your side nobody acknow-
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ledges our right as a national movement, to live there.
40 PW: Give me an example of who acknowledges Palestinian
national rights.
IE: The Labor party acknowledges it. It is on their
platform.
PZ: When did this happen? Before the intifada?
45 IE: Just to remind you in 1986 there was a meeting between
Peres and Hussein ... the London document ... read it and
you will see...
PM: There is no political organization that acknowledges
our national existence.
This interaction contains important fears and needs of both parties.
It can also serve to illustrate how they may remain implicit and make
the conversation difficult to understand. An expansive analysis of this
text tries to “explain” the exchanges that may at first appear to be rather
incoherent. It can be shown that this interaction contains the expression
of:
• important elements of the narrative of both parties,
• a mutual need for recognition (based at least in part on one’s own
narrative),
• mutual assurances of recognition (though they appear somewhat
ambivalent),
• and “triggers” or themes that allow both parties to doubt the honesty
of the other side or not to listen to the other’s recognition.
The exchange begins with an Israeli question with regard to Palesti-
nian violence. The phrase “There was fighting before 1967.” in line 14
refers to the fact that the now Israeli occupied West Bank belonged to Jor-
dan before ‘67 and Palestinians already struggled for independence and
against Israel at that time. The implication is that today’s “fighting” is not
just related to the fact that Israel now occupies the West Bank but has a
deeper motivation. So, what deeper meaning does the Israeli want to ex-
press with the combination of question and statement? It seems that the
Israelis at the table feel threatened by the Palestinian struggle for inde-
pendence in a way that goes beyond giving up control over the occupied
4Line references are always in relation to the numbering of the preceding transcript,
mark the first line if the content, being referred to, extends across multiple lines, and shall
be abbreviated with (l. 1).
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territories and with that the possibility to curb suicide attacks. The ques-
tion and statement may imply the assumption that the current Palestinian
violence serves more than the struggle to create a Palestinian state along-
side Israel. So this question/statement by the Israeli participant may not
only be a question out of interest or concern but trying to make a point
that Palestinians have the intention to destroy the state of Israel.
The Palestinian reaction seems to support that assumption and the fear
underneath. The Palestinian reaction basically says that Israelis are seen
as a foreign entity, an extension of Europe, not wanted (l. 2). However the
Palestinian participant clearly states that this is a sentiment, not necessar-
ily a motivation for action (l. 4). Israeli independence is linked to nega-
tive emotions on the Palestinian side. What role does the reference to the
“supremacy of Europeans” play? It seems that in part it is a justification
for the negative attitudes of Palestinians towards the state of Israel. One
question that needs to be raised is the question if these attitudes concern
the creation or the current existence of Israel. The Palestinian statement is
very ambivalent on this point. On the one hand it is very clear that Pales-
tinian sentiment for Israel is that of an occupying crusader. On the other
hand Israel is referred to as being a reality that “we might learn to live
with”. So the reference to Israel as being an extension of Europe may also
be an explanation for an old struggle and the current difficulties. So the
Palestinian participant picks up on the suggestion in the Israeli statement
that Palestinians might in a way deny Israel a rightful existence.
Why is the response to this implicit statement so ambivalent? How
could the Palestinian have been responding differently? First he could
have made the implicit explicit, asking or stating that Israelis are still to-
day afraid that the Palestinians aim at destroying the state of Israel. In
his statement he could have made it clear that he or Palestinians in gen-
eral see the creation of Israel as unjust and maybe even illegal but that
Palestinians do not per se deny the current Israeli state the right to exist
(Israel being a “reality”). The statement may be ambivalent because of an
underlying ambivalence in the Palestinians’ attitudes toward Israel. Israel
as a force that has committed injustices and as a successful movement for
self-determination that the Palestinians may even admire and would like
to emulate.
How do the Israelis react to this ambivalent statement? There are two
different reactions from two participants. The first (l. 6) shows that the
Palestinian statement has hit a nerve with the Israelis that relates to the
fear implicit in the first Israeli statement. This reaction does not clearly
state that the Israelis are very afraid that the Palestinian side still aims at
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destroying Israel but it implies it. The sentences: “We are still cautious
about that. That you still don’t respect us.” (l. 7) exemplify the distrust
of Israelis for the Palestinian motives in their struggle for independence.
There is a focus on the negative emotions and the view of Israelis as cru-
saders, not the importance of the “reality” of Israel. It seems that the
Israeli speaker has found a confirmation for his hypothesis that Palestini-
ans are intending to destroy Israel. The second reaction is one of empathy
(l. 10). What purpose can this statement serve? It is combined with a
wish for the Palestinians to do the same. So as this statement may ac-
knowledge the injustice done to Palestinians and the resulting negative
attitude towards Israel, it is also a demand towards the Palestinians to ac-
knowledge the motivation for the creation of Israel and the difficulties in
achieving this goal.
The Palestinian response (l. 13) only addresses the Israeli surprise or
unease with Palestinians ambivalence towards Israel and does not contain
an empathic statement. It is a very explicit statement about the violence,
terror and injustice done by Israel. It responds to both Israeli reactions.
First (l. 13) by saying, why are you surprised by our disdain of Israel if we
experience the cruelty of occupation every day and secondly (l. 15), how
can you expect us to feel for you if you are doing all these things to us?
It also puts full responsibility for solving the conflict on the Israelis. The
statement also makes an implicit demand by the Israelis explicit: “[You]
want to build trust over generations without giving the Palestinians [a]
stake in that trust?” The Israeli demand being that Palestinians have to
change their attitude towards Israel into an accepting one for a resolution
of the conflict. The Palestinian response is a counter-demand from the
Israelis to change the treatment of Palestinians and to give them a state
of their own, this being a goal rather than a step in the resolution of the
conflict. So, on the one hand the Palestinian statement contains a threat
towards the Israelis (we will have to continue the violence) while present-
ing the powerlessness of Palestinians in the resolution of the conflict. It
does not take Israeli fears and needs for the resolution of the conflict into
account.
This is evident in the Israeli reaction to the comment. First (l. 20)
phrased as a question of clarification, to appear non-threatened or non-
aggressive. The second statement (l. 22) is much more direct: “That is
not what Israelis would accept.” The talks seem to be at an impasse. The
Israeli side restates their need for acknowledgement of their own struggle
that justifies the creation of Israel by the Palestinians in form of a ques-
tion: “. . . Palestinians do not see settlements as anything beyond colonial-
4.3 Qualitative analysis 93
ism?” Both sides perceive themselves as persecuted, suppressed and this
is in turn the justification for occupation and fighting respectively. Being
seen as colonialists seems to be very hurtful for Israelis. Why? It may
be because it puts them in the same category as the perpetrators that Jews
tried to escape from by creating the state of Israel. Colonialists are char-
acterized as having no moral right to occupy a territory. By implication
Israelis are also denied a moral right to the state of Israel. Recognition
of the Palestinian struggle seems to depend on reciprocity in recognizing
the struggle of Jews for the Israeli participants. In contrast it seems that
for the Palestinians recognition of their struggle is a condition for recog-
nizing Israeli fears and needs. This gives the Palestinians also some sort
of leverage, as they may withhold that recognition after all. Why would
the Palestinians try to gain that kind of leverage? It seems to be a reaction
to the military power and structural control that Israel exerts over Pales-
tinians and as a reaction to the powerlessness of the Palestinians in the
current condition.
How do the Palestinians react to the Israelis? I think the ambivalence
becomes clearer. And the Palestinians seem somewhat baffled by the Is-
raeli need for acknowledgement (l. 25). Israel is seen as a reality and as a
reality that will not change through Palestinian actions. At the same time
the anger or disdain over this reality is expressed. The first Palestinian
statement also shows the Palestinian need for acknowledgement and for
an Israeli commitment to change things for the better for the Palestini-
ans. The second Palestinian comment (l. 29) shows some awareness of
the reality of Israeli fears, stating that the participant finds it very difficult
to address psychological fears. So there seems to be an awareness of the
Israeli needs implicit in this exchange. The second speaker also tries to
address those, by restating the “reality” of Israel for Palestinians. This
statement seems to imply that even though the creation of Israel caused
severe hardship to Palestinians there is a willingness to accept Israel as
a legitimate entity. The ambivalence though still remains. The second
statement may also be dangerous to the Palestinian side as it may under-
cut the power that Palestinians have at the bargaining table with the ability
to withhold the acceptance of Israel. Still both sides seem to fight for ac-
knowledgement of their predicaments by the other, very dependent on one
another in order to justify the actions taken in the name of both parties.
The next Israeli statement makes this very clear (l. 33). Jews, in what
the Palestinians have been saying, do not have any more right to the land
than the colonialists did. It has already been stated that this point of view
is unacceptable to Israelis. So the speaker explicitly asks: “Do you rec-
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ognize anything more?” The answer to this question is probably very
important to the speaker and there may even be the hope for a different
answer than the one to be expected after the preceding exchange. It seems
that Israeli self-definition requires that the creation of Israel is justified
and justified especially from the historic atrocities, namely the holocaust,
committed against Jews. It is probably also important for the Israeli iden-
tity to show that the place in which Israel was created is not arbitrary.
These two issues seem to be central to Israeli identity and maybe through
their centrality they need to be acknowledged by the other side in order
for Israelis to be able to trust and feel safe or understood. So it may be
the case that a questioning of the legitimacy of the Israeli state calls into
question the self-definition of Israelis. Why does it seem to be so impor-
tant for the Israelis to receive an acknowledgement from the Palestinians?
It seems to be that both parties perceive themselves to be in a position of
powerlessness, one defined by being occupied, the other by having been
persecuted for centuries and threatened by neighboring countries in a way
similar to previous persecution (threat of annihilation).
The Palestinian response to the question is clear and expected: “No.”
(l. 36). And the statement is very strong as it states that no Palestinian
or Arab would see a right for Israel to the land. This plays right into the
fears of the Israelis, that Palestinians see no justification or recognize the
right for their existence and by deduction every right for Arab nations to
destroy Israel. For Israelis the situation is very difficult as the Palestini-
ans continue to demand a state, which they already have at least partly
acknowledged as being a rightful demand. This is reflected in the Israeli
statement (l. 38), saying ‘we acknowledge your right but you don’t ac-
knowledge us’. This implies injustice, a situation that is not reciprocal
and therefore untenable. Also on a moral level it seems wrong for one
side to acknowledge the other without being acknowledged themselves.
The Palestinian response seems to be a direct reaction to this ‘accusa-
tion’. It questions the truthfulness of the statement, implying that Israel
has never acknowledged the right of Palestinians to a state (l. 40). So
a short discussion ensues about who acknowledges the Palestinians and
when this happened. The Palestinian statement: “There is no political
organization that acknowledges our national existence.” (l. 48) clearly
shows the difficulties that the Israeli statement provides for the Palestinian
side. It seems that a mutual acknowledgement threatens the pre-existing
conceptions of self and other on both sides and with it the existing mirror
images (see section 2.3). ‘If they really accept us how can we deny the
same to them? So they must not be truthful when they claim to accept
us.’ might be an implicit reasoning underlying the exchange. Why else
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would it be a point of discussion, characterized by Palestinian disbelief,
who acknowledges Palestinians? The same is true for the Palestinian am-
bivalence towards Israel. It seems almost impossible for Israelis to hear
the Palestinians talk about the reality of Israel. They cannot recognize the
implicit acknowledgement of at least the existence of Israel present in the
Palestinian statement. The Palestinian statement accepts the reality of Is-
rael and implies that this reality is acceptable to Palestinians, especially if
Israel should become more accepting of the Palestinian longing for some
sort of self-determination.
‘Fortunately’ the Palestinian position remains ambivalent, which al-
lows for the Israelis to keep their fears alive and continue to demand
recognition from Palestinians, which in turn leads the Palestinians to ques-
tion the sincerity of Israeli statements supporting the creation of a Pales-
tinian state. In summary, the involvement of identity in conflict becomes
clear to me in this passage. It is also apparent that the conflict is also
fought on the level of identity.
4.3.2 Saturday 2:50 pm
1 II: Inherent logic in separating between government positi-
on and other (i.e., that of Israelis here). If follow gov-
ernment position that autonomy is the end, i.e., final
step, why deal with (diaspora?) Logic follows(??). (There
5 is a range of ideas in Israel regarding the autonomy. I
don’t think that all the Likud people believe that this
would be the final arrangement. Some Israelis oppose the
idea of the diaspora because they don’t want to see the PLO
in the negotiations. I myself don’t want to see the PLO at
10 the negotiation table. There are people in Israel who do
not buy your position that the PLO stopped terrorism ... I
don’t see a problem with the Palestinian diaspora if the
issue of the PLO is no longer on the agenda)
II: (?) You’re talking about the problem of us ... what we
15 tried to do is... what you tried to do is bring in whoever
you wanted to bring in.(???) I think that you are represen-
ted... you are simply channeling your voice through(??)
PI: (Israel not willing to deal with the Palestinian entity
separately) ... we are treated as a local concern...
20 IC: ... related less to the general ...
IC: ... from a general point of view I agree that there is
some agreement as to whether to do it or not. I (?)
PI: ... I mean I think that contradicts what you are saying
in a way...
25 IC: Because in our minds the Palestinian problem arose
after (notes indicate something about "taken by Jordan in
1967," which appears to make little sense)
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This exchange touches upon the question of who Palestinians are and
who should represent them. In contrast to the previous interpretation this
one tries to summarize the underlying themes. It becomes clear that the
Israelis perceive the PLO as a threat (l. 10) and not a legitimate repre-
sentative of Palestinians (l. 9). The discussion revolves around the status
of so called “diaspora Palestinians” (interesting loan from Jewish self-
description?). Palestinians clearly perceive a group of people belonging
to a nation relatively independent of the place they are living in now. This
is alluded to by the assertion (l. 18) that “Israel (is) not willing to deal with
the Palestinian entity separately”, e.g. regarding it as a national movement
independent of other Arab countries, and reflected in the Israeli comments
about diaspora Palestinians and the difficulty to have Palestinians repre-
sented in negotiations who are not living in the occupied territories. Pa-
lestinians are concerned that the Israelis have no intentions of viewing Pa-
lestinians in the same way, one Palestinian refers to this as being “treated
as a local concern” (in the West-Bank and Gaza, l. 19). That this is not far
from the position of Israeli participants becomes clear in the last statement
(l. 25) of this quotation constructing the “Palestinian problem” as a recent
one, created in 1967. I do not agree with the notetaker’s comment that
the phrase “taken by Jordan in 1967” (l. 26) does not make sense in this
context. To the contrary this speaks directly to the problem that Khalidi
(1997) addresses in his analysis of the genesis of Palestinian identity as
predating Zionism and not just being a product of Israel. Indirectly the
Palestinians are fighting the same perception of being ‘only’ a product of
Zionism by insisting on the importance of the PLO and the representation
of Palestinians outside the occupied territories in any agreement.
II: I agree with the fact that you used correctly... the
idea of autonomy... I said that I personally, disagree with
30 that feeling...the other thing that I said is that the
other part of the diaspora (issue) has been happening
because (they know that they) have to bypass the Israeli’s
objection to that... We are really trying to limit the idea
of nationhood and that became very clear to me during the
35 discussion.
This subsequent statement (a couple of minutes later) by an Israeli
participant clearly spells out the issue underlying the discussion above
of the diaspora Palestinians. He clearly points to Israel’s effort to limit
the idea of Palestinian nationhood (l. 33) when dealing with the diaspora
Palestinians, challenging the self-perception of Palestinians as a national
movement. He also implies that the Palestinians are aware of this (l. 29).
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4.3.3 Saturday 4:45 pm
1 IM: He is partially answering you by saying that we can’t
separate security from psychological issues. Even Mota Gur
believed until the last moment that Sadat’s plane will land
and a bunch of guys with uzis would jump out (laughter)...
5 (it illustrates what you may consider paranoia but this has
been experience for 40 years, it is a real feeling - Israel
came close in 1973) Palestinians will have to make some
separate concessions during negotiations regarding security.
Palestinians will have to make concessions regarding having
10 arms in a Palestinian state. Not only security but psycho-
logical mentality beneath all of this.
PZ: I’d like to separate what Palestinians can do and what
() and more wide concern regarding threats coming from
other states in the region. This is a legitimacy concern.
15 Maybe a constructive way of looking at that concern given
extremes of Israelis is psychological aspect. Israelis be-
cause of history used to hostility because of who they are.
Our hostility to Israel is specific for things they did.
Behavior vis-a-vis the Palestinians. If that were to fixed
20 - no other Arab state would have an interest in threatening
Israel. It is a different analysis. When I listen to this
I want to ask - why would Iraq want to harm Israel? You see
a peace process concluding with a treaty - with an Iraq
threat down the road. And they won’t want to.
25 IC: We discussed earlier why Arabs want to hurt us, fight
us - and we didn’t come to conclusions. I think that there
is a wider feeling. Palestinian problem may be solved and
still for reasons of their own, other Arab states may want
to pick on Israel.
30 IM: Does this have something to do with antisemitism?
PS: This is not because of your identity, this is because
of what happened. Distinct from historic antisemitism.
IC: I’m not talking as a Jew, I’m talking as an Israeli.
As an Israeli, I am not concerned with antisemitism, I
35 didn’t yet get an answer before if this is the issue. Why
can’t you get together and do it ... we saw this morning
that resolving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict will not
solve the Arab-Israeli conflict.
PZ: Hostility exists because of the Palestinian issue. My
40 argument is that the hostility exists because of tangible
conditions. If they were fixed, I find it unlikely that an
Arab state would like to bother with Israel (threaten it)
if Palestinians were living happily ever after.
IC: If you are saying this - it could reassure the Israeli
45 public, this is important - but your saying so is not enough
for me. I don’t trust Qaddify, etc. I wouldn’t trust them
even if they did say that the Palestinian problem would be
solved then all Arab problems would be solved. I need to be
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able to do for myself. PZ: This is widely understood by
50 Palestinians. We can argue here that you don’t need to feel
this way ... but it is a reality. Maybe we can move on. If
not, the word of this leader or that leader ... what will
it take.
IE: Before getting into technical issues of demilitariza-
55 tion. You just said something I totally disagree with and
its importance for you to fully understand it. Arab coun-
tries say Palestinian issues is heart of problem and the
moment its solved - we’ll live happily ever after. But from
our experience - and also probably from your experience -
60 we have historical experience that Arab countries really
don’t give a damn about Palestinian problem and use your
issue to maneuver to their advantage. That’s our concern.
As you know there are different groups not only Fatah but
other groups who are heavily influenced by other Arab coun-
65 tries. Iranian, Iraqis have their ... It will be in a way
artificial to say "let’s forget about other Arab countries
- they’re only here to help us because they’re our brothers.
PZ: I was talking about a mood, an attitude, a state of
hostility not a state of behavior. Mindset. It is true that
70 Arab states have a problems. They have probably manipulated
Palestinian question and used Palestinian ... but they
would not be able to manipulate the question if there
weren’t widespread hostility to Israel as a result of a
fixable problem. This will go on forever with no one to fix
75 it. On the other point that you raised regarding Palestin-
ian groups being extensions of Arab states - that is
largely myth. They’re marginal, practically nonexistent.
They exist outside the PLO. One of the reasons whey Pales-
tinians support of the PLO is because it represents inde-
80 pendence from Arab state positions.
II: I want to get two messages across. One sense is the
sense of vulnerability in Israel. In many people, its un-
conceivable that Israelis perceive themselves as vulnerable
- mighty army, etc. Still and all, Israel needs the secu-
85 rity because of sense of vulnerability. I find it comfort-
ing to have my vulnerability acknowledged by you.
PI: You know why they couldn’t understand because ...
II: I know, but once this is acknowledged this would help
... you try to get a formula for security which will
90 satisfy us ... when we look at other countries we look at
intention, willingness, and capability of attacking us. So,
even with Egypt’s capability, they don’t have willingness
or intention. With Palestinian demilitarized, you can have
willingness and intention but no capability. There is no
95 straight line, no formula for security. If you had a regime
that you can rely upon in terms of long term peace, that
can help secure Israel. If you don’t have military power,
that secures Israel. We can work up a formula which can
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secure Israel, which entails ... some part of the three
100 elements. There is no single answer to peace.
PI: Do you realize that Palestinians are hostages to your
fear regarding security. Even though you acknowledge that
its a bit meaningless. We feel that its sort of defacto
acceptance of Israel by Arab countries if not secret ties.
105 There are some exceptions and will always be. We realize
that this is the case and to us, if you talk about desta-
bilized region - I may disagree with Syria but he’s been
there for 25 years, Hussein for 20 years ... more possible
for changes in Israel than in Syria. I see a different
110 Israeli society from 1977 than today. More a shift to
ideological right.
In this exchange, quoted in length, important issues regarding Pales-
tinian and Israeli identity are raised. The exchange can also provide an
idea about the other-perception of both sides and possible areas of con-
flict between self- and other-definition. The first comment by an Israeli
participant very clearly illustrates the fears of the Israeli side. In the be-
ginning of his comment the use of “he” (l. 1) is referring to a statement by
a fellow Israeli participant just preceding this passage that was questioned
by Palestinian participants. The fear expressed shows sign of the am-
bivalence of empowerment and post-Holocaust thinking in Israeli identity
(“we can’t separate security from psychological issues”, l. 2). The fear
of annihilation (e.g. l. 3 & 6) is very present. The ambivalence between
Israel’s military power and the fear of annihilation is present in the ex-
pression of the Israeli participant that this may seem like “paranoia” (l.
5). It is also clearly expressed that there are psychological factors on the
Israeli side and that the Israelis would like to have them acknowledged by
the Palestinian participants (l. 10). The Palestinian reaction is very clear
and rephrases the concern (“Israelis because of history used to hostility
because of who they are.”, l. 16). It is also clear that the Israeli ambiva-
lence is trapping the Palestinians in a bad place where they are subjects
of reactions based on fears that they cannot reduce through their behavior
(e.g. above quote and l. 20–24). The Palestinian participant points this
out by explicitly saying that Palestinian hostility is not linked to historical
experiences of Jews (i.e. anti-Semitism) but to specific actions of Israel
(l. 18). He continues this argument to relate other Arab hostility to the
Palestinians.
The Israeli response clearly shows the ingrained fear of Arab coun-
tries (l. 25), allowing the Israeli participant to keep up a generalized fear
in the face of an argument linking hostility to specific actions by Israel (l.
26–29). The next intervention (l. 30), phrased as a question, by an Israeli
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participant makes the underlying perceived threat explicit and names it
“antisemitism”. The Palestinian participant is quick to try and disentangle
Israel’s problems from that fear of anti-Semitism by stating: “This is not
because of your identity, this is because of what happened.” (l. 31). The
Israeli response is to differentiate between a Jewish and an Israeli iden-
tity (l. 33). This is somewhat surprising as there had been discussion in
this workshop at a prior point of the importance of Israel being a Jewish
state. Why does the Israeli participant make this distinction? He tries to
disassociate the perception of a wider Arab threat from the implied ac-
cusation that this is only an expression of misplaced and irrational fear
of anti-Semitism. The Israeli participant states that he “as an Israeli” is
“not concerned with anti-Semitism”. At the same time he continues to
uphold the perception of a wider Arab-Israeli conflict that the Palestinian
participant tried to dispel with the distinction.
The next Israeli statement reiterates the fear forcefully: “I wouldn’t
trust them even if they did say that the Palestinian problem would be
solved then all Arab problems would be solved.” (l. 46) and he goes on
to say: “I need to be able to do for myself.” (l. 48). These statements ex-
press for me the fear of annihilation linked to the lessons drawn from the
Holocaust experience. IC feels that Israel needs to be able to provide for
its own survival as there is nobody else who will do it. This can be linked
to the experience of the Jewish people during the Holocaust and the focus
on physical security in the creation of the state of Israel.
The Palestinian participant is able to acknowledge this fear as an Is-
raeli reality and as one that the Palestinians will not be able to change
through their actions. This seems to leave the Palestinian feeling pretty
helpless. What can Palestinians do to get out of this situation? And he
asks: “what will it take?” (to reduce your fear, l. 52).
The Israeli seems to evade this question by trying to break the pro-
posed link between Arab hostility and the Palestinian problem (l. 56). He
states that the other Arabs do not really care about the Palestinians and
just use the issue for their own agenda (l. 60). He implies that the Arab
states will continue to pursue this proposed agenda even after the Pales-
tinian problem has been solved. In addition he also implicitly questions
the Palestinian self-definition as a people by suggesting that radical Pa-
lestinian organizations are “heavily influenced by other Arab countries”
(l. 64). This puts these elements out of the control of the Palestinians and
also questions the idea of a specific Palestinian resistance to Israel (l. 66).
It seems to identify the Palestinians as part of other humans belonging to a
shared Arab identity and not a specific people under occupation. The Pa-
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lestinian participant responds to this by bringing up the importance of the
PLO, explicitly stating that “it represents independence from Arab state
positions” (l. 79) and defines the Palestinian as a people in their own right.
Finally the Israeli participant seems to focus on his own fear and ex-
plicitly addresses the Israeli “sense of vulnerability” (l. 81) and he ex-
plains it as a psychological phenomenon that exists despite Israel’s mili-
tary power (l. 83). The Israeli security concern is now explained as one
that has to deal with this fear and not “only” with a real threat on the
ground. The Palestinian intervention (l. 87) and the assurance of under-
standing by the Israeli before the Palestinian has finished make it clear that
for both sides this sense of vulnerability based upon an Israeli identity is
difficult to manage. The Israeli goes on to state clearly that perceived
intentions of other parties to the conflict play an important role in the as-
sessment of security (e.g. l. 92–94). The Palestinian response is clear in
focusing on the impossibility for Palestinians to satisfy Israeli security
concerns as a pre-condition for a state (l. 101–103). In this way Palestini-
ans again depict their opponent as all powerful and put the responsibility
for movement and the current condition squarely on the Israelis’ shoulders
(l. 108–111).
4.3.4 Summary
These expositions clarified the overall importance of identity in the work-
shop setting for me. I was also able to deal with the complexity of in-
teractions. Identity issues showed up in every facet of the analyzed dis-
cussions. The interpretations helped me develop categories by exploring
the different aspects of identity use in the passages. Many uses of identity
are rather difficult to detect at first glance as they are intertwined with the
content being discussed. As developed in chapter 2, identity is involved
in supporting conflict and the argument for one’s goal in the conflict. This
can be seen in the use of identity as described above. The next step was
to create categories that helped detect identity uses more quickly and ef-
ficiently. This led to the categories described in section 3.3.5. The results
from the coding procedure are described in the next section.
4.4 Coding: Prototypical use of identity
The coding scheme helped in covering a lot of material more quickly and
in a more structured way than before. First I would like to present how
my students and I anchored one passage from the 1989 workshop we were
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coding with the help of steps 3 to 6 in the coding procedure described in
section 3.3.5. In this section I am now presenting important aspects of our
coding results. I begin with an anchoring result to show what the students
and I produced after the initial reading of an interaction of approximately
ten minutes. After that I present selected examples of typical identity use
in conflict. I chose these examples from the many interactions we coded as
they are prototypical for our interpretations. The third part of the section
focuses on positive uses of identity as these are the most interesting for
advancing conflict resolution work (see also section 2.4).
4.4.1 Anchoring a theme of an exchange
In anchoring the passage we coded, we asked ourselves the question: How
does this text relate to identity and why is it not just a discussion about
some issues? As an answer we had the following to say about the text,
which covered approximately 4 pages:
National identity is not only a condition that gives meaning
to the world and who one is, but also a tool to create a certain
world: a project for the future, if you will. National identity,
being Israeli or Palestinian, is a category that justifies cer-
tain demands, for example, an independent Palestinian state,
and certain behaviors, for example, Israel’s occupation of the
West Bank and Gaza. The question is not so much about who
is right but who gets to create the conflict reality. So ques-
tions in this passage about elections, the US, and the PLO
are not only about practical issues, but part of a negotiation
about who represents the Palestinians and who gets to decide
that representation. It is, at least in part, about defining who
the Palestinians are as a group, a nation. The Palestinians are
arguing that the PLO needs to be included. The Israelis may
not understand the difficulties that the Palestinians have with
the proposed elections or why they are reluctant to give up the
power to define who represents the Palestinians. For the Pa-
lestinians it seems to be an issue of being able to define who
represents them, while Israeli politics (at least in their view)
seems to be geared towards defining Palestinian representa-
tion to their own (Israeli) liking. In this context who I am
(as a group member) seems to be at the forefront and actually
leads to some arguing (“Without the PLO today, I wouldn’t
be a Palestinian.”, “We refuse to be treated like a toddler.”)
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and acts that try to emphasize legitimacy. Themes of identity
are being used as arguments and justifications. So seeing the
other in a certain way and ascribing characteristics to them
has as a benefit to make one’s own argument for something
stronger and more coherent.
This helped us to focus on the use of identity, the use of defining “who I
am” or “who the other is”, in the subsequent coding of the text. This story
formed a backdrop against which we were able to code the text in detail.
4.4.2 Different uses of identity
The superscripts in this section identify the codes assigned to the state-
ments according to the coding scheme from section 3.3.5. The conven-
tions for the quotes are the same as noted at the beginning of this chapter
on page 73. The individual quotes are always taken only from one work-
shop (even if they contain editing by the author), the year of and time
within the workshop are noted at the end of the quote. These are all ex-
amples I found to be prototypical of the different aspects of identity use.
The first few examples relate to general conflict issues. They present an
insight into how identity is used to support conflict. This will be followed
by examples relating to specific issues such as suffering, negative interde-
pendence and the Israeli-Palestinian issue of Jerusalem.
This first quote is prototypical of the way the other’s identity is at-
tacked and used to justify one’s own cause or undermine the other. Not
only does the Palestinian equate the Israelis with imperialists (or colo-
nialists as analyzed in section 4.3.1), but he also accuses the Israelis of
treating Palestinians as inferior:
PM: We have been [u]sing the word violence, violence against
people, killing and hurtingM but for me, personally, if some-
one treats me as if I’m inferior this is another form of vi-
olence. Taking land from people you are not killing peo-
ple but [t]his is another form of violence.M You cannot take
land from Israelis but Israelis can come and take my land.
T [. . . ] For many Palestinians, the way they perceive itA
Israelis at the forefront of the British imperialism, the US
imperialism.B
1995, time 2
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In a different workshop a similar attack on Israeli identity can be
found. Here Israel is accused of treating Palestinians inhumanely. In ad-
dition the ingroup’s actions (Intifada, but also implicitly suicide bombers
etc.) are presented as a morally acceptable and necessary defense against
Israeli aggression. At the same time a Palestinian need to reciprocate the
Israeli strength is mentioned as well:
PZ: I disagree. That Israelis a[re] model on human rights
makes me shudder.D,Q For a Palestinian in Saudi Arabia,
they might admire Israel’s ways.Q
[. . . ]
PZ: It is an untruth not an exaggeration.I,K Palestinians were
not Bedouin out in the desert.C,K Highly developed, but not
comparable to Europe.A It is difficult to acknowledge that the
Israeli system is such a positive oneE , with the exception of
the political system.B
[. . . ]
PW: We admire/learn that you beat us on the battlefield.A,T
That is why the intifada is so important, shifted tactics.U Built
us up. We took control of our own destiny.A,U Put us on the
map.
1992, time 1
One can also find examples in which certain aspects of one’s group are
excluded as not representative for the whole group. The following quote
is a very good example for this sort of argument and it follows as a way
to counter the thematic attack on Israeli identity shown above5:
IM: The second concernA is about how Zionism is viewed
not only by Arabs but by the whole world.E Like for exam-
ple the UN resolution equating Zionism with racism, when it
is not so.C Israel just wants to be a Jewish state.A This has
nothing to do with racism.C People are distorting the idea in
their own political aspirations. In the best case, this is a mis-
understanding of the Jewish cause.B In the worst case, it is a
subversion of (our) political goals.Q
5The first code is A as IM is referring to a concern that the Israeli participants previously
brought up. Here one can see the difficulty of removing quotes from their context, as some
codes attributed to the text may seem to be questionable without the context.
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[. . . ]
IE: It is Jewish slash NationalismA, not Jewish slash Religious.C
When one speaks of an Islamic country, it is obviously religious.T
But when we speak of the Jewish concept, we mean nationalist.A
1992, time 2
This quote additionally shows the retaliation on the level of identity that
the Israelis bring against the Palestinians. The equation of Zionism with
racism is characterized as a subversion of the political goals of Israel im-
plying an unjustified, intentional denial of moral standing for Israel.
The opposing points of view and the struggle to define Israeli identity
to one’s advantage can be explicitly observed in this passage:
PI: (Regarding Zionism) Palestinians see it legally speakingA,
on the ground, as a serious discrimination.Q Especially per-
mits, and land confiscation. What about travel? You can visit,
I cannot even visit Jerusalem, it’s for purely Jewish use.T So
on all sorts of practical levels, there are two rules applied.T
You can for example get a ticket if you have West Bank li-
cense plates, when an Israeli won’t get it for the same thing.T
This could get as sophisticated as access to everything in a
Jewish state. We have a problem with the exclusiveness of
the Jewish state.A,O
IM: Let’s talk about the Israeli-Palestinian issues. You are
not citizensB . . . (the occupied territories) have nothing to do
with Zionism.F
[. . . ]
II: You perceive it as discrimination.B For me, us Judaism is
not a religion.A Our nation lived in this area for many yearsR,
then we left the area not because of free choice.A We took
our Jewish passports with us.R [. . . ] Many years ago Jews
were forced to leave.A But they still carry their Jewishness as
passports.A
PI: We think of us in the same wayU (other Palestinians agree).
1992, time 2
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The threat that the other can pose to one’s own identity is captured in
the following quote. Here it becomes clear what costs can be associated
with accepting the other’s point of view and justification for the conflict.
The threat expressed by the Israeli here is of a moral dimension, one of
justice:
IR: My primary worry about occupation is the toll on our
society, all the bad reasons we know of occupation.A Every-
thing the Palestinian feels is wrong done to him, the Israeli
feels he is doing wrong.U If Israelis don’t feel wrong, then
something is even worse.E Something has slipped in Jewish
values, which is even worse.A
1995, time 1
Palestinians have a similar struggle with their identity. As the follow-
ing statements highlight, Palestinians are struggling to present themselves
as a nation or national movement that has existed independently of the
creation of the state of Israel. As the Israeli statement makes clear, it is
in this conflict not self-evident that the main parties to the conflict should
be Israelis and Palestinians. In addition to claims of Palestinian national
identity as a recent phenomenon, Israeli participants also often point to
their perception of a wider conflict between Arabs and Israelis in which
Palestinians may only be a negligible piece:
PS: The thing is, that Arab nationalism was a reaction to
colonialism.A Each nation, or each country, at that time wanted
to get rid of the colonialization.A,R
[. . . ]
PZ: Arab nationalism is not newC . . . so Arab nationalism
is a much more diffuse idea, and I would suggest that it is
alive and well. . . so Pan-Arabism is only a variety of this
Arab nationalismA. . . specifically, when the Arab national-
ists demanded independence from the Ottoman empire they
demanded two separate Arab statesA, one in Syria and one in
Iraq.
[. . . ]
II: Israel has had a very different experience.R,T First of all,
what happened in 1948, when 7 nations came together. . . so
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the idea of Arab nations coming together and doing things to-
gether was very real to usT,A [. . . ] what happened is that we
occupied part of Jordan and created a new national existence.D
1992, time 1
The next passage again highlights the Israeli challenge to Palestinian
identity in a different workshop6:
PG: [. . . ] Palestinians were entrusted Jerusalem as an Arab/Muslim
place. So it’s a symbol to us.A
IR: When was it placed in the hand of the Palestinians?D
Before the Jordanians took it?Q
[. . . ]
IR: As far as I understand Jerusalem is a symbol for Islam not
only for the Palestinians.D It is also a symbol for Judaism and
Christianity. This is where a solution has to be found.E Pales-
tinians were entrusted with an international city.B Jerusalem
is Arab and Moslem at least as much as it is Jewish.E I al-
ways laugh when I hear them argue about whose capit[a]l it
is.U Like children fighting over a flag on a hill.S,R
1995, time 1
Suffering
One important and frequent issue relating to identity is the Palestinian pre-
sentation of their suffering at the hands of Israel. This is an indication of
the power distribution on the ground where Israel occupies the Palestinian
territories and is the powerful party in this conflict:
PW: The way you try to control us.B Try to control us be-
cause it is easier for you to (oppress us).B,O The more you
try, the more we will resist/stronger we get.T,A This is im-
portant.
PM: ??depersonalize their national identity. Include suppres-
sion of national symbols, flags, national culture.O,B Obvious.
6As it is a challenge to Palestinian identity the code D was employed rather than B in
IR’s statements. The judgement that it is a challenge was made from the wider context of
the exchange.
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PZ: It is a lot more. It’s not so abstract. It is prevention of
economic development in the territories and entrepreneurial
efforts.E,O It’s the creation of an economy that is dependent
on Israelis.B,E Growth of classrooms are strictly controlled
in the territories, partly because of finances.A,E Question of
curricular controls. Generations that are coming out badly
equipped to handle learning. It is appalling to see settle-
ments with pools when Palestinians are rationing water for
bathing.A,E,T
1992, time 1
However it is also interesting and surprising that this description of
suffering does not have to be countered by Israeli participants by descrip-
tions of their own suffering at the hands of Palestinians in this particular
instance. Often Israelis point to the attacks by Palestinian suicide bombers
as their suffering at the hands of Palestinians. The following quote is the
continuation of the above discussion and shows the Israeli difficulty in re-
sponding to the sufferings described. By describing the justification for
Israeli actions with an acknowledgement of Palestinian suffering, the Is-
raeli participants can open an avenue to understanding. An interim period
emerges as an important step towards the solution of the conflict:
PW: In terms of the immediacy of how things are being han-
dled in the West Bank day in and day out, land confiscated,
not just water.E Every day the systematic process by which
Palestinians are put under the gun.B,Q Settlements being builtB ,
a lot of frustration/anger/insecurity. You deal with the in-
tifada as if it is a security concern to you.S It’s not to destroy
you, it’s to create a Palestinian nation and you are stifling
it.A,T,B Pushing Palestinians to the limit. Push, push, push
every time we do something negative or positive.Q,B This is
what the occupation means to us.A,E That is why you were
always one face to us,S all we saw was the occupation.S Cer-
tain stance will never move from. Now we see there are other
faces, people we can talk to.B,U
IC: Most Israelis feel that life in the West Bank is insufferable.A,V
(there are some groups who don’t care) It is a function of
military occupation.E It will cease as soon as we sign an
agreement.E,P It will end. We don’t get anything out of it.A
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PW: Yes, you don’t get anything out of it, but we are con-
stantly suffering.T
IC: I think they react as you would.U
PW: We tell you we need a way out and you need the key.E
(you have control of us) So - frustrating when we go to the
table and you still say no.E,O
IS: We lack the incentive necessary to respond to that need.A,E
It’s our need too.U It is difficult to live with.U There are
groups in Israel who do quite a lotA - for humanity - maybe
important to remember.
PM: You are not doing anything about it.Q
PM: What do you mean incentives?
IC: We have to giveA, I agree, but we have to get something
for the negotiation.E I’m not sure the Palestinians want us to
walk out tomorrow.
PZ: Interim period is in the interest of both sides.U
1992, time 1
The difficulties after the Declaration Of Principles and the Palestinian
frustration with the continued suffering find their way into the 1995 work-
shop. The importance of identity, definitions of the Palestinian Authority
etc. become evident here:
PN: Every time we are rejected and don’t get a permit we
get mad at Palestinians, not at Israelis.A It’s not the Peace we
were looking for. I didn’t want it to be like this. These are
not things people sacrificed their lives for. It’s sad, because
it’s not what we were looking for.O
IR: What’s your problem? Do you want us to come back?N
IM: We have been delegating to the new entity and we are
outside.A
PN: It’s not outside, it’s more inside now.M It’s not a physical
thing, it’s a psychological thing. You’re not outside, because
we have to get a permit from you to leave Gaza.B
1995, time 1
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The discrepant self- and other-definitions of both parties can be seen
in this quote. Here the Israeli definition for a just procedure does not at all
correspond to the Palestinian perception. Both identities seem challenged
in this exchange. The Israeli self-perception of a democratic nation is
questioned as is the Palestinian self-image of a national movement and its
right to an independent nation:
IM: The government doesn’t have the power to overrule the
court.A I know of a case in which people went to the supreme
court over a land taking and they won. You said you respect
democracy, and the courts ruled, so it is legal.B
PJ: Your laws cannot apply to the people in the West Bank
and Gaza.B There is no democracy with regard to the Pales-
tinians in the Israeli supreme court.T There is a power asym-
metry here, and the supreme court serves the government of
Israel, not the Palestinians.T
PG: The laws in the territories are not the same as the laws in
the rest of Israel.A,T
1995, time 2
Jerusalem
The issue of access to Jerusalem, and Jerusalem as a capital for Israelis
and Palestinians is a very contentious issue. One of the Palestinian issues
with Jerusalem is Israel’s decision to have West Jerusalem as their cap-
ital, which seems to force Palestinians to claim the same status for East
Jerusalem for their nation to be. This type of reciprocal claims is a com-
mon occurrence in the workshops. The following quote can be seen as
prototypical of the Palestinian position on Jerusalem and the role it plays
with regard to Palestinian identity:
PG: They were opposed but accepted decisions of the Pales-
tinian majority.A It was not a model of democratic interac-
tions, but in a Palestinian context, it was a decision supported
by the majority, and there was a sizable opposition but it was
acceptedA: an independent Palestinian state to be established
on borders before the 1967 conflict, with the capit[a]l being
East Jerusalem.O This decision was made only because Is-
rael considers West Jerusalem as it’s capit[a]l.E [. . . ] The
context of that is internationalizing JerusalemP , but not only
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East Jerusalem. Israelis have never agreed to have any UN
observation forces on their side of the borderT : in that case
we will not play.F
1995, time 1
The next quote is a prototypical example for the zero-sum view of
conflict issues. Claims to Jerusalem have to be superior to the opponent’s
in order to “win” in the conflict. The other’s national narratives is being
challenged in order to undermine the legitimacy of an exclusive claim to
Jerusalem:
IC: I think that the sense that the Jews claim to Jerusalem is
pretty well understood.A For Israelis the Palestinian claim is
not as clear.A
[. . . ]
IC: What I don’t understand is your concerns aren’t Palesti-
nians? Because Palestinians aren’t exclusive representatives
of Christians and Muslims, where as Jews are representative
of Jews.T
[. . . ]
IC: But before the mandate - what was Jerusalem to you?
PZ: Mandate Palestinian has taken on character of its own.
Once Britain made borders - stuck. When Palestinian nation-
alism emerged - at the time Zionist movement emergedU -
that was what Palestine was. Religion is also important.U
Don’t underestimate it. It is also guardianship for us. Saudi
acts as guardians of holy places. Muslims also Christians re-
gard themselves as having some sort of duty as guardians to
these holy places for the entire Muslim and Christian popula-
tions. You can’t shirk this dutyD, it is pride, identity . . . God
placed Palestinians there to be guardians.A
[. . . ]
IC: I hear what your saying but I just want to point out that
you’ll have trouble translating this to Israeli population. Even
I who feel reasonableJ have trouble seeing your claim as su-
perior to oursD . . . even many non-Jews will see Palestine
claim to Jerusalem as incomprehensible.J
1992, time 2
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Negative interdependence
As described in section 2.2 Palestinian and Israeli identity can be charac-
terized by negative interdependence. In this section I want to show differ-
ent quotes that highlight aspects of this state of negative interdependence.
The power distribution on the ground is reflected here by the weaker party
(Palestinians) arguing often for the need for reciprocity in response to de-
mands or needs of the more powerful party (Israelis).
This quote clearly shows the Palestinian need for acknowledgement of
their own legitimacy by Israel. It is an expression of the interdependence
of both parties but also includes a hint that a change in Israel’s perception
or treatment of Palestinians would be helpful in resolving the conflict:
PN: It seems now that they (Israelis) are a superior powerB
and they are giving something up if they give us some land
and some freedom.B They should believe that Palestinians
h[av]e some rights.P That they have equal rights to live there.A
1995, time 1
Despite Israel’s greater power on the ground, this quote from an Israeli
participant shows that the need for acceptance and acknowledgement is
present on the Israeli side as well. He does not believe that the Palestinians
have accepted Israel and acknowledge Israel’s right to exist:
IM: I’m still asking about where it’s going to stop. Borders,
everything. [. . . ] It’s not clear where you [are] going to stop
demanding for more and more territories.M If it was very
clear that it was going to stop for example here, on the green
line, I don’t know, it will be very easy to get a decision. Is-
raelis thinkA it will take ten years with PalestiniansB and they
are sick of it. The main point is that we are very suspicious
about future demands.T
1995, time 1
How vulnerable Israelis feel, despite their power on the ground, is
exemplified in this quote:
IJ: Security issues come very close to home.A It touches people.O
It’s not something happening only over the border in the ter-
ritories, but next to where I live, next door. This is a possible
basis for a coalition among peace-striving elements.P
1989, time 2
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The interdependence of the two sides and the need for reciprocity is
evident in this exchange:
IM: I believe that most Israelis would accept the Palestinian
state.A You ask us, where it’s going to stop . . . by demand-
ing more and more territory at the Green Line.E People have
been thinking of a Palestinian state for ten years . . . but with
every polarization of views, the main point is they are very
suspicious of future demands by Palestinians.A Left parties
in Israel are living near Jerusalem on Arab land.
PJ: What do you think about that? It’s very interesting . . .
I never got a response from any of you about the right of
return. If we were to get a kind of recognition, such as the
right of return or compensation, that would help.P That we
have a place like you doU , a right to breathe that air, feel the
dun[e], hear the sounds of the place.B [. . . ] For me, to hear
Israelis say there was injustice done, when the state of Israel
was established, Palestinians paid the price for dispossessing
you.M Both wish to live alone, to not intrude. It’s the same
issue on either side.U
1995, time 1
In this example the problem of mirror images that are built up in conflict
and embedded in the negative interdependence of identity, can be seen:
IR: There must be some issues we don’t know. We can’t say
just let it go. I’d agree with the principle. Whoever wants
to participate because it’s also important for us to see the
result.P If 80% (votes) Hamas or Islamic Jihad, we’ll know
that we are not moving forward since they are not for peace
with Israel.B Is Arafat what he says or what you say . . . this
is a red line for us. It’s important now to do it, not when we
take out settlements and withdraw from the area.E I have a
suspicion, Yassir Arafat is trying to get us to stop the par-
ticipation of the opposition elements to his regime.B,M We
could be playing into his hands.O
PG: In a way, I hope for . . . we’re going in circles. IJ is
saying moratorium to violence. Violence is reaction to some-
thing Israel is doing.C I think once Israel stops doing it, it
114 Workshop analysis
will decrease.E,T You’re saying something should be done,
to stop. IR made a point that is interesting but it is also dan-
gerous. What we want is free and open elections.A (. . . ) Ben-
jamin N[e]tanyahu who according to yesterday is my name-
sake, if he is elected (in Israeli elections) this is all down the
trash can.B,O Is this a red line for us? We ought to respect the
results of fee democratic elections.Q If Israelis want Likud I
would feel sad about it as a person, as an Israeli as a Palesti-
nian. If Palestinians vote to elect (. . . )U
1995, time 2
One aspect of mirror images is that both sides claim to have given
everything while having received nothing. This Palestinian statement is
prototypical of such a view:
PN: But Arafat has already done this, he has already de-
nounced and condemned violence and terrorism.A What more
do you want from him? Why haven’t Israel condemned their
own violence?M It seems that the more Palestinians give, the
more Israeli[s] demand.N
1995, time 2
Both sides claim a need for reciprocity, for example that they should
be acknowledged when they acknowledge the other. At the same time
they accuse each other of not reciprocating one’s own good deeds or of
claiming reciprocity when there is no apparent reciprocal gesture that is
supposed to make sense. How this denial of reciprocity fuels mirror im-
ages can be seen in this quote where the Israeli need for a presence of
Israeli military in a Palestinian state is used to highlight the unacceptable
nature of this need for the Palestinian side and the Palestinians’ need for
reciprocity in this matter:
IY: But you’re adding here a problematic element, that there
will be reciprocity by the Palestinians who would be in Israel,
from its center, totally unacceptable by the army
professionals.A,F,O,T
PB: But this tells you what the Palestinians find hard to ac-
cept, foreign presence in the land.A,O
1989, time 2
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In this quote the Palestinian participant expresses that the Palestinian
participants are more prototypical of the Palestinian society than the Is-
raeli participants are for their society. This is used to demonstrate a higher
moral position of Palestinians compared to the Israeli public against which
the Israeli participant is trying to defend him- or herself:
PB: The majority reaction (Palestinian) seems to be along re-
alistic path.A I see a difference between your reactions and
those of a majority of the Israeli public.B You are willing to
make political concessions, yet the Israeli publicB is not yet
ready to deal wit these issues in the way you have.S I believe
the positions presented by the Palestinians do represent the
majority approach.A,R What we have here is a situation. . .
IM: It’s not fair to say thisI . . .
PB: But it’s the way we reactR,N . . .
IM: You say majority. . . the three of you?
1989, time 2
Self-determination
The issues of Palestinian self-determination and especially the right to
define who represents the Palestinians have been discussed contentiously
in workshops. The issue of Palestinian elections in its variations over
the years have been a way for Israelis to try to control Palestinian self-
definition. This theme is very well reflected in the following exchange:
PN: Elections are not just for the good of Palestinians.E It is
also good for Israelis.B You want to be able to pick a target
to be your next enemy.Q
IR: The elections are an outcome of the Palestinian demands.N
1995, time 2
The next quote underlines this conflict over Palestinian self-definition:
IY: If it’s only one day, why can’t you go with confederation
with Jordan?E
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PN: We won’t go into agreement with Jordan unless we’re an
independent stateA, it’s our choice of confederation between
respected independent states.A
1989, time 2
Another aspect of self-determination is reflected in the demand for ac-
knowledgement of equality between the two sides in the following quote:
PN: Israel is unwilling to do anything right now.B Israel perceivesB
any positive action from the Palestinians as the result of their
pushing rather than as a sincere action from them.T You know
there are internal constraints for us too.A,U Maybe have al-
ready reached the limit on further concessions.A So, we have
reached the point where we can’t give anymore.E
1989, time 2
4.4.3 Positive prototypes of using identity in workshops
There are also positive uses of identity. Identity is not only involved in
justifying one’s position and challenging the other’s. One of the explicit
aims of an interactive problem-solving workshop is to enable both parties
to understand the other’s needs and fears and state them back to the other.
The lists of needs and fears developed during the workshops have already
been covered in section 4.2.2. Here are just a few quotes to illustrate how
this is expressed in interaction. As can be seen from the superscript B,
the statements ascribe something to the outgroup, that is, the speaker is
describing the other group:
IN: Empowerment of the PLO is a concern. To include Pa-
lestinians in the political arena.B
IM: And of course the right of return.B
IJ: And compensation.B
IM: Economic constraints, restrictions in the territories.B
[. . . ]
PG: Security.B Borders.B Right of return are concerns for
Israelis.B
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[. . . ]
PJ: To retain a state as a neighbor, and Israel as a whole
entity.B To alleviate the guilt feelings, to assure, lessen the
damage of what it means to be an occupierE . . . To be free of
guilt.V
IR: We’re still waiting to hear recognition of us.A,E
1995, time 1
The last statement also shows how the interaction enables both sides to
make sure that their needs are understood. Difficulties in understanding
or rephrasing can provide an avenue to contentious issues between the
participants present.
In the following quote one can see the importance of this process for
the participants:
IL: I disagree.K It is important for me to hear your approach
to us.E It is important to hear you not only as occupiers.U I
thank you.
PW: We are not doing this for you.
IL: That makes it even more important.
1992, time 1
Jerusalem has been a contentious issue in many workshops. This
quotes shows how the workshop has enabled the participants to reflect
on the significance of Jerusalem for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The
following statements are extraordinary given the conflict context and high-
lights how important an arena to float ideas is for creative problem solv-
ing:
IR: [. . . ] But what people have to realize is that Jerusalem
is a spiritual capit[a]l for all people of the world. If they
[Palestinians] find a way to do that, the whole mysticism of
Jerusalem will evaporate, leaving us with just simple problems.V
PG: IR is making significant grounds here.U I don’t think any
Israeli officials have said this. It is a good way of presenting
the issue to Palestinians.V
1995, time 1
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A similar opening in perception of the other and the conflict can be
seen in the next quote. While the Palestinian begins with a description of
the Israelis as a common enemy, he continues by saying how different the
current interaction is. In this he can see a possibility for future dialogue:
PW: Part of the cohesion behind the Pan-Arabist movement is
this idea of the common enemy.B This is very different from
what we’re talking about.P Now we talk about independent
nations coming together as equalsU , not as an ideology. But
this is for the future.
1992, time 1
Understanding the other’s needs and fears in combination with a soft-
ening of the view of the other can provide an important tool to reduce
mirror images on the way to interactive problem solving. In the following
quote identity seems to be more flexible and statements about the con-
crete issues begin to take the other’s perspective into account (superscript
V) while focusing on commonalities (superscript U):
II: There’s a linkage between needs and compromise to these
needs. So let’s talk about needs for a moment.U Now what
I heard you say, is that if need number two is metA, you’re
willing to (put off) need number one.V That gets on into the
issue of future relations. Now you stated that you had depen-
dence on the Israeli economy. . . wouldn’t that bring about
trust.E I like what I hear, because. . . while Israelis agreeing
in these issues. . . (urgent demands). What about economic
cooperation and mutual security? Addressing needs we can
reach some compromise (i.e., statehood).U
1992, time 1
The following quote clearly shows how the forum can help to float
ideas and judge the reaction of the other. This is a very important step
in finding actions that frame the resolution of the conflict as a win-win
situation leading to creative solutions:
PZ: Specific steps Israelis can take: immediate stop to settle-
ment activities and declaration (?), if not stop slow down or
step in that direction.P Immediate halt of land confiscation.
Stopping these two things will go a long way in encouraging
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Palestinians to make concessions.E,P Specific steps in allow-
ing Palestinians to produce a local political structureP that
military withdrawal doesn’t satisfy: elections, military with-
drawal from populated areasP , will make Israeli life better.U
1992, time 1
This can lead to concrete efforts to define creative solutions such as
the following statement:
PJ: I feel I have a good sense of your constraints and I hope
you have a sense of what some of our constraints are.B,V
I want to turn the question a bit. What could we do to re-
move the constraints on your part (and vice versa) here?P I’m
more fuzzy on what would count as something that we could
do, whereas I think that we are clear about particular actions
that would remove constraints on our side.E Captured in one
sentence: to end occupation, troop withdrawal, dismantle the
settlements, redeployment, make possible for elections and a
move to final status talks now, before the facts on the ground
are established.E,P,B Is there some concrete actions you can
suggest that Palestinians could take that would count to re-
move constraints?P
1995, time 2
The unofficial character of the workshops can also encourage the shar-
ing of personal experiences (positive and negative) that help anchor the
conflict and its resolution in everyday life. This quote is a very good ex-
ample of this:
PM: What can we do so that the children and the youth will
be able to see Jews beyond the front that they are exposed to?
This is a serious problem for me.E Because I have known
JewsJ I have been in their homes, they have been in my
home.U It is in a sense I am lucky to have known that di-
mension since it is impossible for me to be labeling Jews or
labeling Israelis only in one way.V [. . . ] We have to work
with concrete things that allow people to (interact).P This is
what we are trying to do for the children of Palestine.A The
youth of Palestine, to regain their voice, regain their sense of
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responsibility for constructing their own society, their ability
to learn.P Since the British came to Palestine, and then the
Jews then the Israelis this is robbing usM and we have to re-
gain this to feel human to act human, and relate to humans.A
1995, time 2
Real-world constraints are important issues when the discussion fo-
cuses on possibilities to resolve conflict. But instead of being used as a
way to avoid conflict resolution these constraints can help to better define
ways to support conflict resolution. This effort is reflected in the following
quote:
IB: It may be a desirable solution to us here, but we must re-
alize that we are far beyondF what is agreed upon by the real
participants. We must try to express our own opinions and de-
sires with a view to reach accommodation. On the other hand,
we must try to appreciate and recognize what is going on in
the real world in order to reach a real agreement.E In that
world, some of these elements are not still widely accepted.
We must appreciate this constraint first.E One element that
the seven of us here (agree on arrangements?) The other level
is how to make this idea relevant, sell to our own respec-
tive communities. When I think of what’s going on in Israel
I find it a very problematic conflict to reconcile these two
dimensionsA. . . go much beyond what is expected in these
rolesF . . . (“Inherent tension”)
1989, time 2
The next passage illustrates the process of reducing mirror images and
the chance that this provides in developing solutions to the conflict. While
I have omitted some interventions for the sake of clarity of the example,
this exchange took place within approximately five minutes. It also il-
lustrates the difficulties the participants encounter on their way to finding
solutions:
PS: Let me continue. I think there would be other areas of
continuous concern for Palestinians and Israelis.E These ar-
eas could be solved by joint committees of Israelis and Pales-
tinians which will discuss the issues regularly.P We can both
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monitor what’s going on.P If this is your vision, you stress
less military aspects, you stress more actual facts and steps
of working together in the field that stress cooperation rather
than watching and wondering what am I going to do.V,P The
point of Jerusalem is a good example, Israel says there should
be a united JerusalemB , but there are 145-150,000 Palestini-
ans who don’t want Jerusalem united, and they did not par-
ticipate in the democratic process.A,E To make Jerusalem a
model situation, there should be arrangements in Jerusalem
that would ensure that Arabs, Palestinians, in Jerusalem would
have their own institutions within Jerusalem, and with Israel,
joint maintenance of utilities, events, management.P Some
may say too, this is naive view of the future but if there will
be willingness by Israelis to have negotiation, I wouldn’t be
surprised, knowing Palestinian community nowA, that these
ideas would start moving up among Palestinians.A [. . . ] If we
can get people to move toward this idea, we’ll have the begin-
ning of a new relationship between Palestinians and Israelis.P
[. . . ]
IY: [. . . ] Economic profit and increased comfort for the peo-
ple is the main recipe for success.P Problem of Jerusalem is
crucial and Jerusalem should not be divided. If jointly man-
aged, then the idea of independent states is unworkable. Then
we both have problems with extremists that will enter.O
PS: That’s why we have joint administration, extremists. There
will be extremists on your side and our sideU , but I object that
the city would be divided and this is the difficult apart, but it
can serve as a model for the whole situation.
[. . . ]
PS: There is mistrustE and that is why youB alwaysS press
on security, as if there are always Palestinians that want to
destroy you.Q
IY: You’reB alwaysS hopeful.T
[. . . ]
IJ: I completely share your image of JerusalemU , and I don’t
say it cynically, and hope it’s not naive, economic coopera-
tion, joint committees, could be a reality.E I like the way you
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formalize it, and if Arafat joins, so much the betterP [. . . ]
The real ideas are not realizable from the Israeli point of
viewA unless simultaneous means dealing with the security
issue.E
1989, time 2
The next quote not only illustrates the concessions participants are
willing to make for peace but also the influence of the identity structures
on the interaction. The Palestinian response clearly follows the theme
of representing failures as successes against all odds (as described by
Khalidi, 1997):
IN: But we are proposing that we would give something and
the question is what would the response be, if we made a
change? So we were really giving more stuff for immediate
needs to be satisfied.P What would the response be?
PN: Palestinians could do things to improve our situationA
[i]f we were given a chance to do itP , if there weren’t so
many restrictions placed on us.M
IN: But what I am proposing is some kind of step ahead,
whatever the reason that Palestinians now are having trou-
ble paying the bill, the suggestion is that we help with it.P
I agree thoughA, we should not be asking for receipts when
people try to leave Gaza.L
1995, time 2
In the next quote the Israeli participant states the agreement both sides
have reached. The Palestinian’s response demonstrates how influential
the threat to national identity posed by the resolution of conflict can be for
participants and how difficult it is for both sides to support and acknowl-
edge the other:
IJ: I personally feel I understand the desire for the right to re-
turn and that everyone needs an identity, a passport.U But if
there was a Palestinian state alongside an Israeli state agree-
ment, with the right of return, would that satisfy?P
PJ: That’s the same thing as a guarantee. I can’t say. I can’t
promise what will happen when you close the door.F
1995, time 1
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Coming back to the issue of Jerusalem this last quote shows, how
the workshop has helped participants to deal even with strong emotions
(“Wailing Wall not negotiable”) and still focus on finding a solution that
is acceptable for both sides. The amount of learning and change in per-
ception this requires can be seen in II’s statement when he paraphrases the
concept of Jerusalem as a capital of both states and ends with commenting
interesting. This, to me, is a clear sign that this was an idea not expected
to be talked about or agreed upon in this workshop:
II: Sense in Israel that we’re not willing to negotiateA, Wail-
ing Wall not negotiable.S We emphasize the indivisibility
of the city.A We aren’t willing to negotiate that Jerusalem
is the capital of Israel but we can negotiate regarding equal
access.E Can one city be capital of two states? No precedent,
very different. Emphasis on it being capital of Israel. Can we
share a capital with another state?P
[. . . ]
PW: . . . we could work together.P If there was a united city
council, who would pick up garbage, pay taxes . . . challenge
for both of us.U
[. . . ]
II: If we agree that Jerusalem is capital of Jewish state . . .
(?). If we both agree that city shouldn’t be divided, concept
of Jerusalem as capital of both states, interesting7.P
[. . . ]
IC: Lets say there is no sovereignty. Sovereignty is separate.
We both have our capitals there and it belongs to nobody.U
[. . . ]
II: It’s a simple issue because both sides feel the same wayU
- religion, historical roots . . . identityU . . . Palestinians have
lived there and seen it as capitalB , Israelis have lived thereA
. . . we share many needs.U That’s why we went ahead to
solve problems because we did it as same needs.V
1992, time 2
7Highlighted by the author.
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4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter I retraced the steps that I took in exploring the role of na-
tional identity in conflict resolution. In parallel with the development of
the theoretical argument for the importance of national identity in resolv-
ing conflict, made in chapter 2, I examined the actual use of identity in a
particular conflict. As noted in section 3.2.1, the data used here has it’s
limits. These are notes taken by members of the third party and not the
actual utterances of participants. This does preclude certain kinds of anal-
yses. The qualitative analysis done here has it’s obvious limitations too.
It can illustrate that identity is being used in interactive problem-solving
workshops. It does not however allow for a definitive claim that interac-
tive problem-solving workshops provide a space for identity negotiation.
Given the kind of analysis I did, a null hypothesis that identity is not used
in this particular conflict resolution setting cannot be rejected even if it
might seem plausible given the examples of identity use in this chapter.
The following results have therefore the status of suggestions. Sec-
tions 4.2.1, 4.2.2 illustrate that issues relating to identity in the protracted
conflict between Palestinians and Israelis remained relatively stable over
time. Acknowledgment from the other side, need for security and reas-
surances from the other were all needs that were important throughout
the workshops between 1984 and 1999. Section 4.2.3 highlighted the dif-
ficulty of focusing on the use of identity. The quotes in section 4.4.2
illustrate that the discussions about issues on the ground were strongly
linked to uses of identity that were designed (in the most part) to support
one’s claim in the conflict. In order for each party to stay in conflict, its
current national identity has to provide the possibility to delegitimize the
other and to legitimize its own position in the conflict. This can be seen in
quotes in sections 4.3 and 4.4.2 and especially in exchanges marked with
codes M, N, Q and T. Identity was used as a way to challenge the self-
definition of the other, to undermine the legitimacy of their claim in the
conflict, and to present the moral superiority of the ingroup, supporting
the ingroup’s claim in the conflict. The negative uses of identity illustrate
the hypothesized investment of national identity in conflict as described
in section 2.1. This chapter thus provides examples of strategic use of na-
tional identity and it’s construction in interaction supporting one’s conflict
stance.
In section 2.4 I went on to argue that the negative use of identity needs
to be replaced with a use that is more favorable to conflict resolution in
order to reduce the threat of annihilation. Section 4.4.3 illustrates that
4.5 Conclusion 125
the interactive problem-solving workshop allows for an environment that
is favorable to positive uses of identity in the face of a protracted ethnic
conflict. The examples, such as understanding the other’s needs and ac-
knowledging shared needs or fears, point to the possibility of constructing
a different kind of national identity that can support conflict resolution.
The interaction with the other side also provided some relief from the fear
of annihilation, even though this fear reoccurred after having been allevi-
ated. This could be due to the threat posed to identity by the possibility
of resolving conflict. One major step in the interactive problem-solving
workshops was the reduction of mirror images reflected in the understand-
ing of the other’s needs and fears. This is in essence is a change in the self-
and other-perception to include the other’s self-perception in judging the
other. The examples are however rather weak. They do not contain any
direct negotiation of identity. This can, on the one hand, be interpreted as
evidence against the possibility or even necessity of identity negotiation.
Given the investment in conflict illustrated in section 4.4.2, on the other
hand, it may not be very surprising. The goal of conflict resolution efforts
is the sustained resolution of conflict. Judging by the history of many pro-
tracted ethnic conflicts and the identity use found here the question how
identity issues can and should be addressed in conflict resolution efforts
seems legitimate. I will present some suggestions in the next chapter.

Chapter 5
Conclusion
Social scientists can contribute significantly
through the reconceptualization of national
identity and the development of a
methodology for negotiating identity.
(Kelman, 1997b, p. 340)
My initial goal was very different from the results presented here. I
wanted to measure identity negotiation in a conflict resolution setting and
relate it to the quality of the outcome. I encountered several problems.
First, making the outcomes of conflict resolution measurable is difficult,
especially in the field of track-two diplomacy. As the workshops and sim-
ilar efforts are confidential meetings there is no direct reference to the
outcome of workshops in the “outside world”. Defining an outcome of
interactive problem-solving workshops was also not easy as many learn-
ing experiences happen during the process but do not translate directly
into a specific outcome. This is reflected in the fact that the positive uses
of identity found in section 4.4.3 occur both at the relative beginning and
end of workshops. This can be related on the one hand to the protracted
nature of the conflict, which makes any kind of conflict resolution effort
difficult. On the other hand, the setting itself does not endorse finding a
specific solution but rather aims at providing a space that allows partici-
pants to explore new avenues of thinking. Second, it was not clear to me
how to evaluate the identity uses within the workshop settings (see sec-
tions 2.5, 3.3 and 4.2.3). Looking back, this is partly due to the lack of
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theoretical clarity in the existing literature on the role of identity in conflict
and conflict resolution. On the one hand, national identity in protracted
conflict, while considered to be very important, is mostly regarded as non-
negotiable by the conflict parties. On the other hand, national identity in
the experimental tradition of social identity theory, which focuses on the
use of identity, is considered just one of many possibly salient identities
as Brown (2000, p. 761) acknowledges when stating: “It seems to me that
an important step for SIT to take is to incorporate these central dimen-
sions of group diversity and no longer assume that a group is a group as
far as key social psychological mechanisms are concerned.” Influenced
by my experience in participating in a problem-solving workshop I also
intended to conduct my own workshops to test the outcome of interactive
problem-solving workshops and test the usefulness of different interven-
tions. This focus on applying theory to further conflict resolution may
explain the focus in the dissertation on possible useful interventions. This
project proved to be too ambitious however, given the difficulties men-
tioned above.
To tackle the problems while using the data from interactive problem-
solving workshops at hand I decided to follow a grounded theory approach
in analyzing identity negotiation. This methodology itself has had an im-
portant impact on the results of this study. Grounded theory is not pri-
marily concerned with testing hypotheses. The goal is to develop a new
theoretical understanding while keeping that understanding grounded in
the analysis of data. This dissertation does therefore not provide empiri-
cal evidence that identity negotiation is necessary for successful conflict
resolution. Nor does it show that an explicit focus on national identity in
an interactive problem-solving setting improves the outcome of conflict
resolution efforts. In the process of theory development grounded in data
the biggest hurdle was the separation between functional use of identity
and the (important) content of the discussions. This seemed to be neces-
sary in order to present a clear picture of the role of identity in conflict
resolution. The interactions between Israelis and Palestinians (presented
in sections 4.1 to 4.3) informed me in developing my theoretical view on
the role of identity in conflict (as presented in chapter 2) and that view in
turn helped me provide examples of identity use in interactive problem-
solving workshops (see section 4.4).
National identity or nationalism is usually seen as an evil that may
partly be responsible for the existence of conflict and should by all means
be avoided in conflict resolution. Kelman (1997a, p. 216), while repeat-
ing this position, also points to another aspect of identity that becomes
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visible in conflict resolution workshops: “Participants’ interactions in the
group context often reflect the nature of the relationship between their
communities—their mutual distrust, their special sensitivities and vulner-
abilities, their differences in power and minority–majority status—and
demonstrate the self-perpetuating character of interactions among con-
flicting societies.” I have provided examples from workshops that sup-
port the observation that identity is in use during the interactive problem-
solving workshops in section 4.4. In addition I have provided a theoretical
argument in chapter 2 why the typical adversarial interactions seem to be
self-perpetuating. The adversarial interactions can be related to the in-
vestment described in sections 2.1 to 2.3 that conflict requires. In order
to sustain conflict both parties have developed negatively interdependent
identities that allow the derogation of the other and the legitimization of
the ingroup’s claim in the conflict. The examples in section 4.4.2 highlight
the negative interdependence. One can see the derogation of the other and
the moral justification for one’s claims.
Following the theoretical ideas presented in chapter 2 a resolution ef-
fort without a change in identity will threaten the very existence of the
national group as important aspects of the current identity directly con-
tradict conflict resolution. Kelman (1999, p. 591) highlights this point
when he states that “the long history of systematic nonrecognition makes
it clear why the Oslo agreement, despite its many limitations, represented
an important turning point in the conflict”. While the Oslo agreement was
a positive step, the question remains why the agreement has more or less
failed to ameliorate the current situation between Israelis and Palestini-
ans. Among many other reasons, which relate to the specific nature of
the agreement, I believe that their has not been sufficient work on chang-
ing the national identities of both parties. Identities still support conflict
and not conflict resolution. While the investment of identity in conflict
is clearly visible in chapter 4, the interactive problem solving approach
does allow for positive uses of identity to develop. Those positive uses in-
clude, among others, focusing on commonalities, the expression of shared
needs and disagreeing with ingroup members. As can be seen from the
results a focus on identity provides an important point of view on conflict
resolution efforts. Identity can be regarded as a big obstacle in resolv-
ing conflict. However trying to remove identity from a conflict resolution
equation does not seem to be helpful either. The interactive problem-
solving workshops are a positive framework for conflict resolution but it
seems that the approach has currently limitations when dealing with the
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solutions developed by participants and the perceived threat to the core of
identity that these can present.
The theoretical ideas developed, also have some implications for track-
two diplomacy efforts: If identity is involved in supporting conflict, why
do we not directly challenge participants’ self-perception in order to bring
out the role of identity? What is the potential harm of such an action?
It may increase the reluctance of participants to sit down with the other
side and therefore jeopardize the conflict resolution effort. But a direct or
implicit threat to a participant’s national identity within a workshop may
go unaddressed and especially unresolved in the current framework. This
threat may also jeopardize the process. The third party should be mind-
ful of identity issues and use their knowledge to reduce threats to identity
by directly addressing self-perceptions. This involves the risk that both
sides begin arguing about who is “right” and whose historical narrative
is “correct”. Such a discussion could be reframed by the third party as a
possible departure point of reconciliation. I believe that the addition of a
process of explicit identity negotiation, while posing risks, may facilitate
changing one’s own self-perception towards an identity that is less depen-
dent on the other. One may think of this as a process of “disarming” the
respective identities of the parties that have been put into place in order to
sustain the conflict up to now. But as with other disarmaments it is very
helpful to synchronize the process with the opposing side. This is why I
propose such a focus on identity to be included in the framework of in-
teractive problem-solving workshops. Kelman (1997a, 1999) has already
argued that the interactive problem solving approach aims at facilitating
changes in peripheral parts of the participants’ identity. I believe that,
while accommodating the other on the periphery of one’s identity is an
important step in building a working trust between participants, address-
ing the national identities directly can provide a very different push for
conflict resolution. Such an intervention could take the form of a step in
the agenda that focuses explicitly on self- and other-perception at the ta-
ble. It could also be framed as an intervention that takes place in a caucus
of both groups during the weekend from which both groups present their
findings to the other side. This would make it possible for both parties
to see the changes in self-perception on the other side and facilitate their
own process. In addition the framework of the workshop would provide
an opportunity for the initial change in identity to bear fruits in creative
solutions to the conflict.
This brings me to future research that should be conducted. As the cur-
rent study is based solely on data from the Palestinian-Israeli conflict other
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conflicts should be examined to test the applicability of my suggestions to
protracted ethnic conflicts in general. An analysis of different conflicts
with regard to the uses of identity, presented here with examples, could
be a first step. Measuring different identity uses and comparing quantita-
tive data will also provide a clearer picture for further studies. There are,
in my view, two distinctly different avenues for further research. The first
avenue focuses on experimental research to evaluate the theoretical ideas
developed in chapter 2. To test the argument that conflict leads, through
the necessary investment, to a rigid identity, one should test the rigid-
ity of national identities in societies involved in protracted ethnic conflict
(“conflict societies”) and compare it to national identities in societies not
involved in protracted ethnic conflict (“non-conflict societies”). A com-
parison of the inclusion of self- and other-stereotypes, derogation of the
outgroup and moral justifications in the description of national identity by
members of “conflict societies” and “non-conflict societies” would be an
indicator if conflict requires the kind of investment outlined in section 2.1.
A comparison of uses of social identity in protracted ethnic conflict to the
use of social identity in other group conflicts would be useful to determine
the importance of the content of social identity with regard to it’s effects
on group members. The second avenue focuses on the improvement of
conflict resolution efforts, specifically the interactive problem solving ap-
proach. The most important step seems to be the development of outcome
measures for conflict resolution efforts. One possible way to achieve this
could be through the use of questionnaires asking participants to describe
and judge the outcome of a conflict resolution effort. This should probably
occur directly, 6 months and a year after the workshops, as the judgement
may change over time. A difficulty in this endeavor is clearly the confi-
dentiality of the workshops and the different status of the conflict groups.
While it may be relatively easy to get feedback from the high status group,
the low status group is more likely to refuse to participate in this kind of
study. A second step would be testing different interventions as described
above. These interventions should take the form of creating a caucus for
the discussion of national identity and directly addressing the issue in the
presence of both conflict parties. Given the hypothesized risks associated
with the interventions specific safeguards need to be developed and put
into place. A method to judge differences in outcome and identity use
also needs to be developed. The theoretical ideas in chapter 2 can provide
guidance here. In addition it could be informative to compare the national
identity expressions in protracted conflicts with the current identity ex-
pressions in successful conflict resolution efforts, such as South Africa.
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An analysis of change of national identity expression during the resolu-
tion of conflict could also provide important theoretical insight into the
role of identity in conflict and an indicator for the relationship between
identity change and conflict resolution.
One last aspect, absent from the theoretical analysis, I would like to
mention is the role of leaders in conflict. The above ideas on the role
of identity in conflict do suggest implications for leaders’ use of national
identity. First, national identity is a powerful tool as it allows leaders
to exert a lot of power. Second, the essentialized perception of national
identity is helpful in claiming legitimacy and self-evidence for a political
agenda. Third, conflict has a strong impact on the flexibility of national
identity. As easy as it may be to lead a group into a protracted conflict, as
difficult it may be to lead a group into conflict resolution. The, mostly un-
conscious, options for linking a political project to national identity have
been drastically reduced by conflict. This may go as far as effectively
associating any kind of sustained conflict resolution with a threat to the
core of a national identity. Any leader attempting to mobilize support
for conflict resolution would therefore be well advised to critically reflect
on the constraints that the current national identity imposes on thinking
about conflict resolution. This kind of reflection can provide new and
creative ideas on how to use the power and legitimacy associated with
national identity for conflict resolution. As the interactive problem solv-
ing approach addresses influential members and would-be leaders of con-
flict groups it seems to be an ideal place to inform participants about the
constraints identity can put on their thinking. The group of participants
selected for interactive problem-solving workshops seems to be at an in-
terface between the general ideas on identity in conflict societies and the
specific role of leaders in developing identity projects. Their actions and
thoughts on the issue may be of interest to researchers studying the role
of leadership in conflict or conflict resolution.
Appendix A
Frequencies
In order to get an overview of what might happen in workshops and to get
some way to select from the large number of workshops at my disposal I
looked for different keywords and their frequency of mention in the work-
shops I had access to. The first three items in table A.1 on page 139 re-
fer to United Nations Security Council’s resolutions 181, 242 and 338.
These are UN resolutions with regard to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
UN resolution 181 is the partition plan for the British mandate territory
of Palestine. It was adopted in 1947. UN resolution 242 was adopted in
1967 after the Six Day war. It calls for “the withdrawal of Israeli armed
forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict” (Resolution 242,
1967) and the termination of all hostilities. It also calls for the recognition
of Israel, Egypt, Syria, and Jordan by each other and it calls for the es-
tablishment of peace and secure and recognized boundaries for all parties.
UN resolution 338 was adopted in 1973 and called for the end of the Yom
Kippur war and the implementation of resolution 242. It also called for
an immediate beginning of negotiations between “the parties concerned
under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace
in the Middle East” (Resolution 338, 1973). Similarly, the other keywords
were selected on the basis of my understanding of and experience with the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. I selected keywords that could reflect differ-
ent facets of the conflict that might surface in problem-solving workshops,
such as, for example, discussions of nationalism, a two-state solution, the
role of Jerusalem, the involvement of Arab nations in the conflict, the role
of security concerns and issues of peace and perceived threat.
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A few words should explain some notations in table A.1. For the en-
try “arabi*” any word beginning with this string was counted. Numbers in
parentheses specify the count of the keyword version mentioned in paren-
theses at the beginning of the line, while the regular count includes this
version and all others. When comparing frequencies across workshops
one needs to take into account the total number of keywords for a work-
shop as these differ widely between workshops (within a range of 1297
– 2135 words). Distributions of keywords differ across the workshops.
“Intifada” is one keyword which could only occur beginning in the 1989
workshop as this was the first year in which this phenomenon existed
on the ground. Similarly “Oslo” was mentioned only beginning in the
1995 workshop, which was the first workshop that took place after the
Oslo accords of 1993. Looking at the frequencies the choice of the work-
shops from 1989, 1992 and 1995 as material for further analysis seems
to adequately represent the diversity contained in the workshops, even if
“Zionism” seems to be somewhat underrepresented in these workshops
compared to the workshops not chosen for further analysis. Also note-
worthy is the frequent use of “Holocaust” in the 1988 workshop. But the
overall count of the three chosen workshops is comparable to the other
workshops and keeping to a three year rhythm between workshops should
also somewhat reduce a selection bias. This selection bias would prob-
ably have been larger if I had chosen workshops to code further solely
on the basis of the frequencies of certain keywords or solely on my first
impression after reading them.
135
Ta
bl
e
A
.1
:F
re
qu
en
ci
es
of
ke
yw
or
ds
in
Is
ra
el
i-
Pa
le
st
in
ia
n
w
or
ks
ho
ps
19
83
19
84
19
86
19
87
19
88
19
89
19
92
19
93
19
95
19
96
19
99
18
1
0
0
2
4
1
0
0
1
0
0
3
24
2
0
0
0
19
12
7
0
1
3
0
8
33
8
0
0
0
0
0
4
0
0
0
0
4
Je
ru
sa
le
m
18
36
31
6
3
21
40
42
15
3
24
68
se
cu
ri
ty
7
9
49
38
18
55
15
6
53
28
26
59
se
ttl
em
en
t
1
20
12
12
6
16
18
11
5
4
21
se
ttl
em
en
ts
12
17
8
12
8
5
37
12
22
10
79
re
fu
ge
e
14
2
2
3
8
14
6
7
18
40
51
In
tif
ad
a
0
0
0
0
0
59
16
12
6
6
5
ri
gh
to
fr
et
ur
n
0
0
2
1
0
12
10
7
41
1
14
la
w
of
re
tu
rn
3
0
1
1
6
0
2
9
0
0
2
je
w
is
h
22
38
16
17
37
14
37
36
31
6
54
je
w
is
hn
es
s
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
3
Z
io
ni
sm
33
6
5
25
21
0
9
22
0
0
3
Z
io
ni
st
33
9
12
11
11
4
3
12
3
4
5
A
ra
f a
t
16
17
78
49
15
46
1
27
68
58
35
no
n-
st
ar
te
r
0
0
1
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
4
oc
cu
pi
ed
8
2
16
1
11
23
14
17
7
7
8
th
re
at
1
19
1
13
18
7
21
8
5
1
3
th
re
at
en
2
7
5
3
6
7
7
2
3
0
4
pe
ac
e
13
2
85
13
6
11
3
47
51
54
51
72
16
6
11
0
pe
ac
ef
ul
4
11
20
6
1
4
20
0
3
2
3
136 Frequencies
Ta
bl
e
A
.1
:F
re
qu
en
ci
es
of
ke
yw
or
ds
in
Is
ra
el
i-
Pa
le
st
in
ia
n
w
or
ks
ho
ps
19
83
19
84
19
86
19
87
19
88
19
89
19
92
19
93
19
95
19
96
19
99
id
en
tit
y
9
10
16
5
9
8
22
31
7
13
9
id
en
tif
y
6
2
2
2
4
7
8
8
2
5
3
na
tio
n
3
20
28
8
29
7
25
19
7
26
5
na
tio
na
l
9
26
14
14
12
6
42
41
8
4
7
bi
-n
at
io
na
l
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
3
na
tio
na
lis
m
2
5
19
8
3
8
14
18
1
2
3
na
tio
na
lis
tic
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
st
at
e
11
0
82
80
14
5
20
4
12
2
13
4
18
9
86
14
1
20
9
st
at
eh
oo
d
0
4
9
9
2
0
13
7
0
0
2
A
ra
b
st
at
es
2
3
0
1
6
4
16
11
0
3
0
A
ra
b
70
70
40
50
79
75
13
1
71
36
51
14
P a
le
st
in
ia
n
st
at
e
47
15
15
29
23
39
35
78
20
20
25
je
w
is
h
st
at
e
2
10
1
2
9
5
12
0
5
0
28
Is
ra
el
27
5
13
6
20
1
17
0
21
3
21
2
17
8
20
6
16
0
11
7
18
3
Is
ra
el
i
19
4
87
95
72
12
9
17
2
14
0
17
6
14
3
15
6
15
4
Is
ra
el
is
13
1
73
55
96
15
6
16
8
14
1
15
4
12
9
11
3
13
5
P a
le
st
in
ia
n
16
4
97
15
3
11
4
10
5
16
0
14
7
25
8
16
1
14
6
21
1
Pa
le
st
in
ia
ns
18
2
14
2
11
5
13
3
18
2
23
9
25
6
17
7
26
9
17
3
25
0
H
ol
oc
au
st
0
6
0
7
43
3
0
8
3
7
16
bl
am
e
6
1
1
4
4
0
1
1
4
3
6
ha
te
0
5
0
1
3
7
0
3
4
13
15
Sa
m
ar
ia
0
0
1
1
1
3
1
0
0
0
6
137
Ta
bl
e
A
.1
:F
re
qu
en
ci
es
of
ke
yw
or
ds
in
Is
ra
el
i-
Pa
le
st
in
ia
n
w
or
ks
ho
ps
19
83
19
84
19
86
19
87
19
88
19
89
19
92
19
93
19
95
19
96
19
99
Ju
de
a
0
0
1
1
2
3
1
0
0
0
7
W
es
tB
an
k
11
8
63
34
54
57
28
31
58
31
22
52
G
az
a
10
1
19
10
12
15
14
31
85
25
29
U
S
16
7
28
27
18
47
4
27
12
5
7
U
N
3
1
23
6
9
14
5
25
3
0
4
A
m
er
ic
an
(p
l.)
19
(7
)
11
9
(2
)
18
(3
)
14
(7
)
18
(7
)
7
(2
)
8
(2
)
11
(1
)
7
(3
)
5
B
ri
tis
h
1
2
1
3
4
0
0
4
8
1
1
PL
O
10
4
76
15
5
12
7
90
12
0
46
75
42
1
4
H
am
as
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
27
20
26
6
H
eb
re
w
19
2
7
6
14
3
0
4
5
2
10
ar
ab
i*
(S
au
di
)
18
(4
)
8
1
8
(1
)
9
2
13
(4
)
8
(2
)
4
(1
)
4
5
Is
la
m
1
1
0
1
0
0
0
1
11
0
1
is
la
m
ic
(J
ih
ad
)
0
1
1
1
0
2
6
(1
)
5
26
(3
)
3
0
un
ite
d
(U
S)
2
6
(5
)
6
(3
)
3
1
(1
)
3
4
(1
)
0
2
(2
)
1
(1
)
1
(1
)
O
sl
o
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
12
34
34
co
nfi
de
nc
e
1
2
0
3
1
4
1
9
8
2
1
co
nfi
de
nc
e
bu
ild
in
g
0
0
1
2
0
2
1
8
2
4
1
te
rr
or
0
4
1
4
0
0
1
8
6
1
0
te
rr
or
is
t
1
0
1
3
2
4
8
7
8
3
11
te
rr
or
is
ts
0
0
0
0
2
5
4
1
5
2
3
te
rr
or
is
m
2
11
0
13
1
13
16
0
22
1
11
te
rr
or
is
tic
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
138 Frequencies
Ta
bl
e
A
.1
:F
re
qu
en
ci
es
of
ke
yw
or
ds
in
Is
ra
el
i-
Pa
le
st
in
ia
n
w
or
ks
ho
ps
19
83
19
84
19
86
19
87
19
88
19
89
19
92
19
93
19
95
19
96
19
99
su
ic
id
e
0
0
2
3
0
0
0
1
2
1
6
fr
ee
do
m
12
2
1
1
1
1
2
2
8
4
2
fig
ht
er
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
re
si
st
0
1
0
1
2
0
2
0
1
0
1
re
si
st
an
ce
2
4
0
1
1
2
1
2
3
2
0
sa
fe
pa
ss
ag
e
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
3
6
m
ili
ta
ri
ze
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
de
m
ili
ta
ri
ze
1
1
2
1
1
7
1
4
0
0
0
A
cc
or
d
0
1
4
0
0
0
2
1
3
0
0
ag
re
em
en
t (
pl
.)
41
(1
)
23
(1
)
69
(5
)
24
(1
)
31
(1
)
34
(3
)
36
(3
)
61
(3
)
11
1
(1
)
10
7
(4
)
74
(1
2)
di
sa
gr
ee
m
en
t
12
1
14
2
1
3
1
1
3
5
9
br
ak
e/
br
ok
e
3
4
1
0
8
2
1
2
1
0
2
in
to
th
e
se
a
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
2
1
tr
us
t
20
12
8
11
1
21
26
12
19
29
58
m
is
tr
us
t
4
3
1
2
0
9
1
6
1
4
8
di
st
ru
st
0
0
1
6
0
6
0
1
6
3
0
in
se
cu
ri
ty
2
2
0
2
1
0
1
3
0
1
1
id
en
tifi
ca
tio
n
2
0
1
2
0
0
0
2
1
1
0
re
se
ttl
em
en
t
0
0
0
1
0
5
1
0
0
0
0
na
tio
na
lis
t
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
4
0
1
0
br
ok
er
(a
ge
)
0
2
0
0
0
3
0
0
0
0
0
139
Ta
bl
e
A
.1
:F
re
qu
en
ci
es
of
ke
yw
or
ds
in
Is
ra
el
i-
Pa
le
st
in
ia
n
w
or
ks
ho
ps
19
83
19
84
19
86
19
87
19
88
19
89
19
92
19
93
19
95
19
96
19
99
∑ 1
18
84
12
97
16
19
15
19
16
89
19
22
19
45
21
07
19
72
16
34
21
35
1 D
oe
s n
ot
in
cl
ud
e
th
e
ite
m
s“
Pa
le
st
in
ia
n
st
at
e”
,“
je
w
is
h
st
at
e”
an
d
“A
ra
b
st
at
es
”
as
th
ei
rc
ou
nt
is
al
re
ad
y
co
nt
ai
ne
d
in
th
e
ite
m
s“
st
at
e’
,“
Pa
le
st
in
ia
n”
,
“J
ew
is
h”
an
d
“A
ra
b”
;i
ta
ls
o
do
es
no
ti
nc
lu
de
th
e
ite
m
“S
am
ar
ia
”
as
it
on
ly
oc
cu
rs
in
co
nj
un
ct
io
n
w
ith
“J
ud
ea
”.
Appendix B
Needs and fears
To look at similarities and differences across time I collected the lists of
needs and fears that the participants produced in some of the workshops
during the Saturday sessions. The same superscript (e.g. a) for one of the
groups corresponds to the same need in different workshops in order to
facilitate understanding the explanation given in section 4.2.2 on page 82.
The superscripts are not directly comparable between groups. All lists
have been produced by the participants of the workshops and have been
preserved in their original formatting.
B.1 1984
Israeli needs/concerns 1984:
1. Recognition of Israela (as a legitimate state)
2. Fear of annihilationb (which is not sufficiently dealt with by military
security and can only be addressed by point 1)
3. Securityc: strong military as a defense against Arab states (which
raised the question of who needs to be involved in peace talks: Pa-
lestinians only or other Arab states, too) and need for a demilita-
rized West Bank (which might also serve as a “psychological proof”
for point 1 if things were to be stable in a demilitarized W-B during
an interim autonomy period)
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4. Feeling of urgency as the establishment of settlements is creating
dangerous facts on the ground
5. Need for a Jewish stated; seen as possibly opposed to a democratic
state due to the “demographic issue” (need to find solution)
6. Jerusalem as the capitale of Israel.
Palestinian needs/concerns:
1. Nationhooda and statehood; closely related to a fear of and concern
about statelessness and its practical implications; PLO as
representativeb of Palestinians
2. Fear of extinction (related to statelessness, being absorbed or dis-
persed. . . )
3. Urgency in solving the conflict because of the day-to-day sufferingc
4. Concerned with the expansion/building of settlementsd; West Bank
is becoming an extension of urban Israel; Settlements need to go
5. East Jerusaleme must be the Palestinian capital
6. Ability to allow immigration (i.e. right of return)f , also for Israeli
settlers who would like to stay in/return to their settlements in a
Palestinian state
7. Need for securityg (this is linked to recognition by the Israelis)
B.2 1992
Palestinian needs/concerns 1992:
1. Right for existence, recognition, nationhooda
2. The issue of the Palestinian diaspora must be addressed (defining
the “right of return”f ); in this context the need for the acceptance
of the PLO as representativesb of the Palestinian people by Israel
was brought up
3. Occupation needs to end, establish security for Palestinians; “civil
human rights”c
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4. Israel’s nuclear weaponsg were perceived as special threat to Pales-
tinians
5. The building of settlementsd and land exploration need to be halted
6. There needs to be a link between the West Bank and Gaza, but this
illuminates the fear of Palestinian dependency on Israel.
7. Jerusaleme: capital of a Palestinian state, access from the West
Bank without dependency on Israel
8. “Long-term” concerns: distribution of water, great economic de-
pendence on Israel, tax system, demographic issues such as too few
and underfunded schools and universities
Israeli needs/concerns:
1. Securityc (Palestinian question what does it mean? Example Sa-
dat’s acknowledgment of Israel’s right to exist and return of Sinai;
see below):
• Military security: to be strong enough to defend oneself against
aggressors
• Political security: safety from terrorist attacks (not only Pa-
lestinian but Lebanon, Syria. . . )
2. Acknowledgementa, acceptance, inclusion in the region, relates to
3. Comprehensive peace
4. Fear of and need to deal with internal strifeb
5. Need for Israel to be a Jewish stated; includes the “demographic
issue” and the need for a more positive view of Zionism (no longer
equated to racism) from the outside (i.e. Arab countries)
6. Jerusalem as the capitale of Israel; “non-negotiable”, no possibility
of division, maybe joint sovereignty in East Jerusalem; Internation-
alization of Jerusalem seems contradictory to the idea of being the
capital of Israel
B.3 1993 143
B.3 1993
Israeli needs/concerns 1993:
1. Securityc:
(a) Objective: Need for a strong army (protection against Iran and
others. . . )
(b) Subjective: Linked to the Holocaust experience, “Israel was
created by people escaping persecution”, importance of Sa-
dat’s visit enabling Israel to return Sinai
2. Fear of losing securityb, homeland, everything (concerned about
“pure” survival)
3. Need to preserve national identity/ability to live as a Jewd
4. Need for recognitiona of Israel and Zionism as legitimate not only
by Palestinians but by all Arab countries
5. Concern about monetary support of a possible Palestinian state
6. Concerned with the territorial split between the West Bank and
Gaza (how to deal with it, where and how will a Palestinian state
exist?)
Palestinian needs/concerns:
1. Israeli state was established at the expense of the Palestinian people:
(a) no place for Zionism
(b) Palestinian sufferingc needs to be acknowledged
2. Concerned about the asymmetry in the relationship: perception of
Israel as very powerfulg and backed by the West, not as a small state
surrounded by enemies (as Israelis point out)
3. Fear that Israel has no intention of giving up the territories (rein-
forced by settlements)d
4. Fear that Israelis think that Palestinians should not be “here” and
will disappear over time (need for recognition, legitimacy; also
urgency)a
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5. Concerned that there is no international pressure to hold Israel to
any promise given (US as pro-Israel); may lead to token autonomy,
taken away by Israel after the first disturbance
6. Need for Israel to recognize the PLO as representing the Palestiniansb
B.4 1999
Israeli needs/concerns:
1. State for Jewsd
(a) No return of Palestinian refugees to Israel proper
(b) Politically separated entitya
(c) Right of return for Jews
2. Securityc
• Personal
• Of the state
3. Long term/strategic commitment to peace from the Palestinian’s
side
• Finality and acceptance
• Concern regarding the lack of trust in Palestineb
4. Cooperation with Palestinians across boundaries
• Quick response to acts of terrorism
• Vocal non-partisan Palestinians
Palestinian needs/concerns:
1. Independent statea
• Abolishment of all settlementsd in West Bank and Gaza
• Withdrawal from occupied territoriesc
• Unity of Land: territorial continuity between West Bank and
Gaza
• Metropolitan Jerusaleme: religious/political
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2. Securityg
• On a personal level
• For the state
3. Admission of responsibility and compensation for wrongdoing to
Palestinians, including 1948 to present.
• Right of returnf for all refugees with compensation
4. Economic viability
5. Trust that the Israeli Government will fulfill political agreements
• That Israel gives up claim to Palestine land
• Assurance of long term/Finality
• Change of terminology (“giving up”)
• Release of prisoners of war
Appendix C
Codes for 1992
The following statements are further examples of text passages that de-
veloped into theoretical codes as described in section 4.2.3 on page 83.
Annotations in brackets after the quotation such as “(ARABS)” signify
that this statement can also be attributed to a second code, in this case
“Arabs, being part of the Middle East”.
C.1 Examples of Israeli statements
With regard to a Palestinian state:
• Self:
“Accepting a Palestinian state is acquiescing to you.”
“For us it is another stage in the struggle for our survival.”
“Much less opposition that you would imagine. . . many Israelis agree
to some kind of Palestinian entity.”
“The Labor party acknowledges it [Palestinian national rights]”.
• Other:
“For you it is the end of your struggle.”
“[Palestinians] never address brining in the other Arab states. . . they
do not seem to face the feeling in Israel that this will not solve our
problems.” (ARABS)
• Relations to each other:
“You have everything to gain. . . we have only to lose except we have
peace to gain.” (POWER)
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Power:
• Self:
“We have the physical power.”
“We have only to lose except we have peace to gain.”
“We can deal with the present lack of peace because we have a
strong army.”
• Other:
“You have everything to gain.”
Time:
• Relations to each other:
“Your sense of urgency parallels our need to delay.” (STATE)
Threat:
• Self:
“This is an important point that it will take generations (to neutralize
emotions). We are still cautious about that. That still you don’t
respect us.”
“Israel feel they will never be acknowledged as part of the area.”
“We would like you to see us. Not as an European extension.”
• Other:
“Arabs simply don’t want Israel there on any terms.”
“If you want to live with us in peace. . . you have to prove that to
us.”
“[Palestinians] is another element in hostile environment.”
“[Palestinians] never address brining in the other Arab states. . . they
do not seem to face the feeling in Israel that this will not solve our
problems.”
“Is it not true that you want to get rid of us?”
“Have you been saying that Palestinians do not see settlements as
anything beyond colonialism?”
“On your side nobody acknowledges our right as a national move-
ment, to live there.”
“If you could stop seeing us as foreign. . . ”
“You have to acknowledge our roots are in the same region.”
“You have gotten back your pride. . . ” (with regard to the Intifada)
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• Relations to each other:
“. . . we are Jews who created our own homeland because we think
we have the right. It is the same for you.”
“You can argue till the 21st century that we are Europeans. But we
are not European from our point of view.”
Peace:
• Self:
“If peace with Palestinians will bring us peace with all other Arab
nations then this is what we have to gain from it. . . this is all we
have to gain.” (ALSO ARABS)
“We acknowledge your right [to land].”
“Our recognition is part of the deal.”
• Other:
“What I understood is the right for Jews to that land is no more
than the colonialists rights to that land. Do you recognize anything
more?”
Responsibility:
• Self:
“People say in different degrees that we have done injustices.”
“I think of myself as someone on the left, who would like to see
justice done.”
“We must apologize and it is not pragmatic. . . it is not viable. . . in
terms of the Israeli public.”
“I think there are a lot of Israelis who. . . feel guilt, shame, a sense
of wanting to repose or help. . . ”
• Other:
“Arab nations will have to be responsible. This is fundamental is-
sue.”
“A lot of Israelis feel that they are the ones who should be apolo-
gized to not the Palestinians.”
• Relations to each other:
“This [injustice done] is not in dispute, what comes through to us is
that you want to get rid of us.” (THREAT)
“If you want us to go beyond pragmatism this will lead us beyond
it more toward apology.” (to third party)
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Arabs, being part of the Middle East:
• Self:
“Israel doesn’t feel that Palestine is only issue.”
“Some of us see the Palestinian state as just one more stage in the
struggle of Arabs to get rid of us.”
“We are trying to reorientalize ourselves.”
“Israel feel they will never be acknowledged as part of the area.”
“I am saying we have a historical connection to you and the Arab
people. It is not a new relationship.”
• Other:
“Our enemies have always been the Arabs.”
“The main hindrance is the state of Israel not being a part of the
Middle East.”
For Israelis there is a strong link of the Palestinian issue with Arabs.
C.2 Palestinian statements
With regard to a Palestinian state:
• Self:
“Nobody gave you a state except yourself [you struggled]. . . nobody
else. Nobody else can tell us except us.”
• Other:
“Give me an example of who acknowledges Palestinian national
rights.”
“There is no political organization that acknowledges our national
existence.”
Power:
• Self:
“Palestinians feel that we are not able to speak or act for all the Arab
states.”
• Other:
“Is it Israeli public opinion that we have this kind of power?”
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Time:
• Self:
“There is no acknowledgment among Arabs your right to take over
Palestine. This is the past.”
“Now the reality is, Israelis are there.”
“We are losing everyday.”
“We have little time.”
Threat:
• Self:
“Until such guilt is dealt with Palestinians will remain hostile.”
“I don’t deny the Palestinian hostility.”
“. . . at the same time Palestinians feel terribly victimized.”
“If we hear talk like that [apology] both publicly and privately. . . that
will go a long way to decrease the hostility among Palestinians.”
“Jewish immigrants were not wanted from the start.”
“It was seen as an extension of the supremacy of Europe.”
“There is no acknowledgment among Arabs your right to take over
Palestine.”
“When you talk about the population and their rights it is different
[from above]. Among the Palestinians, despite all animosity in his-
tory, there is a humane belief that people born in Israel belongs to
these people.”
“Israelis who have been born and raised there, it is a different story.”
“It does not mean that they are accepted as a desirable presence.”
“The point is a different attitude from the past it is more than an
acknowledgement of the reality but a right we do not like to see but
it is there.”
• Other:
“Why do you feel the Arabs want to fight Israel?”
“Israel feel threatened, this is a genuine feeling. . . ”
“The only thing we get from you is occupation.”
“There are planes over our camps. . . you came to our land.”
“Building settlements on this land will lead to more frustration.”
“Without solving this issue [Palestinians], you cannot be part of the
region.”
“You are the enemy.”
“What have Arabs seen coming from you? What have you con-
tributed [to the region]?”
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• Relations to each other:
“Israel feel threatened, this is a genuine feeling, at the same time
Palestinians feel terribly victimized.”
“The only thing we get from you is occupation.” (PEACE, RE-
SPONSIBILITY)
“Building settlements on this land will lead to more frustration.”
(RESPONSIBILITY)
Peace:
• Self:
“We might learn to live with reality but to neutralize emotions [with
regard to the supremacy of Europe] takes two generations at least.”
“Maybe Palestinians will be willing to work with you if there is
land.”
“There is no acknowledgement [of the Israeli right to the land]. I
don’t see any Palestinian or Arab who sees it as a right.”
“I feel it is not really important our historic rights or to analyze
history, but to be able to live with each other.”
“Options are really only two, first is killing each other or hugging
each other.”
“We don’t have to hug each other to recognize our rights.”
• Other:
“You are a reality.”
“You made the reality your hard work. You won’t include the Pa-
lestinians in it.”
“Palestinians accept that reality.”
Responsibility:
• Self:
“We don’t feel [our feelings] acknowledged by the Israelis. . . ”
“I do not understand why you want me to tell you that I feel good
about you [existence of Israel].”
• Other:
“Is there any sense in Israel that they owe an apology to the Pales-
tinian people?”
“Until such guilt is dealt with Palestinians will remain hostile.
“. . . to acknowledge that Palestinians lost in a very real
human sense. . . ”
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“If we hear talk like that [apology] both publicly and privately. . . that
will go a long way to decrease the hostility among Palestinians.”
“You took our land, Palestine, and want to build trust without giving
the Palestinians a stake in that trust?”
Arabs, being part of the Middle East:
• Self:
“Palestinians feel that we are not able to speak or act for all the Arab
states.”
“There is no acknowledgment among Arabs your right to take over
Palestine. This is the past.”
“Jewish immigrants were not wanted from the start.”
“It was seen as an extension of the supremacy of Europe.”
“There is no acknowledgement [of the Israeli right to the land]. I
don’t see any Palestinian or Arab who sees it as a right.”
• Other:
“Without solving this issue [Palestinians], you cannot be part of the
region.”
“You are the enemy.”
“What have Arabs seen coming from you? What have you con-
tributed [to the region]?”
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